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Abstract
This thesis proposes a new methodology for the integrated performance and reliability evaluation
of embedded fault-tolerant systems used in aircraft, space, tactical, and automotive applications.
This methodology uses a behavioral model of the system dynamics, similar to the ones used by con-
trol engineers when designing the control system, but incorporates additional artifacts to model the
failure behavior of the system components. These artifacts include component failure modes (and
associated failure rates) and how those failure modes affect the dynamic behavior of the compo-
nent. The methodology bases the system evaluation on the analysis of the dynamics of the different
configurations the system can reach after component failures occur. For each of the possible system
configurations, a performance evaluation of its dynamic behavior is carried out to check whether its
properties, e.g., accuracy, overshoot, or settling time, which are called performance metrics, meet
system requirements. Markov chains are used to model the stochastic process associated with the
different configurations that a system can adopt when failures occur. Reliability and unreliability
measures can be quantified, as well as probabilistic measures of performance, by merging the val-
ues of the performance metrics for each configuration and the system configuration probabilities
yielded by the corresponding Markov model. This methodology is not only used for system eval-
uation, but also for guiding the design process, and further optimization. Thus, within the context
of the new methodology, we define new importance measures to rank the contributions of model
parameters to system reliability and performance.
In order to support this methodology, we developed a MATLAB/SIMULINK@ tool, which also
provides a common environment with a common language for control engineers and reliability
engineers to develop fault-tolerant systems. We illustrate the use of the methodology and the capa-
bilities of the tool with two case-studies. The first one corresponds to the lateral-directional control
system of an advanced fighter aircraft. This case-study shows how the methodology can identify
weak points in the system design; and point out possible solutions to eliminate them; compare dif-
ferent architecture alternatives from different perspectives; and test different failure detection, iso-
lation, and reconfiguration (FDIR) techniques. This case-study also shows the effectiveness of the
MATLAB/SIMULINK® tool to analyze large and complex systems. The second case-study com-
pares two very different solutions to achieve fault-tolerance in a steer-by-wire (SbW) system. The
first solution is based on the replication of components; and the introduction of failure detection,
isolation, and reconfiguration mechanisms. In the second solution, a dissimilar backup mechanism
called brake-actuated steering (BAS), is used to achieve fault-tolerance rather than replicating each
component within the system. This case-study complements the flight control system one by show-
ing how the performance and MATLAB/SIMULINK@ tool can be used to compare very different
architectural approaches to achieve fault-tolerance; and therefore, how the methodology can be
used to choose the best design in terms of performance and reliability.
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Introduction
In this introductory chapter, we state the necessity of developing a new methodology for
analyzing the reliability and performance of fault-tolerant systems used in aircraft, space,
tactical, and automotive applications. In order to put this research in the appropriate con-
text, a review of classical reliability evaluation methodologies and tools is provided, as
well as some work relevant to this research. To facilitate the reading process, and highlight
the main contributions of this thesis, the chapter ends with a summary of the research,
in which the structure of the document and the main contributions of each chapter are
provided.
1.1 Problem Statement
The safety-critical/mission-critical nature of embedded systems used in aircraft, space,
tactical, and automotive applications, mandates that the systems' functionality for which
they are designed be performed even in the presence of component failures 1. Thus, safety-
critical/mission-critical systems must have the capability to adapt and compensate for
component failures in a planned, systematic way [3]. These types of adaptable systems are
known as fault-tolerant systems2 .
Designing an effective fault-tolerant system requires a through and comprehensive analy-
sis to fully understand and quantify potential failures and assess the effectiveness of failure
'According to Laprie [4], a failure occurs when the delivered service no longer complies with the agreed
description of the component's expected function and/or service.
2The concept of fault-tolerance was originally formulated by Avitignis in the field of computers [5]. How-
ever, the concept of fault-tolerant systems is much broader than the computer field. There are several examples
of fault-tolerant systems, e.g., aircraft, aerospace, defense, in which computers are just part of the system, but
there are other equally important components or subsystems, e.g., actuators, sensors, valves, or generators.
Therefore, we prefer the definition given in [3], which states fault-tolerance as the ability of a system to adapt
and compensate in a planned, systematic way to random failures of their components that can cause a system
failure.
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detection, isolation, and reconfiguration (FDIR) mechanisms. There are well-developed
techniques to support the reliability 3 evaluation of conventional systems (see section 1.2).
However, all these techniques can yield ambiguous and/or incomplete results as they
base the analysis on a qualitative description of the system's functionality. This functional
description describes how components and subsystems are interconnected to fulfill the
functions they are designed for, and may include how component failures can propagate
to other components through their interconnections and affect the system functionality
[6, 7, 8]. For conventional systems, this approach is valid, as it is possible to evaluate
how a system can fail to perform the function for which it was designed by using this
high-level qualitative system's functionality description. However, this is not the case for
large-complex systems or embedded software-intensive systems.
The introduction of software to control engineering systems results in increased flexibil-
ity in the design of fault-tolerant systems. With this flexibility it is possible to perform a
complete system reconfiguration to accommodate failures, i.e., not only compensate for
hardware failures by substituting for the failed elements, but also by reconfiguring the
control software 4 . However, as pointed out by Leveson in [9], the introduction of software
in engineering systems, and the large numbers of components and subsystems (and the
interconnections among these) has greatly increased the complexity of engineering sys-
tems. Thus, for large-complex systems or embedded software-intensive systems, typical of
fault-tolerant systems, the additional complexity introduced by:
" the software controlling (and reconfiguring) the system; and
" the large number of interconnected components
makes it nearly impossible to fully understand the system performance -and thus deter-
mine its reliability, in the presence of hardware failures or software malfunctions, by only
using a qualitative description of the system's functionality and components' failure be-
havior.
3There are different ways to define reliability. We will use the one given in [10], which states reliability as
the ability of an item to perform a required function under stated conditions for a stated period of time.
4To illustrate this, on its return to Earth on May 41h, 2002 from the International Space Station (ISS), a
Soyuz TMA-1 spacecraft recovered from a module failure by reconfiguring itself to perform a backup re-entry
maneuver known as ballistic mode [11]. The problem, which caused the Soyuz TMA-1 to perform the re-entry
in ballistic mode was a failure in the BUSP-M guidance system, which is necessary in order to carry out a
controlled re-entry. The system responded to this failure by engaging higher control functions to take the
BUSP-M system out of the control loop and convert to an entirely different (ballistic) re-entry mode.
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Therefore, the main goal of this thesis is to develop a new methodology to analyze the per-
formance and reliability of fault-tolerant systems; minimizing the subjectivity introduced
in the system analysis due to incompleteness of current modeling techniques. Thus, rather
than using a qualitative description of the system's functionality, this methodology uses
a model of the system dynamics plus additional features to model component failure be-
havior. These features include component failure modes (and associated failure rates) and
how these failure modes affect the behavior of the component. All reliability-related eval-
uation activities will be based on this quantitative system behavioral model, thus reducing
the possible ambiguity that always arises when using qualitative models to analyze system
reliability.
1.2 Background and Related Work
The IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical and Electronics Terms defines reliability as the abil-
ity of an item to perform a required function under stated conditions for a stated period
of time [10]. For a conventional system, with no redundancy or backup mechanism to ac-
count for component failures, it is natural to think that the system will deliver its function
only if all the components are operational. This is not the case in a fault-tolerant system,
which implements additional components and subsystems to account for component fail-
ures, thus delivering its function despite the presence of certain failures. Therefore, in
a fault-tolerant system, reliability will be dictated by the combinations of components at
any time. Furthermore, the ordering in which these combinations of failed components is
achieved may be important in some systems. Thus, the sequences of component failures
leading to system failure give a qualitative measure of system reliability. However, if a
quantitative measure of system reliability is required, knowing only the sequences of com-
ponent failures leading to system failure is not enough. Since the failure behavior of single
components is often modeled as a random process, i.e., the time to failure of the compo-
nent is regarded as random [6], it is natural to quantify system reliability as the probability
of the system delivering the function for which it was designed, for a period of time, e.g.,
system lifetime.
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1.2.1 State-of-the Art in Probabilistic System Reliability Evaluation
In this section, we present a thorough literature review of probabilistic system reliabil-
ity evaluation techniques; highlighting the attractive features of each technique to model
fault-tolerant systems reliability; but also pointing out its shortcomings. The use of each
technique is illustrated with an example. Additionally, the use of Markov chains for reli-
ability modeling is further illustrated with a case-study in Chapter 2. Discussions of ad-
vanced reliability evaluation techniques are also included, some of which are very relevant
to this research. This is the case for a technique called Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assess-
ment (DPRA), as we will further detail in Chapter 3, when we introduce the mathematical
framework of the methodology proposed in this thesis for the integrated performance and
reliability evaluation of fault-tolerant systems.
1.2.1.1 Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD)
System Model. This is a graphical representation of the system's structure function5 in
the form of a success-oriented network [6]. Thus, each component within the system is
represented by a two-terminal box. The components are connected through their termi-
nals to form a two-terminal network. Each component can be failed or non-failed. If the
component is non-failed then there is path between its two terminals, otherwise there is no
path. The system will fulfill its function (in the presence of component failures) whenever
there is a path between the two terminals of the network. If the system has more than one
function, and the necessary components to fulfill each function are different, then separate
RBDs will be developed for each function.
To illustrate how an RBD is developed, consider the parallel circuit for energy transmission
displayed in Fig. 1.1(a). Let's assume that the system function is to deliver a constant
output voltage V2 for an input voltage V. Let's assume that the components can only fail
open circuit. Then for the system to deliver its function, the existence of a path between
the circuit ends is necessary. Thus, the two electric lines Li and L2 will be represented
in parallel in the RBD, while the two busbars B1 and B2 will be represented as series
components. The resulting RBD is displayed in Fig. 1.1(b). Note that in this case, the
5The system structure function O(xi, X2, . ., XN) is a binary function, where each xi is an indicator variable
that takes value 0 when the component failure event associated with xi occurred and 1 otherwise (the associ-
ated component did not fail). The system structure function #(Xi, X2, . .., XN) will take value 1 whenever the
system is functional for a given (Xi, 2 . X.. N) and zero whenever the system failed.
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(a) Architecture functional description. (b) RBD for voltage V2 delivery.
Figure 1.1: Energy transmission circuit system functional description and reliability block diagram
model.
resulting RBD has a structure similar to the system functional description. This is usually
the case when modeling reliability of static networks, e.g., electric circuits with a fixed
structure..
Model Evaluation. System reliability is obtained by quantifying the probability of ex-
istence of a path between the RBD ends. As mentioned before, an RBD is a graphical
representation of the system's structure function. Thus, in order to build the structure
function associated with the system RBD, it is necessary to first compute the minimal cut-
sets6 . For the parallel circuit RBD example, Fig. 1.1(b), the minimal cut-sets are: {B 1 fails
open circuit}, {B 2 fails open circuit}, and {Li fails open circuit, L2 fails open circuit}. The
resulting structure function is given by:
$(xi, X2, X3, x4) = X1x2(x3 + X4 - x3x4) (1.1)
where x1 is the indicator variable associated to the {B 1 fails open circuit} event, x2 is the
indicator variable associated to the {B 2 fails open circuit} event, X3 is the indicator variable
associated to the {Li fails open circuit} event, and x4 is the indicator variable associated
to the {L 2 fails open circuit} event. Then, the system reliability R can be computed as the
expectation of the structure function [6]. By assuming independence of the simple events:
R = E[0(x1, x 2 , X3 , x 4)] =
P(xi = 1)P(x2 = 1)P(X3 = 1) + P(x1 = 1)P(x2 = 1)P(x4 = 1) -
P(x1 = 1)P(x2 = 1)P(x3 = 1)P(x4 = 1). (1.2)
If the time to occurrence of each simple event is considered to be exponentially distributed,
then the system reliability can be computed as a function of time t. Let \ be the rate of
6A minimal cut-set is defined as a minimal-size set of simple events that cuts any path between the RBD
ends [6]. Minimal-size implies that any set resulting from eliminating any simple event of the original cut-set
is no longer a cut-set.
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occurrence for event i = 1, 2, ... 4, then
P(X, = 1) = 1 - e . (1.3)
By substituting the expression for each component yielded by (1.3) into (1.2), an expression
for the system reliability R as a function of time is obtained.
Shortcomings. RBDs are static structures, i.e., there are no time-dependencies between
events within the RBD. Thus, an RBD is a snapshot of the components that must be oper-
ational at any time for the system to deliver its function. Therefore, this means that RBDs
are not suitable to model systems where the order of component failure is important, i.e., at
a given time, two combinations of failed components which are reached in different order
may result in two different outcomes.
To illustrate this, consider the parallel parallel circuit for transmitting energy displayed in
Fig. 1.2. In the system failure-free operational conditions, Electric line L, is engaged; and
Electric line L2 is disengaged. When the voltage sensor VS detects a voltage drop, then
it sends a command to the Switch SW, and then Electric line L, is disengaged and Elec-
tric line L2 engaged. Now, let's consider two different sequences of component failures
involving the same events. Let's consider that the system is working in its nominal opera-
tion conditions and the Electric line L1 fails open circuit first. Then, the voltage sensor will
detect a voltage drop, and send a signal to the switch SW which will disengage Electric
line L, and engage Electric line L 2 . After Electric line L2 is in operation, let the voltage
sensor VS fail to detect voltage drops. In this case, since the system is already operating
with Electric line L2 , the sensor failure will not affect the energy transmission. Now con-
sider the inverse order in the failure events: the system is operating with Electric line L1
the voltage sensor VS fails first to detect voltage drops. In this scenario, the system will
keep its operation with Electric line L1 , but no voltage drop detection is possible. Then
let the Electric line L1 fail open circuit. In this conditions, the switch does not receive any
voltage drop warning from the sensor VS since this one is already failed. Thus the Electric
line L2 will not be engaged and thus the system will fail to transmit energy. It is clear that
in this case, the different events-ordering result in very different outcomes.
RBDs also can not capture other important features that may be important for modeling
fault-tolerant systems. It is not possible to model repair processes that may be triggered to
replace some components that may have failed without causing the system to fail. RBDs
are also not suitable to model failure coverage. Failure coverage refers to the ability of a
fault-tolerant system to recover from a component failure and stay operational. There are
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Figure 1.2: Electric energy transmission system fault-tolerant architecture in its failure-free opera-
tional mode.
cases in which there is no uncertainty on the system recovery after a failure occurred, i.e.,
the system will always recover (perfect-coverage) or it never recovers (no-coverage). How-
ever, there might be cases in which depending on the system operational conditions at the
time of failure, the system may recover or may not, i.e., there is uncertainty (imperfect-
coverage) with respect to whether the system will survive the failure. RBDs can handle
perfect-coverage or no-coverage situations. However, they are not suited to modeling sys-
tems with imperfect-coverage situations. Finally, state-dependent failures are another im-
portant feature of fault-tolerant conditions, i.e., the likelihood of certain component fail-
ures depends on the the components that are already failed. RBDs can not handle this
important feature either.
Despite these limitations, RBD modeling is an appropriate technique to assess the reliabil-
ity of networks with static structures7 , in which each component can only have two states:
operational or failed. In this sense, RBDs are appealing because, unlike fault-trees (as we
show next), the RBD structure resembles the network physical structure. Thus, it is easy to
understand the system failure behavior when components have failed, and furthermore, it
is possible to automatically build the RBD from the functional block diagram description.
1.2.1.2 Fault-Trees
System Model. This is a graphical representation of the system's structure function in
the form of a fault/success-oriented logical diagram [6]. Thus, the top event of the tree
represents the conditions that must be met in order for the system to fail/not-fail to deliver
the function for which it was designed. The events that lead to the top event occurrence are
obtained through combinations of simple events (component failures), and are graphically
represented in the tree using logical AND and OR logical gates.
7Pioneering work on developing reliable electrical networks was published in 1956 by Moore and Shannon
[12].
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(b) Fault-tree for voltage V2 drop top-event.
Figure 1.3: Fault-tolerant electric energy transmission system functional description and fault-tree.
To illustrate how a fault-tree is built, consider the same parallel circuit used to illustrate
the construction of an RBD, Fig. 1.3(a). Let's assume that the system function is to deliver
a constant output voltage V 2 for an input voltage V1. Now, we assume that each element
within the circuit can fail either short or open circuit. Under these assumptions, the result-
ing fault-tree is displayed in Fig. 1.3(b).
Model Evaluation. System reliability is obtained by quantifying the probability of occur-
rence of the the fault-tree's top-event. The simple events (component failure events) are
assumed to be independent events. Thus, the calculation of the top-event's probability
boils down to computing the probability of unions and/or intersections of simple events.
However, for large fault-trees, this can be a daunting and error-prone task. Thus, there
are techniques that simplify the calculation of the top-event probability. One of these tech-
niques consist on computing the minimal cut-sets8 . To illustrate this, let's compute the
minimal cut-sets for the parallel circuit example, Fig. 1.3(b). In this example, the cut-sets
are: {V drops}, {B 1 fails open circuit}, {B 1 fails short circuit}, {B 2 fails open circuit}, {B 2
fails short circuit},{Li fails short circuit}, {L 2 fails short circuitl, {Li fails open circuit, L 2
fails open circuit}.
8In Fault-Trees, a minimal cut-set is defined as a minimal-size set of simple events that leads to the occur-
rence of the top-event [6].
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The resulting structure function is given by:
$(x 1 , X2, X3, X4 , X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) = X1 X2X 3 X4X 5 X6X7(X8 + X9 - X8X9), (1.4)
where xi is the indicator variable associated with the {V 1 drops} event, x 2 is the indica-
tor variable associated with the {B 1 fails open circuit} event, X3 is the indicator variable
associated with the {BI fails short circuit} event, x4 is the indicator variable associated
with the {B 2 fails open circuit} event, x5 is the indicator variable associated with the {B 2
fails short circuit} event, X6 is the indicator variable associated with the {Li fails open cir-
cuit} event, X7 is the indicator variable associated with the {L1 fails short circuit} event,
x8 is the indicator variable associated with the {L 2 fails open circuit} event event, and x9
is the indicator variable associated with the {L 2 fails short circuit} event. As mentioned
before, each of these indicator variables will take the value 0 whenever the event occurs,
and 1 otherwise. Then, the system reliability R can be computed as the expectation of the
structure function. As mentioned before, by assuming independence of the simple events:
R = E[(xi,x2,x 3,x 4 ,X5 ,X6 ,X7 ,X8 ,Xg) -=
P(i = 1)P(x2 = 1)P(X3 = 1)P(X4 = 1)P(X5 = 1)P(X6 = 1)P(X7 = 1)P(Xs = 1) +
P(X1 = l)P(X2 = l)P(x3 = 1)P(X4 = 1)P(X5 = 1)P(X6 = 1)P(X7 = 1)P(X9 = 1) -
P(Xi = 1)P(x2 = l)P(X3 = l)P(X4 = l)P(X5 = 1)P(X6 = 1)P(X7 = l)P(X8 = l)P(Xg = 1).
(1.5)
As for RBDs, if the time to occurrence of each simple event is considered exponentially
distributed, then it is possible to compute the system reliability as a function of time t.
Shortcomings. One advantage of fault-trees is that, unlike in RBDs, different failure modes
can be considered for the same component. However, fault-trees have shortcomings simi-
lar to those exposed for RBDs:
* Fault-trees are static structures. Therefore, fault-trees are not suitable for modeling sys-
tems where the order of component failure is important.
* Fault-trees are not suited to modeling repair processes.
* Fault-trees can not handle imperfect failure coverage.
Another shortcoming of fault-trees (and in general of any classical reliability evaluation
technique) is the difficulty of generating the fault-tree in a systematic and objective way
from the functional description of the system and the component failure description. Quot-
ing from [13] "Fault-tree has at present, though, a number of drawbacks. It is an art, rather
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than a science. If two people analyze a system, the results are never the same". Further-
more, as pointed out in the introduction, for very large complex systems, it is impossible to
understand how a system behaves in the presence of component failures by using only a
description of the system functionality. This makes the development of the fault-tree even
more difficult.
Advanced Fault-Tree Techniques
In the remainder of this section, several advancements in fault-tree analysis techniques
will be presented. These techniques solve some of the shortcomings mentioned above.
However, there are still several important features of fault-tolerant systems that these tech-
niques cannot handle.
Dynamic Fault-Trees. Priority logical gates were introduced in order to solve the event
time-dependency problem [14], which conventional logical gates can not handle. Later on,
logical gates were incorporated into fault-trees for the analysis of fault-tolerant computer
system [151, and thus the concept of a dynamic fault-tree was introduced [16]. The dynamic
fault-tree solved the problem of reliability modeling of systems where time-dependencies
of simple events are relevant.
To illustrate the use of dynamic fault-trees for reliability modeling, let's consider the same
parallel circuit example presented to show the inability of conventional fault-trees to han-
dle sequence-dependencies. The system functional description is displayed in Fig. 1.4(a).
As explained before, the system is operating with electric line L, in nominal conditions,
when L1 fails (open or short circuit), the voltage sensor VS will detect a voltage drop in V2
and will switch over the operation to electric line L 2 . The switch SW can fail open or short
circuit, causing the system to fail. The voltage sensor can fail to detect voltage drops in V2.
As mentioned before, if the voltage sensor VS fails when electric line L, is in operation, a
subsequent failure of L, will not be detected, causing the system to fail. On the contrary,
if the voltage sensor VS fails after the line L 1 failed, and operation was already switched
to line L2, the system will remain operational. The resulting dynamic fault-tree to describe
the system behavior in the presence of failures is displayed in Fig. 1.4(b).
There is a new element in this model that enables sequence-dependence modeling -the
priority-AND gate [141. This logical gate will yield a true value if all the inputs occurred
in the order they go into the gate, starting from left to right. Several other priority logical
-26-
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Figure 1.4: Fault-tolerant electric energy transmission system functional description and dynamic
fault-tree.
gates (functional-dependency gate, cold-spare gate, sequence-enforcing gate) were intro-
duced in [16], allowing other more complex sequence-dependencies to be modeled.
Although dynamic fault-trees solve the sequences-dependency problem, there are still sev-
eral features of fault-tolerant systems that dynamic fault-trees can not properly handle,
e.g., repair processes, failure coverage, and state-dependent failures. Furthermore, unlike
fault-trees, which have algorithms to directly quantify the top-event probability, there are
no direct evaluation techniques for dynamic fault-trees. It is necessary to first convert
the dynamic fault-tree into an equivalent Markov model, and then solve this associated
Markov model to compute the top-event probability [171.
Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation Studies (HiP-HOPS). HiP-
HOPS is a methodology that allows the development of fault-trees from architecture func-
tional block diagrams in which local failure models for each component within the system
are defined [8]. It also supports system Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) auto-
matic construction [18]. The component failure models are defined as collections of logical
expressions that relate deviations of the component output (called output deviations) to
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deviations of the component input nominal behavior (called input deviations) and com-
ponent internal failures (called basic events). The architectural connections between com-
ponents (data connections, energy connections) allow the interconnection of the logical ex-
pressions of each local failure model, and thus, the development of a collection of system
fault-trees (or a system FMEA). The top-event of each fault-trees that HiP-HOPS generates
corresponds to a component output deviation.
The HiP-HOPS methodology is conceptually very similar to previous work developed by
Taylor in the context of electronic systems and software [13, 19]. Taylor also attempted to
automatically build fault-trees from a set of "transfer statements"; each of them describing
how a component output event can result from a component internal change (a failure), or
from an input event passed by another component output event [191. This clearly indicates
the similarity between HiP-HOPS and the work by Taylor.
Although HiP-HOPS (and the seminal work of Taylor) attempts to fill the gap between
the system functional description (augmented with component failure descriptions) and
the construction of the fault-tree, it still has several shortcomings. In these methodologies,
the output deviations due to input deviations or internal failures are based on the logical
expressions defined in the component local failure model. This failure model is based on
the analyst's skills in understanding the component failure behavior, and therefore it is
subjective. One peculiarity of the HiP-HOPS (and Taylor's) approach is that when two
components are connected, the output deviations of the first component must match the
input deviations of the second component [19, 20], which requires caution when defining
the local failure models and limits the input deviations of a component to the set of output
deviations of the previous component for cascading connections.
HiP-HOPS (and Taylor's approach) has the same problem as any other methodology based
on static failure models, it can not capture failure sequences. This is easy to understand
since the resulting failure model it is either a fault-tree (or an FMEA built from a fault-tree),
and fault-trees can only capture combinations of component failures as mentioned before.
Finally, both methodologies allow the component output deviations to be related to simple
event occurrences. However, it is still the task of the analyst to determine if those devia-
tions can cause the system to totally fail to perform its function, or to just cause a degraded
system performance which is acceptable in some situations. Thus, these methodologies do
not allow us to understand the overall system performance in the presence of component
failures.
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1.2.1.3 Markov Models
Among all the mathematical formalisms to model random process, continuous time Markov
chains has proven to be a powerful approach to quantify the reliability of fault tolerant
systems. This is due to the fact that many important features of fault-tolerant systems are
naturally captured by a continuous-time Markov chain [21, 22]. Examples are: sequences
of failures in which the order of component failures matters, different repair strategies,
failure coverage, common mode failures, and state-dependent failure rates. In Chapter 2
the Markov reliability modeling principles presented in this section are illustrated with a
case-study. A brief introduction to continuous-time Markov chains (CTMC) is provided in
Appendix A. The reader is referred to [23, 24] for a more rigorous treatment of Markov
processes.
System Model. This is a graphical representation, in the form of a state-transition dia-
gram, of the system status (failed or operational) for each system configuration reached
after a unique sequence of component failures. The system is said to be in its failure-free
configuration when all the components within the system are non-failed. The system can
evolve from the failure-free configuration to other configurations depending on the status
(failed or operational) of the components within the system.
The nodes of the state-transition diagram represent the status (operational or failed) of
each system configuration, and the edges represent transitions between configurations
triggered by component failures (or repair processes). There are two types of nodes: ab-
sorbing nodes and non-absorbing nodes. The system will fulfill its function whenever it
is in a non-absorbing node. The system will fail to deliver the functions for which it was
design whenever it transitions to an absorbing node. Even if the system must deliver more
than one function, only one model is necessary. In this case, the non-absorbing states are
associated with system configurations in which maybe one of the functions is not available,
but the system is still operational. If the system is to operate in different mission phases,
then several several state-transition diagrams are to be developed; one per mission phase.
We will use the same parallel circuit used before, Fig. 1.5(a), to illustrate two of the most
important capabilities of Markov reliability models for modeling fault-tolerant systems:
sequence-dependencies and failure coverage. The state-transition diagram corresponding
to the Markov reliability model is displayed in Fig. 1.5(b). The absorbing states (displayed
in red) correspond to system configurations declared as failed, while the states displayed
in blue (transient states) correspond to the system configurations declared as non-failed.
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Figure 1.5: Fault-tolerant electric energy transmission system functional description and state-
transition diagram.
Note that sequence-dependencies are naturally included: states { 3, 2}1' and { 9, 2} are two
different sequences of the same failed components failed, with different results; the same
applies to states { 7, 2} and { 10, 2}1.
As mentioned before, failure coverage refers to the ability of a fault-tolerant system to
recover from a component failure and stay operational. There might be cases in which,
depending on the system operational conditions, the system may recover or not, i.e., there
is uncertainty (imperfect-coverage) with respect to whether the system will recover or not
after a failure has occurred. In this case, for the { L, short circuit} event, it may be the
9Each state of the Markov model is labeled with a double index { i, k}, where k = 0, 1,. ... represents the
number of component failures, and i = 1, 2,... is a counter for the Markov states reached after sequences of
failures of size k.
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case that the short circuit path is not a direct contact to ground (there is some resistor
in the path). It may happen that the voltage sensor VS is not able to detect this failure,
and depending on the system operational conditions, this may cause the system to fail to
deliver its functionality. This has an impact on the system reliability model; when the line
L1 fails short circuited, it will generate two states in the state-transition diagram instead
of one. The first of these states {2, 1} will correspond to the case where L, fails short
circuited and the system recovers from this failure. The second one {3, 1} corresponds to
the uncovered short circuit failure of L 1, which results in a system failure.
Model Evaluation. System reliability R is quantified by calculating the probability that
the system will be in any of the non-absorbing states at a given time given that the sys-
tem was in the failure-free state {1, 0} at time t = 0 with probability 1. The transitions
between configurations occur stochastically and are triggered by random failures within
the system components. Each of these failures have an associated coverage probability.
We assume the system evolves between configurations in a Markovian fashion, i.e., the
system configurations (dictated by component status) at future times will only depend on
the configuration at the present time. Therefore the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations (see
Appendix A) can be used to compute the configuration status probabilities.
To illustrate the evaluation process, let's build the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations corre-
sponding to two of the states of the state-transition diagram of Fig. 1.5(b). Let A7'(SC) be
the failure rate for open circuit (short circuit) failure mode of component L 1 (L 2 ). Let AVS
be the failure rate for the component VS, and Av, the rate associated with voltage drops
in V1. Let CLsc be the coverage probability of L, short circuit failure. Then, the Chapman
Kolmogorov equations for states { 1, 0} and {2, 1} are given by
d t = -(AOC + ASC + Av, + AVS)pi 0,(t), (1.6)
dp it = csAf iot)- (Af+ Aff + Avi + Avs)p 2,1(t), (1.7)
dt CLSCAL 1P1,O(t)- (ALoC +AS V V)
where pi,o(t) is the probability that no failure has occurred at time t, given that pi,o(0) = 1,
and P2,1 (t) is the probability that the system is operating with electric line L2 at time t (due
to the fact that L1 failed covered), given that pi,0(0) = 1 . Similar differential equations
can be obtained for the remaining states of the Markov model. Then, after solving the
resulting set of differential equations, the system reliability R at time t can be computed as
the probability of being in a non-absorbing state of the Markov model:
R(t) =pi,0 (t) +pi,1(t) +p2,1(t) +p5,1(t) +p3,2(t) +p7,2(t). (1.8)
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Shortcomings. Markov reliability modeling allows us to include, in a natural and intuitive
way, other important features of fault-tolerant systems, such as different repair strategies,
failure coverage, common mode failures, and state-dependent failure rates when these are
constant. However, there are some limitations in the time-varying case. For example, let us
consider a component with different failure rates when in standby and when operational.
We will assume that the failure rate when the component is operational increases with
time; and that its initial value depends on the time the components is brought on-line.
Thus, the configuration status probabilities depend not only on the time the system is
operational, but also on the time components remain operational, i.e., two different time
scales. The effect of this additional time scale violates the Markov property, i.e., visits to
future states do not depend on visits to past states, only on the state visited at the present
time. Therefore, Markov models cannot be used to model component state-dependent
time-varying failure rates [25].
Another important drawback to the use of Markov reliability modeling is that the state
space grows exponentially with the number of components. Therefore, for large fault-
tolerant systems, it is necessary to apply model truncation techniques to control the state
space explosion [21, 26]. However, when truncating the analysis, it is necessary to assess
the impact of the truncation on the system reliability and unreliability estimates.
A technique to truncate the analysis consists of assuming that all system configurations
with kmax or more failed components are declared as failed. Upper and lower bounds in
the system reliability R, and unreliability Q, can be obtained by using [27]:
Qkmax < Q < Qkmax + Pakmax, (1.9)
Rkmax R < Rkmax + Pa,kmax, (1.10)
where Qkmax is the probability of being in an absorbing state associated with a configu-
ration with less than kmx components failed; Rk..ax is the probability of being in a non-
absorbing state associated with a configuration with less than kmax components failed; and
Pakmax is the probability of the system having exactly kmax components failed, which corre-
sponds to the probability of being in an absorbing state reached from all the non-absorbing
states associated with configurations with kmax - 1 components failed. The lower bound
in (1.9) is never achieved; the system will fail eventually for a sequence of component fail-
ures of size bigger than kmax. A similar conclusion can be reached for the upper bound in
(1.10), which can never be achieved.
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Finally, the main shortcoming of Markov reliability modeling (true for most reliability eval-
uation techniques, as mentioned before) is the difficulty of generating the Markov model
from the functional description of the system and the component failure descriptions. For
large complex systems, this can be a daunting and error-prone task. Chapter 2 introduces
a technique to overcome this problem by building several system level FMEAs, which col-
lect the different failure sequences and their effects on the system functionality. This gives
a systematic solution for exploring all possible sequences of failures and their effects on
the system operation. However, it is still a manual task.
Advanced Markov Modeling Techniques: Computer Aided Markov Evaluator (CAME)
In the remainder of this section, we present a technique that addresses the main problem of
Markov reliability modeling techniques - the gap between the system functional model
and the reliability model. It was developed in the form of a computer tool, named the
Computer Aided Markov Evaluator (CAME), at the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory in
the mid '80s [27, 28]. The tool was developed to analyze the reliability of fault-tolerant
systems encountered in avionics and space applications, but it can be used to analyze the
reliability of any engineering system.
Although the name might suggest that CAME is merely a computer tool to evaluate Markov
models, CAME is the computer implementation of an advance methodology to evaluate
the reliability of complex fault tolerant systems. This methodology automatically gener-
ates a Markov reliability model from the following:
" A description of the components within the system. For each component, it includes:
its failure rate (the component is only regarded as failed or non-failed), the component
failure coverage probability, and the component operational dependencies, i.e., which
other components or subsystems within the system must be operational for the compo-
nent to be operational.
" A system operational description, which captures the components that must be func-
tional at any time for the system to be operational, and how the system reconfigures
itself to account for component failures, thus modifying the system operational descrip-
tion.
The methodology implemented in CAME tried to fill the gap between the system func-
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tional description and the system reliability model -the same way as the advanced fault-
tree techniques previously discussed. One of the advanced features introduced with CAME
is the automatic modeling of system reconfigurations, which are extremely important in
fault-tolerant systems. However, there are still several problems that the methodology
implemented in CAME cannot handle. CAME cannot model different component failure
modes or time-dependent failure rates. The failure rate associated with each component
is assumed constant. The system operational description still relies on the subjective judg-
ment of the analyst to determine the necessary components for the system to deliver its
functionality.
1.2.1.4 Other System Reliability Evaluation Techniques
Although the techniques discussed previously are the most common ones to quantify the
reliability of fault-tolerant systems, there are other techniques, some of which we briefly
discuss in this section. Although these techniques might be appropriate to model and
quantify the reliability of specific types of systems, they have the same common short-
coming as those already presented: the difficulty of generating the reliability model in a
systematic and objective way from the functional descriptions of the system and the com-
ponent failures (apart from the advancements in this matter introduced by HiP-HOPS and
CAME).
Reliability Graphs. They are extensively used to model network reliability [29]. Reliabil-
ity graphs are a graphical representation, in the form of directed graphs, of the system's
structure function. The edges of the graph represent component failure events. There are
two special nodes called the source node and the sink node. The source node has no in-
coming edges, and the sink node has no outgoing edges. The system will be functional
whenever there is a connection between the source and the sink nodes. Reliability graphs
are equivalent to reliability block diagrams [30]. Therefore, they have the same shortcom-
ings, as RBDs for modeling fault-tolerant systems.
Event-Trees. They were developed during the WASH - 1400 study lead by Norman Ras-
mussen to assess the accident risk in nuclear power plants in the US [311. Event-trees are a
graphical representation, in the form of decision tree, of the outcomes that can result from
an initiating event.
Nuclear power plants are designed with a philosophy called "defense-in-depth" which
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refers to (among other things) a set of safety systems that provide multiple barriers of de-
fense between a hazard and the public [32]. Event-trees are a powerful tool to quantify the
effectiveness of these different safety system swhen an undesirable event occurs. That is,
to estimate the likelihood that, given an initiating event that perturbs the nominal opera-
tion of the plant, the multiple safety systems will bring the plant back to normal operation
or safely shut it down.
Although, unlike fault-trees and RBDs, they cannot include repair processes event-trees al-
low modeling sequence-dependencies and imperfect failure coverage. Despite this, event-
trees are not really suited to model the reliability of the class of fault-tolerant systems
treated in this thesis, i.e., aircraft, space, and automotive systems. Event trees are suited to
analyzing the consequences of a single initiating event, whereas the fault-tolerant systems
used in the aforementioned applications are usually designed to withstand sequences of
more than one initiating event. Furthermore, due to constraints on weight, cost, and vol-
ume, the "defense-in-depth" methodology is not employed in the design of this type of
fault-tolerant systems. Usually only one, or at most two additional systems are put in
place to compensate for component failures.
1.2.2 Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (DPRA): Removing the Subjec-
tivity of Qualitative Functional Description Based Methodologies
One of the most important ideas introduced so far, the shortcoming of most current reli-
ability evaluation techniques, is the difficulty of generating an objective reliability model
from the functional description of the system and the components failure description. That
is, to understand how the system behaves in the presence of failures. A methodology
named Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (DPRA), developed in the nuclear engi-
neering field, attempts to solve such a problem. It was developed to assess the likelihood
of different accident sequences in a nuclear reactor [33, 34, 35].
The main difference (and most appealing feature) of DPRA with respect to the other reli-
ability evaluation techniques described previously resides in the system description used
to generate the reliability model. Rather than using a system qualitative functional model,
DPRA bases the system reliability evaluation on quantifying the behavior of the system
dynamic variables x,(t), for each possible configuration {i, k} adopted by the system after
the occurrence of a given sequences of k component failures. Thus, the ultimate objective
of DPRA is to find the probability Pi,k (x, (t), t).
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System Model. The system model is a collection of dynamic system models, each of which
represents the system dynamic behavior for each possible configuration attained by the
system [35]. Let {i, k} be a configuration adopted by the system after a unique sequence
of k component failures. The dynamics of this configuration is defined by
i 8 (t) = fsjk(x(t),w(t)),
y8t)= ~k(Xs9(t), W(t)), (.1
where k is the number of component operational mode transitions leading to system con-
figuration {i, k} from any of the initial system configurations {i, 0}, x,(t) is the vector of
system state variables, w(t) is the vector of system input variables, y,(t) is the vector of
system instantaneous outputs, foi'k(.) is the system state evolution function (for the {i, k}
configuration), and g,'k(.) is the system instantaneous output function (for the {i, k} con-
figuration).
Model Evaluation. The system reliability evaluation results from quantifying the sys-
tem dynamic behavior to check whether or not some sequences of events cause the sys-
tem dynamic variables xs(t) to exceed some predetermined values. Assuming that the
system state dynamic variables behave in a Markovian fashion, i.e., x,(t + dt) only de-
pends on xs(t) and not on previous values of x. [35], the probability distribution function
Pi,k(Xs (t), t) can be computed by solving the set of partial differential equations given by
aPi,k(Xs(t),t) + div(f,k (X (t), w (t))p,k (X (t), t)) =
at
Ai,k (Xs(0), OApik (Xs(t), 0) +-E A' k,_1(Xs(t), OAp, k_ 1(),) (1.12)
i.k-1
where Aj,k(x(t), t) results from adding all the individual transition rates that can trigger a
system transition out of configuration {i, k} and it depends on the system state variables
XS(t). A'_1 (Xs (t), t) is the transition rate associated with the operational mode transition
that causes the system to go from configuration {i, k - 1 } to system configuration {i, k}
and it depends on the system state variables x. (t) as well.
It might be possible to find analytical solutions to (1.12) for very simple systems [35]. How-
ever, the large number of components involved in the type of systems addressed by DPRA
(nuclear power plants) makes an analytical solution untractable for (1.12). Thus, numerical
methods (Monte Carlo simulation is one of them) are usually used to solve the problem. A
comprehensive review of these methods can be found in [36].
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Shortcomings. In nuclear power plants, the stochastic transitions between configurations
and system state dynamic variables cannot be decoupled [37]. Thus, as discussed before,
an analytical solution is untractable for (1.12) for very large systems. Numerical solutions
are computationally very expensive. To illustrate this, let's take Monte Carlo simulation,
which is one of the numerical methods proposed to solve the problem [38]. With Monte
Carlo, random sequences of component failures are generated for the system operational
time, and the system dynamic evolution is simulated (for each sequence of events) until
meaningful reliability measures are obtained. For very reliable systems, only a few of these
simulations will lead to system failure; e.g., in a system designed to have a reliability of
10-6, there will be only one simulation out of one-million simulations resulting in system
failure[21]. Therefore it is necessary to carry out a larger number of simulations to obtain a
meaningful reliability result. Since component failures are regarded as rare events, achiev-
ing completeness in the possible sequences of failures is difficult [36]. However, there
has been some work done to try to overcome the computational problems associated with
DPRA. A good review of the main developments in this arena, as well as new work, can be
found in [39]. Finally, unless there is only one operational point in nominal conditions (no
failures), it is necessary to carry out the analysis for each possible plant initial operating
point, which increases the computational burden even further.
1.3 Thesis Summary and Organization
The main shortcoming of current reliability evaluation techniques has been clearly iden-
tified -the incompleteness of the system models used to analyze the system behavior in
the presence of failures. Thus, the main goal of this thesis is to introduce a new model-
ing and evaluation methodology for fault-tolerant systems addressing this problem. This
methodology ought to minimize the subjectivity introduced in the system analysis due to
incompleteness of current system modeling techniques.
Rather than using a qualitative description of the system's functionality (as in current tech-
niques), the methodology proposed in this thesis will use a quantitative model of the sys-
tem dynamic behavior (with no failures) plus additional features to model component
failure behavior as well. These features include component failure modes (and associated
failure rates) and how these failure modes affect the dynamic behavior of the component,
thus reducing the ambiguity that might arise from the use of qualitative models to analyze
system reliability.
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The new methodology is based on the following principles:
1. Starting from the failure-free configuration, the system can evolve to different configu-
rations, depending on which components failed, how these components failed, and the
order in which the components failed (when more than one failed).
2. For each of these possible configurations, a system model that quantifies the system
dynamic behavior is developed. This model will be used to determine whether or not
the system delivers the performance for which it was designed. This is where the main
difference with current techniques lies: the effect of component failures on the system
dynamic behavior is modeled and quantified.
3. After the system transitions into a new configuration due to a component failure, two
outcomes are possible. Either the system state variables remain within some predefined
region dictated by the system performance requirements at all times, then the configura-
tion is declared as non-failed (the failure is covered); or there are transient or permanent
excursion outside this region, then the configuration is declared as failed (the failure is
not covered).
4. The coverage probability (the probability of declaring a configuration as non-failed) will
be computed as a function of the system state variables at the time of failure and the
predefined region dictated by the system performance requirements.
5. The transitions between configurations occur stochastically, and the system is assumed
to evolve between configurations in a Markovian fashion.
The other key aspect of the new methodology is that not only quantitative measures of
reliability will result from the analysis, but also quantitative measures of dynamic perfor-
mance. This is possible because the system behavior is quantified for each system config-
uration, and thus certain performance metrics of interest can be measured, e.g., the power
consumption, the latency of certain signals, or the overshoot of certain system dynamic
variables response. This allows the full integration of system reliability with dynamic per-
formance evaluation, enabling a unified probabilistic-informed design framework, that
will help to:
e identify weak points in a design so they can be improved in subsequent iterations of
the design, and
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* Compare different system architecture alternatives to help identifying the optimal one
in terms of performance and reliability.
This will guide the system design towards optimal system dynamic performance, robust-
ness, reliability, and fault tolerance. In the remainder of this section, the structure of the
subsequent chapters of the thesis is detailed, explaining the contents of each chapter and
main contributions
Chapter 2. Markov reliability models are used in the new methodology to model the sys-
tem behavior due to component failures. Thus, the main purpose of this chapter is to make
the reader familiar with the principles of Markov reliability modeling, and to introduce
some of the terminology that will be used in the remainder of the thesis. To accomplish
this, a case-study of a power net architecture for automotive safety-critical applications is
presented.
The main contribution of this chapter is the development of a technique to systematically
build system-level Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for each level of failure.
This allows a direct mapping to the Markov reliability model, thus alleviating its construc-
tion. Most of the work presented in this chapter was published in [40].
Chapter 3. The mathematical foundations of the new integrated methodology for evalu-
ating the performance and reliability of fault-tolerant systems is presented in this chapter.
As mentioned before, the main advantage of the methodology is that, rather than using
a qualitative description of the system's functionality, it uses a quantitative model of the
system dynamic behavior (with no failures) plus additional features to model component
failure behavior as well.
The main contributions of this chapter are:
" The rigorous definition of a generalized component behavioral model, which is a key
part of the methodology.
" A rigorous approach for computing failure coverage probabilities, which is key to de-
veloping the system stochastic-behavior model due to component failures. In this re-
gard, analytical solutions for the coverage probability in LTI systems are provided, as
well as a methodology, based on Monte Carlo simulations, to compute these coverage
probabilities in non-linear systems.
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Chapter 4. One of the key features of fault-tolerant systems is complexity The methodol-
ogy presented in Chapter 3 attempts to solve some of the problems associated with com-
plexity when analyzing the reliability of fault-tolerant systems. However, this methodol-
ogy is useless if the analysis is not automated with the help of a computer. This chap-
ter presents a MATLAB/SIMULINK@ tool to support the methodology introduced in
Chapter 3 -InPRESTo, an acronym for Integrated Performance and Reliability Evaluation
SIMULINK® Toolbox.
The basic functionality is presented in this chapter. The automated analysis provided by
InPRESto is not the only important contribution of the tool. InPRESTo also provides a
common environment with a common languages for control engineers and reliability en-
gineers to develop fault-tolerant systems. The InPRESTo developed as part of this thesis is
being also used by the Systems Engineering and Evaluation Division at the Charles Stark
Draper Laboratory for the evaluation of space and tactical systems.
Chapter 5. The purpose of this chapter is to show how the new methodology (and its sup-
porting tool InPRESTo) can be used to: identify weak points in the system design; guide
the design, pointing out to possible solutions to eliminate the uncovered weak points;
compare different architecture alternatives from different perspectives; and test different
failure detection, isolation, and reconfiguration (FDIR) techniques. To accomplish this, we
present a case-study of a fault-tolerant architecture for a fighter aircraft lateral-directional
flight control system [41].
This case-study proves the scalability of the tool to analyze large systems. Part of the this
work was published in [42].
Chapter 6. This chapter illustrates how the new methodology (and its supporting tool) can
be used -to compare conceptually very different architectural approaches to achieve fault-
tolerance. For this purpose, two different solutions to achieve fault-tolerance in a steer-by-
wire (SbW) system are presented. The first solution is based on component redundancy
and the introduction of failure detection, isolation, and reconfiguration mechanisms. In the
second solution, a dissimilar backup mechanism called brake-actuated steering (BAS), is
used to achieve fault-tolerance rather than replicating each component within the system.
This chapter complements Chapter 5 by showing how the performance and reliability eval-
uation SIMULINK @ toolbox -InPRESTo- can be used in a different way from that shown
in Chapter 5. BAS is part of our earlier research in steer-by-wire and it was published in
[43].
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Chapter 7. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the new methodology as the en-
abler of a unified system probabilistic-informed design framework. Existing probabilistic-
informed decision making importance measures for system design will be reviewed. Def-
initions of new importance measures will be proposed within the framework of the new
methodology. This chapter also discusses open questions and future research directions in
the context of system probabilistic-informed design.
Chapter 8. The final chapter of the thesis collects the main conclusions extracted from this
research. It summarizes the advancements of the new methodology with respect to exist-
ing ones, and highlights the fact that this research enables a new approach to probabilistic-
informed design for fault-tolerant systems.
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Chapter 2
On Markov Reliability Modeling: An
Automotive Power Net Case-Study
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the principles of Markov reliability modeling
when a block diagram of the system functionality (with no quantitative information of the
component dynamic behavior) is used to understand the system behavior in the presence
of component failures, and thus develop the Markov reliability model. In this context, a
case study of an automotive power net architecture for automotive safety-critical applica-
tions is presented. Several system level Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) will
be developed from this block diagram, identifying the different sequences of component
failures, helping the construction of the Markov reliability model. Sensitivity analysis will
be used to understand the influence of perturbations in the model parameters. This will
help to determine the robustness of the reliability estimate with respect to parameter un-
certainty, and it will also help to improve the design. Most of the work presented in this
chapter appears in [40].
2.1 Introduction
In automotive power nets, power for traditional loads is provided by a battery, an alterna-
tor, various switches, fuses or circuit breakers, and wiring. If any of these fails, there is a
chance that the power net voltage will collapse and no actuation of any electrical system
will be possible. Although this is a problem from the driver comfort point of view, the
safety-critical systems of the car, such as conventional steering and braking systems are
not electrical, and still function. However, with the introduction of steer-by-wire (SbW)
and brake-by-wire (BbW), a loss of the power supply is no longer acceptable. Loss of elec-
tric power would mean loss of control of the vehicle, resulting in a dangerous situation for
the driver. Considerable attention has been focused on the development of highly reliable
SbW and BbW systems [1, 44, 45, 46], but only [1] and [46] talk about the fact that the power
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supply also has to be highly reliable and fault-tolerant, and even here, the authors' work is
not focused on this issue. Current fault-tolerant power net designs are not reliable enough
for use in safety-critical applications [47]. Therefore, it is important to develop new power
net architectures and carry out a reliability analysis of these architectures to validate them
for use in safety-critical applications. Some work has been done in this regard. In 1994,
and anticipating the needs for future electrical loads in vehicles, [47] proposed alternative
electrical distribution system architectures, already addressing the reliability issue of these
new architectures. In [48], the requirements of vehicle power supply architectures were
identified and, although some solutions were proposed, no further reliability analysis was
done to validate them for their use in safety-critical applications.
In this chapter, a power net architecture based on one of the solutions given in [48] is pro-
posed. It is not necessarily the optimal solution for the power net in terms of reliability, but
it is complex enough to illustrate the use of Markov models for the reliability evaluation
of Fault-Tolerant systems. To carry out the reliability analysis of the power supply for the
proposed power net, several system level FMEAs are developed to identify the different
sequences of component failures that can be reached from the failure-free configuration.
A Markov model to quantify system reliability is constructed based on the FMEAs previ-
ously developed. The parameters of this model include time-dependent failure rates, and
failure-coverage probabilities.
The power net architecture used in the study is defined in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 presents
the system reliability model, including the different system level FMEAs, and the sub-
sequently developed Markov reliability model. Section 2.4 presents the analysis results,
including a sensitivity analysis of the reliability estimate with respect to some model pa-
rameters. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 2.5.
2.2 Dual Battery Power Net Architecture
The proposed power net architecture, shown in Fig. 2.1, consists of the following elements:
" Alternator G, which generates energy for the electric loads and for charging the battery.
" Main battery B 1, which provides energy for the electric loads.
" Backup battery B 2, which is in cold standby and only switched on in case of a failure of
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the alternator G, or the main battery B 1 . The backup battery B2 will be chosen to have
the same capacity as the main battery B 1.
* Voltage and current sensors SV and SA, which measure the voltage of the power supply
and the current flowing through the main battery B1 and alternator G.
" Switches SW1, SW 2 and SW3.
" Electronic control unit ECU, which receives signals from the voltage and current sen-
sors Sv and SA, and sends signals to the switches SW1, SW2 and SW3 in case a failure
occurs.
" Main wire harness MWH, which links the power supply with the fuse box.
" Fuses F, for short circuit protection.
" Wire harness H.
" Steer-by-Wire channels SbW and SbW 2 .
* Conventional electric loads L.
Power supply subsystem
ECU -
H
F
SWW SWS
---- 2 - BSbWj Sb
F
W2
F
L L L
Figure 2.1: Dual battery power net architecture.
The primary difference between the proposed and conventional power nets is the backup
battery B 2, and the detection and isolation system (composed of the electronic control
unit ECU, the voltage and current sensors Sv and SA, and the switches SW1 , SW2 and
SW3). If a fault is detected in the alternator G or the main battery B 1, the detection and
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isolation system switches off the faulty element and switches on the backup battery B2.
Additionally, the backup battery is also switched on if there is a voltage drop in the power
supply, even when no fault has been detected in the alternator G or the main battery B 1.
No failure annunciation system is considered for non-failed configurations with one failed
component, which means that the system must work for the stated period of time without
maintenance.
2.3 System Reliability Model
The reliability analysis will be focused on how failures in the power supply subsystem
components affect the power delivery to the electrical loads. Thus, the analysis is restricted
to the alternator G, main battery B 1, backup battery B2, voltage and current sensors Sv
and SA, switches SW1 , SW 2 and SW 3, electronic control unit ECU, and main wire harness
MWH.
The process of building the system reliability model starts with a qualitative description of
the system's functionality, Fig. 2.1. It describes how components and subsystems are in-
terconnected to fulfill the functions the system was designed for. Additionally, component
failure modes (and associated failure rates), and how these component failures can affect
the system functionality are required. Then, based on this information, several system
level FMEAs are developed, which collect the system configurations reached after one or
more components failed; and if these configurations result in system failure, or the system
is still operational. Finally, a Markov model is built from the information collected in the
FMEAs, and system reliability measures can be obtained.
2.3.1 System Level Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
In order to quantify the reliability of a fault-tolerant system, it is necessary to build a
Markov model. However this can be tedious and error-prone process for large systems.
Thus, in order to alleviate this task, several system level FMEAs are usually first devel-
oped, which help in the subsequent construction of the Markov model. The first FMEA
will help to identify first component failures in the system, which yield both failed and
non-failed system configurations. From the non-failed system configurations with one
component failed, a second FMEA will be developed. This second FMEA will identify
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failed and non-failed system configurations after two components have failed. The pro-
cess will end when all the system configurations are declared as failed. To construct the
system level FMEA, several simplifying assumptions are introduced:
" The backup battery B 2 has zero failure rate while it is in the standby condition.
" The main battery B1 and the backup battery B2 have equal failure rates when they are
working.
* Since no annunciation system is considered in this architecture, repair processes for
component failures that do not result in a failed configuration are not considered.
" The failure detection and isolation system is comprised of the ECU; the switches SW1,
SW2 , SW3 ; and the sensors S1, S2 , S3 .
" If a failure occurs in any of the elements of the failure detection and isolation system,
this element will be disabled, and additional failures of any of its components will not
affect the rest of the system.
" The failure detection and isolation system is disabled once a fault has been successfully
detected and isolated.
Table 2.1: System level FMEA for single component failures.
Failure-free configuration State Failure mode Transition rate System configurations after one System sta- Statefailure tus
Bi Delivering energy, and G {1, 0} B, fails covered cA \B B 2 delivering energy, and Non-failed {1, 1}
generating energy, and DS G generating energy, and
monitoring the system, and M W H transporting energy
M W H transporting energy B1 fails uncovered (1 - C)A B - Failed {2, 1}
G fails covered cA G B, delivering energy, and Non-failed {3, 1
B 2 delivering energy, and
MW H transporting energy
G fails uncovered (1 - c)AG Failed {4, 1}
DS fails A-ECU + 3ASW + 3AS Pi delivering energy, and Non-failed {5, 1}
G generating energy, and
MW H transporting energy
MWH fails AMWH - Failed {6, 1}
Table 2.1 corresponds to the FMEA for single component failures in the system. The first
column of this table lists the system failure-free configuration (no component failures). The
second column associates the failure-free configuration with state {1, 0} of the Markov re-
liability model developed in the next section. The third column describes all possible com-
ponent failure modes. The fourth column lists the transition rates from the failure-free
configuration {1, 0} to the new configurations. The fifth column describes the new sys-
tem configurations resulting after the component failures described in the third column
occurred. Column six describes the resulting configuration as failed or non-failed. Fi-
nally, column seven associates each new resulting configuration with a state in the Markov
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model -absorbing states for the failed configurations, and transient states for the non-
failed configurations. Table 2.2 corresponds to the FMEA for sequences of two component
failures. The first column of this table corresponds to the non-failed configurations re-
ported in column five of Table 2.1. The remaining columns of Table 2.2 are obtained in the
same way as for Table 2.1.
Table 2.2: System level FMEA for sequences of two component failures.
Non-failed system configurations af- State Failure mode Transition rate System configurations after two System sta- State
ter one componentfailed failures tus
B2 delivering energy, and {1, 1} B2 fails. AB 5  - Failed f1, 2}
G generating energy, and G alls. - Failed 2,2
MWH transporting energy MWH fails. AMWH - Failed {3,2
B 1 delivering energy, and {3,1} B 1 fails. AB 1  - Failed {4, 2}
B2 delivering energy, and B 2 tails. AB9 - Failed {5, 2}
MWH transporting energy M W H tails. AMWH - Failed {6, 2}
B 1 delivering energy, and {5, 1} BI fails. A 1  - Failed {7, 2}
G generating energy, and G fails. A7G -Faled J8, 21
M WH transporting energy M W H tails. A MWH - Faded {9, 2}
AB2
C ABI AG
AMW H
(1-0) ABI
C ABl
(1-c) AGMWH
ECU 3SW 3S ABI
AG
AMWH AMWH
Figure 2.2: Markov model for the power supply of the dual battery power net architecture of
Figure 2.1.
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2.3.2 Markov Model
Based on the system level FMEA developed in the previous section, it is possible to con-
struct a Markov model that represents the stochastic behavior of the system due to compo-
nent failures. Figure 2.2 displays the state-transition diagram associated with the Markov
model. State {1, 0} represents a system configuration with no failures. States {1, 1}-{6, 1}
represent the status of system configurations reached after one failure. Finally, states {1, 2}-
{ 9, 2} represent the status of system configurations after two failures.
Each coefficient aij of the state-transition matrix A is obtained by combining the compo-
nent failure rates (which trigger the transitions between system configurations) and the
coverage probabilities (column 4 in Tables 2.1 and 2.2), resulting in
a, 1
a 2 ,1
a 3 ,1
a 4 ,1
a5 ,1
a6 ,1
a7,1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
a2,2
0
0
0
0
0
a8,2
a9 ,2
a10,2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
a4,4
0
0
0
0
0
0
ali,4
a12,4
a 13 ,4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
a6 ,6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
a 14 ,6
a 15 ,6
a1 6 ,6
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
(2.1)
The coefficients of the state-transition matrix A are given by:
* al,1 = -AB 1 - AG - AECU - 3ASW - 3AS - AMWH,
" a2,1 = CAB 1, a3,1 (1 - c)AB1,
* a4,1 = CAG, a5,1 (1 -c)AG
* a6,1 = AECU + 3ASW + 3As,
* a7,1 = AMWH,
* a2,2 = -AB 2 - AG - AMWH,
* a8,2 = AB 2, a9,2 = AG,
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* a10,2 = AMWH, all,4 = AB 1,
* a4,4= -AB 1 - AB 2 - AMWG,
* a12,4 = AB 2 , a13 ,4 = AMWH,
" a 6,6= -AB 1 - AG - AMWG,
* a14,6 = AR 1 al 5 ,6 = AG,
* a16 ,6 = AMWH,
with AB 1 the battery B 1 failure rate, AB 2 the battery B 2 failure rate, AG the alternator G
failure rate, AMWH the main wire harness MWH failure rate, AECU the electronic control
unit ECU failure rate, ASW the switch SW failure rate, As the sensor S failure rate, and c
the failure coverage probability.
Component Failure Rates
The failure rates for the main battery AB 1, the backup battery AB 2 , the alternator AG, and the
main wire harness AMWH are considered to be time-dependent and Weibull distributed:
A(t) = aAo(Aot)"- 1, (2.2)
where a is called the shape parameter, Ao is the scale parameter and t is the time [6].
The values of a and A0 for each component (alternator, main and backup batteries, and
main wire harness) were obtained from field data provided by the Allgemeiner Deutscher
Automobil Club [2], and are displayed in Table 2.3.
The failure rates for the rest of the components, i.e., ECU, sensors Sv and SA, and switches
SW, are assumed to be constant and were chosen based on typical data for automotive
components [1]. Since the values of the failure rates for the ECU, the sensors Sv and
SA, and the switches SW are assumed, a sensitivity analysis will be carried out for each of
these components to see how a change in its failure rate affects the reliability of the system.
Failure Coverage Probability
As stated in Appendix A, the failure coverage probability depends on the ability of the
system to detect and isolate a failure, and reconfigure itself in order to keep delivering
its functionality. Detection depends on the detection algorithm successfully detecting a
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Table 2.3: Component failure rates and detection probabilities used in the development of the
simplified Markov model for the power net of Figure 2.1 (from [1] and [2]).
Component Description a Ao (/h) A (/h) D
Alternator G 2.68 0.32 -10- 5  5.14. 10-15 .t6 8  0.99
Main battery/backup battery B1/B 2  3.56 0.21. 10-4 7.69. 10-17 t 2 .16  0.99
Main wire Harness MWH 1.95 0.32- 10-6 4.28. 10-13 t.9 -
Electronic control unit ECU 1 5 .10- 7  5. 10-7
Voltage and current sensors SV/SA 1 10-7 10-7
Switches SW1 /SW 2/SW 3  1 10-6 10-6
failure, and the voltage and current sensors Sv and SA, and the electronic control unit
ECU working on demand. Thus the probability of detecting a failure when it occurs is
given by
P(D/F) = DP(X S' = )P(X^ = O)P(XA = O)P(XtECU = 0), (2.3)
where D is the detection probability given in Table 2.3. A successful failure isolation and
reconfiguration occurs when there is no failure in the components involved in the isola-
tion and reconfiguration mechanism, which are the switches SW1, SW 2, and SW3. Thus
the probability of failure isolation and reconfiguration, given a failure occurred and was
detected, is given by
P(I n R/F n D) = P(Xswl = O)P(XW2 = 0)P(X;w3 = 0). (2.4)
Therefore, considering that all the switches have the same failure rate Asw, and the sensors
having, as well, the same failure rate As, the failure coverage probability can be computed
using
c = De-(AECU+3Asw+3As)t. (2.5)
2.4 Results Analysis
A vehicle lifetime of 15 years and an average of 400 working hours per year was considered
for the simulations, which gives an evaluation time T of 6000 h. The Dependability rate
A(T) (defined in A.5 in Appendix A as the ratio of the system unreliability Q(T) to time
T) will be used as the system reliability measure. Using the parameters of Table 2.3, which
correspond to the assumed nominal failure rate values, and the failure coverage probabil-
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iE 6.OOE-09 0 Configurations with one
5.00E-09 failed component
4.OOE-09 U Configurations with two
3.OOE-09 failed components
2.V E-09 El Total
1.00E-09
0.OOE+00
Figure 2.3: System configurations contributions to the total system dependability rate \(T) sorted
by number of components failed.
ities given by substituting the corresponding values in (2.5), the dependability rate A(T)
yielded by the Markov model is 6.1 - 10-9 failures/hour. In the remainder of this section,
further analysis, displayed in Figures 2.3 - 2.5, is carried out to gain more insight to:
" contributions of system failed configurations (sorted by number of components failed)
to the system dependability rate A(T);
" contributions to the system dependability rate A(T) of the last failed component within
failed configurations (sorted by number of components failed); and
" the influence on the estimate of the dependability rate A(T) of perturbations in some of
the model parameters.
Dependability Rate Breakdown by Number of Failed Components
Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of system configurations declared as failed after one
and two components failed. It is important to note that the most important contribution,
amounting to 66% of the total system dependability rate A(T) estimate, is given by failed
system configurations reached after one component failed, which corresponds to uncov-
ered failures of the main battery B1 and alternator G, and the failure of the main wire
harness MWH.
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(a) Component contributions to the dependabil-
ity rate of system configurations with one compo-
nent failed.
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(c) Component contributions to the dependabil-
ity rate of system configurations with a second
component failed, after the alternator G failed
first.
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(b) Component contributions to the dependabil-
ity rate of system configurations with a second
component failed, after the main battery B1 failed
first.
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(d) Component contributions to the dependabil-
ity rate of system configurations with a second
component failed, after the DS failed first.
Figure 2.4: Contributions to the dependability rate \(T) for system configurations with one and
two components failed.
Impact of Individual Component Failures on the Dependability Rate
For a better understanding of individual impact, Figure 2.4 displays the contributions to
the dependability rate A(T) of the last failed component for failed system configurations
with one and two failed components. Thus, Fig. 2.4(a) displays the single contributions
of uncovered single failures in the main battery B 1, alternator G, and main wire harness
MWH. In this case, the main contribution to system failure, being 3 -10-9 failures/hour,
comes from the main battery B 1.
Figures 2.4(b) - 2.4(d) display the individual contributions of the last failed component
within system configurations declared as failed after two component failures. It is inter-
esting to note the influence of the main wire harness MWH, depending on the number of
failed components. For system configurations with one component failed, Fig. 2.4(a), the
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contribution of the MWH failure is of the same order of magnitude as the other contribu-
tors. However, after each first failure, the contribution of the main wire harness is always
the least important, at one or two orders of magnitude less than the other contributors. For
example, after a covered failure in the main battery, the contribution of the backup battery
is 3.7. 10-12 failures/hour and the alternator contribution is 1.2-10-12 failures/hour, while
the main wire harness contribution is 2 - 10-13 failures/hour. The failure coverage prob-
ability is responsible for this behavior. For single failures, the transition rate out of the
nominal configurations for uncovered failures of B1 and G is obtained by multiplying the
corresponding component failure rate by 1 - c, where c is the coverage probability. It is
expected that c will be close to one. Thus, even for failure rates in B1 and G one or two
orders of magnitude bigger that the MWH failure rate, the uncovered failures of B1 and G
contribute in a similar amount to that corresponding to the MWH. For system configura-
tions with two failures, the failure coverage probability is not present, thus the difference
between the MWH failure rate, and the B1 and G failures rates is no longer attenuated
by the factor 1 - c, resulting in the one or two order of magnitude difference observed in
Figures 2.4(b)- 2.4(d).
Sensitivity Analysis
The purpose of running a sensitivity analysis with respect to the the model parameters is
twofold:
" Highlight the influence of the assumed failure rates of ECU, voltage and current sen-
sors, Sv and SA, and switches SW on the dependability rate A(T).
" Determine how sensitive the dependability rate A(T) is with respect to the detection
probability D. This will help to establish how good the detection algorithm must be.
The procedure followed to estimate the influence of the failure rate parameters was to per-
turb the value of each component failure rate, one at a time; then recompute the depend-
ability rate for each perturbed parameter to determine how this perturbations affected the
nominal solution [49]. The parameter multipliers used were 0.1 and 10 for all components.
Figure 2.5(a) displays the sensitivity analysis results. The influence of changes in ECU and
voltage and current sensor, Sv and SA, failures rates, although difficult to see in the figure,
is almost the same, and it is small in comparison with the effect of changes in the switch
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(a) Sensitivity analysis to changes in the ECU, the (b) Sensitivity analysis to changes in the detection
switches SW and the sensors S failure rates. probability D.
Figure 2.5: Dependability rate \(T) sensitivity to the failure rates of the electronic control unit
AECU, the sensors As, and the switches Asw; and to the detection probability D.
SW failure rates. The switches SWs are the components of the detection and isolation
system that most influence the dependability rate, i.e., an increase in the failure rate of the
switches translates to a one order of magnitude increase of the dependability rate. The rest
of the failure rate changes keep the dependability rate within the same order of magnitude
as that obtained using the nominal failure rates.
A similar procedure to the one explained above was used for determining the influence
of the detection probability D. The results are displayed in Fig. 2.5(b). This analysis
shows that the influence of the detection and isolation system in the overall dependability
rate is very important. As seen, the dependability rate strongly depends on the detection
probability D when it is less than 0.99. Above D = 0.99, the dependability rate estimate is
insensitive to the detection probability.
The results reported in this section suggest that one way to improve the dependability
of this architecture, would be to improve the detection and isolation system by improving
the detection algorithm. Thus, achieving a detection probability D of 0.99 or greater, which
would make the dependability rate insensitive to this parameter. Another way to improve
the dependability would be by redesigning the link between the power supply and the
main fuse box, i.e., the main wire harness in the previous design. This would prevent sin-
gle failures in the main wire harness from making the system fail despite the redundancy
introduced by the second battery.
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2.5 Conclusions
The case-study presented in this chapter illustrates the steps commonly applied to evaluate
the reliability of a system. The process requires a qualitative evaluation of a functional de-
scription of the system in the presence of failures. For conventional systems, this approach
is valid, as it is possible to infer the system behavior (under component failure conditions)
without using a quantitative model of the system. However, for more complex systems, it
is very difficult to understand the system behavior in the presence of component failures.
For example, in this case-study, components were only regarded as failed or operational,
without specifying in which sense they have failed. we could have considered, for exam-
ple, the battery failing open or short circuit, or the alternator excitation system partially
failing. In these cases, it is much more difficult to understand the system behavior; thus, it
is very difficult to assess if these failures cause the system to stop delivering power to the
loads. Furthermore, with a qualitative system description it is not possible to quantify sys-
tem degraded operational modes, i.e., the system might be delivering enough power for
some loads, but not for all of them. In the next chapter, we introduce a new methodology
for evaluating system reliability that bases all the analyses on a quantitative model of the
system to be evaluated.
Notation Used in this Chapter
A :
BbW:
B1(:)
C :
DS:
ECU:
F :
FMEA:
G:
H:
L:
MWH:
P(D/F), D:
P(I n R/F n D):
SA:
Sv:
SbW:
SbW 1 :
Markov reliability model state transition matrix
Brake-by-wire
Main (Backup) battery
Failure coverage probability
Detection and isolation system
Electronic control unit
Fuse
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
Alternator
Wire harness
Conventional electrical loads
Main wire harness linking the power supply with the fuse box
Probability of failure detection given a failure has occurred
Probability of failure isolation and reconfiguration given a failure has occurred, and it has been detected
Current sensor
Voltage sensor
Steer-by-wire
Steer-by-Wire channel 1
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SbW 2 : Steer-by-Wire channel 2
SW1 : Main battery switch
SW2 : Alternator switch
SW3 : Backup battery switch
t :Time
T :System global evaluation time
XECU : Number of failures in ECU for an operating time oft hours
Xj^A Number of failures in EA for an operating time of t hours
XSV Number of failures in 5 v for an operating time of t hours
XSW : Number of failures in SW 1 for an operating time of t hours
XSW2 Number of failures in SW 2 for an operating time of t hours
X; :Number of failures in SW3 for an operating time of t hours
a : Shape parameter of the Weibull distribution
A : Failure rate
ABI lAB2 : Battery failure rate
AG : Alternator failure rate
AECU: Electronic control unit failure rate
As : Sensor failure rate
Asw : Switch failure rate
AO: Scale parameter of the Weibull distribution
,\(T) :Dependability rate
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In this chapter, we propose a methodology for integrating the evaluation of system per-
formance and reliability. The methodology uses a behavioral model of the system dynam-
ics, similar to the ones used by control engineers when designing the control system, but
with additional features to model different failure behaviors of the component. The per-
formance evaluation is based on the system dynamic behavior when component failures
occur within the system. The proposed methodology allows one to assess not only sys-
tem reliability, but other important dynamic performance metrics that might be relevant
in the design of a fault-tolerant system. The system stochastic behavior due to component
failures is modeled by using Markov models. In this context, a rigorous approach for com-
puting failure coverage probabilities is presented, providing analytical solutions for LTI
systems, and a Monte-Carlo based methodology for non-linear systems. Several examples
are developed to illustrate the concepts introduced in the chapter.
3.1 Introduction
The analysis of system behavior in the presence of component or subsystem failures and
therefore system reliability, availability, and safety, is usually carried out using a qualitative
description of the system's functionality. It describes how components and subsystems are
interconnected to fulfill the functions for which they are designed, and how component
failures can propagate to other components through their interconnections and affect the
system functionality [6,7,8]. For conventional systems this approach is valid, as it is possi-
ble to evaluate how a system can fail to perform its function without paying attention to its
dynamics. However, this is not the case for large complex systems or embedded software-
intensive systems, which are characteristic of fault-tolerant systems [9]. For these kinds of
systems, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to understand how the system behaves in
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the presence of hardware failures or software malfunctions without using a model of the
system dynamics to quantify its performance under failure conditions.
In this chapter, we propose a methodology that integrates performance and reliability eval-
uations of fault-tolerant systems. Rather than using a qualitative description of the sys-
tem's functionality, this methodology uses a model of the system dynamics which is aug-
mented with additional features to model component failure behavior. These features in-
clude component failure modes (and associated failure rates) and how these failure modes
affect the dynamic behavior of the component.
Starting from thefailure-free configuration, the system will evolve to different system config-
urations, depending on which components fail, how these components fail, and the order
in which the components fail (when more than one fail). For each of the possible system
configurations, an evaluation of the system dynamic behavior performance is carried out
to check whether some of its properties, called performance metrics, meet some predefined
operational requirements. After all system configurations have been evaluated, the values
of the performance metrics for each configuration and the probabilities of going from the
nominal configuration to any other configuration are merged into a set of probabilistic mea-
sures of performance.
As discussed in Chapter 1 (see Section 1.2.2), the idea of using a dynamic model of the
system under control was first proposed in the nuclear engineering field and the result-
ing methodology is commonly known as Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (DPRA).
However, as will be discussed in Section 3.7, there are certain aspects of the problems that
DPRA addresses that make DPRA differ substantially from the methodology proposed in
this chapter.
Section 3.2 introduces the mathematical framework for modeling the dynamic behavior of
the system to be evaluated. Section 3.3 explains how to define the performance metrics
(and associated requirements) that will be used to evaluate the dynamic performance of
the system. In Section 3.4, the mathematical model associated with the system stochastic
behavior due to component failures is presented. Section 3.5 provides an example of how
the present methodology can be used to analyze a series RL circuit. Section 3.6 presents
different probabilistic measures of performance, which are used to evaluate the overall
system performance. Section 3.7 compares the new methodology with DPRA. Concluding
remarks are presented in Section 3.8.
- 58-
Chapter 3
On the Integration of System Performance and Reliability Evaluation
3.2 System Dynamics Behavioral Model
The system dynamics behavioral model will emerge from the interaction of the behav-
ioral models of each individual component within the system. We understand the term
behavioral model as understood in circuit simulation - a set of mathematical expressions
that models the component external behavior (manifested through its connections to other
components), without necessarily modeling the real physical processes involved in such
behavior. A component behavioral model will define not only the component behavior
under failure-free conditions, but also under different failure conditions (failure modes).
3.2.1 Components
In classical reliability analysis, the concept of failure mode is used to define a component
operational behavior under specific internal failure conditions. Similarly, the concept of
the failure-free mode of operation is used to define the component behavior under failure-
free conditions. We will use the expression operational mode to refer to both failure and
failure-free modes. Thus, we define a component behavioral model by:
" A list of the component variables of interest relevant to each component operational
mode definition and a set of mathematical expressions, termed behavioral equations,
that constrain those variables.
* A stochastic model that describes the transitions between different operational modes
triggered by component-internal failure conditions, or by component-external events.
The mathematical expressions constraining the component variables can be of very differ-
ent natures, depending on the component to be modeled, e.g., algebraic equations, differ-
ential equations, difference equations, logical expressions, and/or combinations of those.
In the remainder of this section, we will focus on defining component models for a class of
systems in which the variables of interest evolve as a function of time -dynamic systems.
Thus, differential (or difference) equations can be used to describe the constraints among
these variables. In particular, the state-space description form of a dynamic system will be
used to define each mode of operation (both failure and failure-free).
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Behavioral Equations
Let a component ci have k operational modes. The j operational mode behavioral equa-
tions for j = {0, 1,... k} are defined by
xcs(t) = fi(xcM(t),UC (0)
yci(t) = gci (t), Uc (0) (3.1)
where xc (t) is the vector of component state variables, u,, (t) is the vector of component
input variables, yc, (t) is the vector of component instantaneous outputs, fc () is the com-
ponent state evolution function (for the j operational mode), and gJ (.) is the component
instantaneous output function (for the j operational mode).
The transitions between different operational modes occur stochastically and can be trig-
gered by internal failure conditions or by external events. Let U, (t) be a random variable
that can take values in the set Bc2 = {0, 1, ... k}, representing the component ci instan-
taneous component operational modes. Assuming the transitions between different op-
erational failure modes occur in a Markovian fashion, we can define the instantaneous
transition rate Am(t) between any two component operational modes 1 and m by
Alm(t) = Pc.(t+dt )-mUc (t)=I) (3.2)
where 1 = 0, 1,. .. k and m = 0, 1, ... k.
Sensor Behavioral Model Example
To illustrate the process introduced above, the behavioral model for a sensor ci will be
defined. The sensor has four operational modes:
* Failure-free mode (N): bandwidth T-, resolution R, latency of -ir, gain G.
" Output-omission failure mode (0): regardless of the sensor input reading, its output
is set to zero, i.e, gain 0 and other properties the same as in the failure-free mode.
" Gain-change failure mode (G): bandwidth Tr, resolution R8 , latency of Ti, gain Cs.
" Bias failure mode (B): bandwidth T8 , resolution R., latency of Ti, gain G, and output
biased by a factor B,.
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Under the above conditions, the behavioral equations for each operational mode of the
sensor are defined by
Uc, (t) = 0 (failure - free),
(t)= - c1 (t) + Luci(t); yci(t) = G, ; (3.3)
R,
Uc1 (t) = 1 (output omission),
&Ci(t) = -xci (t) + -c M(t); yc1 (t) = 0; (3.4)
Ucj (t) = 2 (gain change),
c (t) = -Xc 1 (t) + uci (t); yc (t) = ; (3.5)ks
Uc1 (t) = 3 (bias),
= -L -c 1 (t) + -uc 1 (t); yc1 (t) = Gs - - + B8. (3.6)
R,
Transitions from the failure-free mode to each failure mode can occur, as well as transitions
from the gain-change and the bias failure modes to the output-omission failure mode (op-
erational modes do not coexist). Thus, the instantaneous transition rates are defined by
= P(U~c, (t+dt)=1IUc
ANB(t) = P(Uc1 (t+dt) 3U 1 (t)=O)
AGO(t) = P(Uc1 (t+dt)=1jUc1 (t)=2)
ANG M =dt
ABO(t) = P(Uc1 (t+dt)=1Uc1 (t)=3)P(, tdi1 ()3 (3.7)
3.2.2 Configurations
In a component behavioral model, a single component can exhibit different operational
modes depending on its internal failure conditions and on external events. Similarly, a
system will adopt different configurations depending on the the status of its components
[39], i.e., which component operational modes are active. Thus, the system is said to be
in its failure-free configuration if all its components are in their failure-free modes. The
system may evolve from its failure-free configuration to another dynamic configuration
if a component transitions from its failure-free mode to one of its possible failure modes.
Under these conditions, a system model is defined by:
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" A set of component models and how they interact with each other. Depending on the
components' operational modes, the system will adopt different configurations.
" A stochastic model that describes the transitions between different system configura-
tions triggered by component operational mode transitions.
In the previous section, we focused on defining component behavioral models for dynamic
systems, adopting the state-space description for their definition. In this section, we will
use the same formalism; we will assume that the systems of interest are composed of inter-
connected dynamic systems, and therefore a state-space description will be used to define
each system configuration.
Configuration Dynamics Equations
Let k be the number of component operational mode transitions leading to the system
configuration {i, k} from the initial system configuration {1, 0}, and let i > 1 index the set
of system configurations which have k > 0 components failed. The dynamics of the {i, k}
system configuration reached after a unique sequence of k component operational mode
transitions be represented by
dx, (tik) fikx(t'kwik)
dti,k - S:: fse,(st~)Wt~
y(ti k) = gik(X5(tik), W(ti~k))
xs(oi'k) E i,k(oi,k)
w(ti'k) C Qw(ti,k), (3.8)
where x8 (ti'k) is the vector of system state variables, w(tisk) is the vector of system input
variables, y 8(ti'k) is the vector of system instantaneous outputs, fik(-) is the system state
evolution function for the {i, k} configuration, and g,'k(-) is the system instantaneous out-
put function for the {i, k} configuration. The time variable ti'k is also indexed in order to
highlight the fact that two different system configurations cannot coexist, therefore their
time-axis must be different.
The set Q' k( 0 ik) represents the possible value of the system state variables at the time the
system transitions into configuration {i, k}. Similarly, QiOl(ti'k) represents the set of possi-
ble values for the system control inputs at time tik from the transition into the {i, k} config-
uration. Thus, even if each system configuration {i, k} is defined by a unique sequence of
-62-
Chapter 3
On the Integration of System Performance and Reliability Evaluation
component operational mode transitions, there is uncertainty regarding the system states
and the system inputs at the time of failure. This uncertainty will play a very important
role in defining the failure coverage probability (see Section 3.4 for details) and thus the
system stochastic behavior due to component failures, as will be explained in Section 3.4.
R1 Ll 0)
+ VW ZRL C 
,
r 3 e Cict E
Figure 3.1: Series RLC Circuit Example.
Series RLC Circuit Example
To illustrate the concepts introduced in this section, let's consider the circuit displayed in
Fig. 3.1, which results from interconnecting two impedances: ZRL (corresponding to a
resistor of value R1 in series with an inductor of value L1 ) and ZC (corresponding to a
capacitor of value C1). Impedance ZRL has an associated failure mode that results in a
short-circuit in the resistor's terminals. Impedance ZC can fail by modifying the value of
the capacitor from C1 to C2. Thus, the dynamics of the failure-free configuration {1, 0} can
be described by
_ __ F Li L~ i F Li ti 1d (ti'0 ) I i(t '0 ) v(t0)
dt'6 c(t1'0) 0 I I (t '0) 0
x(0 1'0) = [i(0 1'0 ), vc(t 1'0 )]' E Q,0(01,0)
V(ti'0) E QV(t1,0). (3.9)
The system configuration {1, 1} after the impedance ZRL fails (the resistor's terminals are
short-circuited) can be described by
d F i(t '1 ) 1 0 - i(t ') 1 i 1 j)
c(ti) 0 C (t j) 0 I
X(0111) = [i(01'l), oc(t )]' E X J (0 ' )
V(tl") E Qv(tl"). (3.10)
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The system configuration {2, 1} after the impedance Zc (the capacitance goes from C1 to
C2) fails can be described by
d [i(t 2'1 ) 1 F 492 ,1 ) 1 [Li
&U [vC(t2 ) L 0 ve(t2j) 0
X(0 2'1 ) = [i(0 2'1 ), Vc(t2 )' q a7 1(02,1)
V(t2j) E jv(t2j). (3.11)
For sequences of failures of size k = 2, there are two options: Z. fails after ZRL (cor-
responding to configuration {1, 2}); or ZRL fails after ZC corresponding to configuration
{2, 2}). In both cases, the dynamics is described by the same differential equation, how-
ever the set of initial state-variables 12 (01,2) (for configuration {1, 2}); and Q 22(02,2) (for
configuration {2, 2}) may be different; thus
i{t1(2),2) R1 1 i1(2),2) 
__L1 Vtl2)d___ - L i L i L 1(2 )'2 ( 2) ,2J
dt 1(2),2 Vc (t1(2),2) 2 0 V c(t(2),2)
X(01(2),2) =[i(01(2),2), VC(t1(2),2 ]/ E 1(2),2(01(2),2)
V(t1(2),2) Evt1(2),2). (3.12)
3.3 Performance Metrics, Requirements Definition, and System
Evaluation
The system evaluation process is a forward search in the sense that the evaluation starts
with the system in its failure-free configuration. Then single failures are introduced in
the components and the resulting system configurations are evaluated to check if certain
system dynamic properties, termed Performance Metrics, meet some predefined criteria,
termed Performance Requirements. The configurations reached after a sequence of failures
that do not meet the performance requirements are declared as failed, and no other sys-
tem configurations can be reached from them. The configurations declared as non-failed
meet the performance requirements, meaning that the system is still operational and can
still perform the function for which it was designed. Other system configurations (after
subsequent component failures) can be reached from them.
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Performance metrics
Performance metrics are a set of m system-related properties, denoted by Z1, Z 2 , ... , Zm,
that, for each system configuration {i, k}, can be computed by using the system dynamic
equations (3.8). Performance metrics will quantify how well a system performs the func-
tion for which it was designed.
The performance metrics chosen to evaluate a system depend on the nature of the system.
For example, in a tracking system, dynamic-related properties may be important, e.g., the
tracking error, the overshoot, the settling time, or the pole and zero locations if the system
is linear. If the system to be evaluated is a power system, performance metrics of inter-
est may be the instantaneous (or the average) power consumption within the system, the
maximum power delivered by a single power element, or the maximum current flowing
through some components.
Performance Requirements
Performance requirements are defined through sets <15,DI ... , <D, and represent the
values that the performance metrics are allowed to take on each non-failed system config-
uration. For each system configuration {i, k} reached after a sequence of failures of size
k, the values of the performance metrics Z1 , Z 2 , ... , Zm will be checked to see if they are
within the predefined performance requirements 4Di, <DZ, ... .. ,k .
Taking the circuit of Fig. 3.1 as an example, two performance metrics that may be relevant
for assessing the performance of the system are the instantaneous power in resistor R1
and the voltage across capacitor C1, denoted by vc(t*), where we are using t* as a generic
time-axis notation for any configuration. Let Pnax be the maximum instantaneous power
allowed in resistor R 1, and Vma, the maximum allowed voltage across capacitor C. For
any non-failed system configuration
p(t*) Pmax
vc(t*) Vmax. (3.13)
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Dynamic Performance Evaluation
ik I ik i~k
To evaluate the system performance, it is necessary first to map the sets ( z, Z2*, . ..
defining the performance requirements onto the regions of the state space in which the
system states must remain at any time in order to meet these requirements. It is important
to note that sometimes is not straightforward to map sets of requirements onto the state
space, particularly when the requirements depend on the system input, e.g., settling time.
Let ( 1 )i* 4)*z --- 4 zm) be the regions of the state-space when the system is in config-
uration {i, k}, in which the requirements for the performance metrics Z1, Z2 ,. . ., Zm (de-
fined by the sets P , , . . ., 'tig ) are satisfied. Let x(Z - 4 i) (Z2 ) n ... n (zm
Let si,k(ti'k) be an indicator variable that takes value 1 when the configuration {i, k} is
declared as non-failed, and 0 otherwise. Then
1,if Xs(ti') 
E 4D,k
si,k (ti,k) _
0, otherwise, (3.14)
where x8 (tik) is the vector of system state variables. It is important to clarify the dif-
ference between t, which denotes the global evaluation time, i.e, the time the system may
remain operational (system lifetime, preventive maintenance period or mission time), and
the individual configuration time-axis ti'k, which is a subset of t (ti'k C t). The shape of
ik ik ik i ein heA(Pj depends on the sets ,' ..2 ., * that define the performance requirements. An
example of this for a two-dimensional case is shown in Fig. 3.2, where 4)x is defined as a
rectangular box.
XT2 r ---------- 1 -
ask~ooil)
Qk (Oi k)
Figure 3.2: Two-dimensional example for j,k' e~ik, and Qihk(0t~k)
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3.4 System Stochastic-Behavior Model
The transitions between configurations occur stochastically and are triggered by random
operational mode transitions within the system components. After the system randomly
transitions into configuration {i, k} (from configuration {j, k - 1} due to a component fail-
ure) two outcomes are possible. As stated before, if the system state variables remain
within the allowed region <ik dictated by the performance requirements at all times, then
the configuration is declared as non-failed; if there are transient or permanent excursions
outside these regions, then the configuration is declared asfailed. The probability of declar-
ing configuration {i, k} non-failed or failed is a function of the failure coverage probability,
i.e., the probability that the system will be able to detect and isolate the failure, and recon-
figure itself so the system state variables remain within the region <I.
Failure Coverage Probability Definition
The coverage probability is defined as the ratio of the volume of the subset of possible
initial conditions that results in trajectories which are contained in the set of "acceptable"
states to the volume of the set of possible initial conditions (i.e., the conditions at the time
of transition). Let kik( 0 i4k) define the set of possible state variable values at the time of
failure when the system transitions from configuration {j, k - 1} into configuration {i, k}.
Let eink C -ik( 0i'k) such that if X8 (Oi'k) E ),k, then X,(ti'k) E Di,k for all tik > 0 (an
example of e' and Xk(Oi'), for a two-dimensional case is shown in Fig. 3.2). Then, the
coverage probability c'_ 1 when the system is in configuration {j, k - 1} and transitions
to configuration {i, k} is defined by
i,k _ vol(eik)
j,k-1 V(ik (0i,k (3.15)
Stochastic Behavior of Configuration {i, k}
It is important to note that each system configuration {i, k} generates two states in the
Markov model. One of these states is transient ({2i-1,k}), and corresponds to the configu-
ration {i, k} being declared as non-failed, where the other one ({2i,k}), which is absorbing,
corresponds to the same configuration {i, k} being declared as failed.
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Let X(t) denote the system configuration at time t. Let p2i-1,k(t) be the probability that,
at any time t > 0, the configuration {i, k} is declared as non-failed, conditioned on the fact
that the system was in the failure-free configuration {1, 0} at t = 0 (with probability 1).
Then
(3.16)P2i-1,k(t) = P(X(t) = {i, k}, si,k(ti'k) = 1|X(0) = {1, 0}).
Similarly, let p2i,k(t) be the probability that, at a time t > 0, the configuration {i, k} is de-
clared asfailed, conditioned on the fact that the system was in the failure-free configuration
{1, 0} at t = 0. Then
(3.17)P2i,k(t) = P(X(t) = {i, k}, i,k(ti'k) = 0|X(0) = {1, 0}).
From (3.16) and (3.17), it follows that:
P(X(t) = {i, k}Isi,o(0) = 1) = P2i-1,k(t) + P2i,k(t). (3.18)
Let ' be the failure coverage probability when the system is in configuration {j, k - 1}
and transitions to configuration {i, k}. Let A'_ be the transition rate (associated with the
transition rate between two component operational modes) that causes the system to go
from from configuration {j, k - 1} to configuration {i, k}.
C.'k-1 ,Jk-1
i,k i,k
1 -Cj,k--1 j,k-1
k jk-1
AI'+
>'
m
Figure 3.3: Stochastic behavior of the non-failed system configuration (i, k) when a failure
occurs in component m.
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We assume that the system evolves between configurations in a Markovian fashion, i.e.,
the system configurations at future times will only depend on the configuration at the
present time. Therefore the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations can be used to compute the
probabilities of each system configuration status (failed or non-failed). Then the stochastic
behavior of system configuration {i, k}, displayed in Fig. 3.3, can be represented by
0 0 --
P2j-1,k-1 P2j-1,k-1
d~ cilk ik -\ m,k+l ~ Pi1k(.9dt P2i-1,k Cj,k-13,k-1 k 0 P2i-1,k (3.19)
P 2ik ik ik P 2i,k
-
(1 - c _ )Aj._k 1 0 0 -J
The state-transition matrix associated with the Markov model that governs the transitions
between all system configurations is obtained by assembling the blocks (3.19) correspond-
ing to each configuration {i, k}. Let A be the state-transition matrix associated with the
transitions between all system configurations. Then the system configurations' probability
vector P(t), can be computed by solving
dP(t) 
- AP(t)
P(O) = [1 0 0 ... 0]'. (3.20)
Each component P2i-1,k(t) of P(t) corresponds to the probability that the system is in con-
figuration {i, k} and it has been declared non-failed, given that the system was in configu-
ration {1, 0} at time t = 0. Similarly, P2i,k(t) corresponds to the probability that the same
configuration {i, k} is declaredfailed, given that the system was in configurations { 1, 01 at
time t = 0 with probability pi,o(0) = 1.
The state-transition matrix A is a random matrix with the following properties:
1. It is a lower triangular matrix.
2. The columns add up to zero.
3. The diagonal elements are negative or zero.
4. The off-diagonal elements are zero or positive.
5. It is a diagonally-dominant matrix.
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6. The columns and rows of A can be rearranged to obtain an equivalent matrix A* [241:
A* =[ MR 0 (3.21)
MQ 0
where matrix MR is associated with the transient states and MQ is associated with the
absorbing states.
3.4.1 On the Computation of Failure Coverage Probabilities
As mentioned before, the probability of declaring configuration {i, k} non-failed or failed
depends on the failure coverage probability. In this section, methods for computing the
failure coverage probability are introduced. First, its computation through Monte-Carlo
simulation is discussed. This technique can be applied to any system. Then analytical
techniques for computing the failure coverage probability in LTI systems are introduced.
This approach is based on the definition of non-failed configuration, which states that a
configuration {i, k} is declared as non-failed when the system state variables remain at all
i~ktime within the "allowed" region <Vj of the state-space dictated by the performance re-
quirements. Thus, the coverage probability will be defined by the set of reachable state
variables at the time of transition Qik (0i'k), and by a subset of that set of initial conditions
Ex This subset eX is such that, if the system state variables are contained inside, then
the trajectories followed by the system are to remain, at all times, within the "allowed"
region <bik dictated by the performance requirements.
Failure Coverage Probability Computation Through Simulation
To compute the coverage probability c _1 when the system transitions from configuration
{j, k - 1} to configuration {i, k}, it is necessary to obtain the set of possible state variable
values Qijk (Oik) at the time of transition, and also the "acceptable" set of initial conditions
i~k
Set of possible state variable values gki( 0 ik) at the time of transition. Let jk-1 (
define the steady-state set of reachable states when the system is in the configuration {j, k-
1} and this configuration was declared as non-failed. This set defines the set of possible
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initial conditions _?'k(0ik) for system configuration {j, k}:
Qi~koi~k) =Qjikl(0). (3.22)
"acceptable" set of initial conditions E)k. This set can be mapped through Monte-Carlo
simulation by randomly taking initial conditions x,(0i'k) from the the set of possible state
variables at the time of transition Q$k(oik). This technique has been used before to map
domains of attraction in non-linear systems [21]. The principles are the same, except that
i~k
in this case the attractor is replaced by the "acceptable" region of the state-space <Di . Thus,
for every x,(0i'k) E e'k
xS(ti'k) E Njk v ti'k > 0. (3.23)
It is important to note that for computing Q k( 0 i'k), it is necessary to know Qk-1 (0)Qik-(0 ki) exk Qik(0 i~k)ad k(which is computed from and '-. Therefore (5)and En" can be
obtained by recurrence given that Q O'(01o0) is known.
Analytical Calculation of Failure Coverage Probability in LTI Systems
For LTI systems, it is possible to analytically obtain bounds on the coverage probability.
This is possible due to the fact that for each system configuration {i, k}, it is possible to
analytically obtain bounding ellipsoids for Qik(oi'k) and EOk. In the remainder of this
section, we will illustrate the process of obtaining the failure coverage probability for a
configuration reached after one component failure, i.e., a configuration with index { 1, 1}.
Let the dynamics of a system in the failure-free configuration {1, 0} be represented by
dx(0'0 ) = F1'0x(t 1'0 ) + G1'0w(t 1'0)
x(01 '0 ) E Qx(01'0), with Qx(01,0) = {x : x'(I1,0 )-1x < 11
w(t1 '0 ) c Qw(t 1 ,0 ), with Qw(t 1 ,) {w w'Q-1 w < 1}, (3.24)
where F1'0 is the system state-transition matrix, and G1,0 is the system input matrix, both
for configuration {1, 0}. Ti0 and Q are positive definite matrices and the matrix inequali-
ties in (3.24) define ellipsoids.
Let <b1'0 be the region of the state-space that contains the states that meet the functional
performance requirements of the system. Let QI0(tl,0) denote the set of reachable states,
such that Q1'0(t1'0) 9 <bx 1 '0 . A bounding ellipsoid Q 1 (tl'o) = {x : x'(I1 '0 (t1 '0))-x 1},
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such that QV,0(t 1 ') C Og(tO) C Q1', can be computed by solving [50]
dF"r(t 1 'o) = F1 0F(tl O) + F1 0 (t1'0)(F 1'0 )' + 0 1'0F' 0(t6 0) + 1 G'Q(G')'dt+11,
F(0 1' 0) = I (3.25)
with 0 < #31'0 < 1. Let iL0 denote the steady-state value of F1'0 (t '0 ), thus Q0 (oo) = {x
x(FL9)-1 x 1}, where F 0 can be computed by solving
0 = F1'oF0 + F1(F,0)' + 01,ofl'o + 1 G' 0Q(G 1'0 )'. (3.26)
Q (oo) contains the set of reachable states after the "initial transient" settles. This "initial
transient" has nothing to do with possible transients of x within the system dynamics due
to changes in the input w(t1 '0 ), i.e., Qx (oc) takes into account these transients of x.
Decoupling Assumption. It is assumed that the system dynamics time constants are much
smaller that the time constants dictated by the failure rates. In this scenario, the likelihood
of two components failing within a time on the order of magnitude of the system dynamic
time constants is negligible relative to the likelihood of just one component failing. There-
fore, the steady-state set of reachable states Q1r0 (oo) 9 G (oc) is reached before another
failure occurs.
Under the above assumption, another failure occurs within the system, and thus the sys-
tem transitions from configuration {1, 0} to configuration {1, 1}. The dynamics of the new
configuration is defined by
dx(t"') = F1'1x(t1'l) + G1't w(t1-1)
x(01,1) E 1'1 (01,), with " 'l(01'1) = Q1 0 (oo)={x : '(F 0 )- 1x < 1}
w(t1 l') E Qw(t1 l'), with Qw(t"'1 ) = {w w'Q-'w < 1}, (3.27)
where F1'1 is the system state-transition matrix, and G1' is the system input matrix, both
for configuration {1, 1}. As before, FL and Q are positive definite matrices. It is extremely
important to note that the new set of initial conditions Qx' (011) is defined by the bounding
ellipsoid Q1 for the steady-state of reachable states before the transition.
Let Q '(t 1 '1 ) denote the new set of reachable states at time t 1 . A new bounding ellipsoid
Q (t) = {x : x'F'1 (t1'1) 1x < 1}, such that i',l(t1'l) C Q'1(61), can be computed by
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solving
drl(t") = F1',1rJl(t 1'1 ) + + 0(t'1)1' (F1')'+ +1 1 '(t')  G'Q(G'l)'
F1, 1(o1,1) = Fr (3.28)
with 0 < 01 1. Let P1' be the region of the state-space that contains the states that meet
the functional performance requirements of the system in this new configuration after the
failure has occurred. Then, depending on Q 1(t' 1) and 41', we have the following cases:
1. If Q1(oo) ' 1' ,, the coverage probability is:
vol(Ql (t,'l) n Ql,1(01'1))C ', =b ' ' (3.29)1'0 vol(1 "(01'"))
where ti'j > 0 is such that Q 1(t1') C (1' Vt1'1 > t"'. The following extremes cases
are possible:
(i) if t' 1 = 0, then the coverage probability is:
ci'=1. (3.30)
In this case, the set of reachable states at any time is fully contained within the
state-space region defined by the performance requirements. Therefore, the system
always survives this failure. This situation can be visualized in Fig 3.4 for a two-
dimensional case and two different situations. The ruled area represents the region
of the set of all possible initial conditions Q 1 (01,1) that will result in trajectories
fully contained in the set 41 defined by the performance requirements.
X2 11
(a) o,(t"1) C Q'(oo) Vt>1 1 ( 0 (b) Q"'(t1 ) ( 01(oc)
Figure 3.4: Bounding ellipsoid Q 4(t1 '1 and region g " of the state-space that contains the states
that meet the functional performance requirements of the system for a two-dimensional for the case
when Gy(oc) C @i, and 04(t"'1 is such that c" 1.
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(ii) if t'l is very large, a lower bound of the coverage probability is:
1 -vol(QG'(oo))C I' = ' . (3.31)
1,0 vol(Q1'(O')) (.
In this case, although the set of reachable states may not be fully contained within
the state-space region defined by the performance requirements at all times, the
steady-state set of reachable states is. The steady-state set of reachable states is an
invariant set with respect to the system dynamics [51]. Therefore, the trajectories
with initial conditions within the steady-state set of reachable states will remain
within this set. This situation is depicted for a two-dimensional case in Fig. 3.5,
where the ruled area (the region of the set of all possible initial conditions Q1'1(O11)
that will result in trajectories fully contained in the set <b' defined by the perfor-
mance requirements) is now Q1'"(00).
Q2 1,1
' 0b (00')
X1
Figure 3.5: Bounding ellipsoid Q1'(t l and region <D " of the state-space that contains the states
that meet the functional performance requirements of the system for a two-dimensional for the case
when Q4',(oo) c <DI and the value of cl given by 3.31.
2. If Q1'1(oo) 4 ', then:
(i) if Q',4(oo) n <P4'1 = 0, the coverage probability is
10 0. (3.32)
In this case, the steady-state set of reachable states is outside the state-space region
defined by the performance requirements. Therefore, the system never survives
this failure. This situation is depicted for a two-dimensional case in Fig. 3.6(a),
where it can be seen that there is no overlap between Q1'"(oo) and <D"'.
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(ii) if QG'j(oo) n (b'l $ 0, a lower bound for the coverage probability is
vol(,$',' n Q"'(01'1))C 1' = ' .~ (3.33)
',0 vol(Qi' ((0'i))1,1 x,b
where 411 is the largest invariant set with respect to the dynamics of configuration
{1, 1}, such that -$X" C Q1'1(oc)nf1' 1. This is the most difficult case, as it is difficult
to find 44k. Analytical techniques for computing invariant sets with respect to LTI
systems are discussed in [51]. This situation is depicted in Fig. 3.6(b).
-IX
X1
\Q (oo)
X
(a) Qxlb(oo) n <b? = 0.
Figure 3.6: Bounding ellipsoid Q ,1(t,1 and region <D'" of the state-space that contains the states
that meet the functional performance requirements of the system for a two-dimensional for the case
when Qi',(oo) X <121.
3.5 A Series RL Circuit Example
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the concepts introduced in previous sections of
this chapter. Let's consider the series RL circuit displayed in Fig. 3.7, and let's assume that:
1. The analysis is constrained to the effect of resistor failures on the current flowing through
the inductor.
2. The resistors can only fail open circuit with a failure rate of AR, and AR 2 , respectively.
3. The initial current i(0) flowing through the circuit is unknown, but it is such that Ii(0)1 <
. T1/2c
4. The voltage source v (t) is unknown, but it is such that I v(t)| <;: Q 1/2.
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5. The maximum current that resistors R1 and R 2 can process is iR1 and iR2 , respec-
tively, and once this current is reached the resistors fail open.
6. Q, R 1, R 2 , ilax, and iR2 are such that -Q< iR < , and imi > ,eQ' where
is the maximum DC current that can flow through the circuit when both resistors
are operational. Similarly, F is the maximum DC current that can flow through the
circuit when resistor R1 is failed.
7. The system fails with probability 1 if both resistors fail open.
R,
Vi~t)
_ R2 L
Figure 3.7: Series RL Circuit.
Failure-Free Dynamic Behavior
Before any failure, the current i(t'1 0) can be computed by solving
di(t'_ - ) jRvit1 0 )
i(01 -0 ) E Qi(O 1'0), with Q'0(010) f{i(0 1,0) :i(1,0) 1/ 2
v(t 1'0 ) E QG,(t 1,0 ), with Q_ (t1 '0 ) - {v(t, 0 ) : 1v(t 1,0)1 /2 (3.34)
where Req = RR 2 . Let <,"O = {i(t1 '0 ) : Ii(t1'0)I 5 i 1 2x} be the set of acceptable cur-
rent flowing through the circuit, where ibiax is the maximum current flowing through the
circuit such that the current flowing through each resistor is less that its maximum al-
lowed current. Let QGjO(t1'a) denote the set of all possible current at time t10 , such that
Q1'0(t',O) 9 4D1,'. A bounding ellipsoid Q1r0(t 1'0 ) = {i : i'F1 0 (t1 0)- 1 i < 1}, such that
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1,'0(ti'0) c Q1(t 0) C D'", can be computed by solving
dr1______0 = RqL'O1 + 03F1 '0(t1 '0 ) + RegQ
d-1  0  L 1,0 (1,0,
0(010)= '. (3.35)
where F1 '0 (t1 '0 ) is a positive number, and 0 < 01'1 < 1. By taking 1,0 Req/L, which is
the value that minimizes Fsls [50], the solution to (3.35) is given by
1,0(ti'0) = Q + ('i - R)e- ', (3.36)IF--2 q Rq
and the steady-state Fis value is given by
-,0 = ri 0(oo)= (3.37)
eq
Figure 3.8 represents the evolution of the interval in which lies the current flowing through
the circuit. It is important to note that F = < il02x. Thus, even if there is uncer-
tainty in the value of i(t), it will always be within the maximum limits requirement.
t 1 ,0 _ 00 j 1 , 0 -+ 0
I I I I I I
_i,o_ 0 [ 1,o (t)
max -T V 'Rti max
eq eq
Figure 3.8: Series RL Circuit current evolution for T < .
Failure Coverage Probability Computation
Now, let's assume Qi b(oo) has been reached and resistor R1 fails open circuit. The current
flowing through the circuit is now governed by
di(tl ) __= _R 1~t,1 ,
______ 
L +
i(01,1) E Qi(01' ), with Q 'R0(( )1/21eq
v(t 1'1 ) E QV(t" with Q_(t 1 '1 ) = {v(t 1' 1) : Iv(t1 ')I <K Q1/ 2 1. (3.38)
It is important to note that the new initial condition for Q (01) is the steady-state value
Q1 '0 (oo) before the failure occur.
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Let (D" - {i(t'1 ") :Ii(t' 1')I ! i'l with i 1'x = ilx< i 1,0e <D 'a ma max, be the new set that contains
the acceptable current flowing through the circuit. It is easy to understand why the maxi-
mum current flowing through the circuit is smaller now: there is only one resistor in series
with the inductor. Let Q1 1(t11) denote the new set of reachable states.
A new bounding ellipsoid Qi (t ) = {i : iTF'(t ')>i 1}, such that Qfl(tll) 9
Ql'(t 1 "), is given by
Q R2 Q - (3-39)
l (t1') = (R - 2)e (
0000
Fig rei mr ax ma =Re q- t
Figure 3.9: Series RL Circuit current evolution after R1 fails open circuit for Q, R 1, R 2, and
imax such that < imax < eq
By assumption (6), we have that < iiLL < /Q. Figure 3.9 represents this situation.
_R_ 27eq
If i(01' 1 ) takes values within the intervals in red, then the system will fail; on the contrary, if
i(0 1' 1 ) takes values within the interval in blue, the circuit will survive the failure of resistor
R 1. In this case, this is always true because of the dissipative nature of this system. One of
the underlying assumptions is that the reachable currents before and after the failure are
uniform distributed. Thus, the computation of the coverage probability is as follows:
1,1x - (-ilL) . __1F1
ci,o = = a (3.40)
e ,q eq
Similarly, the following coverage probabilities are obtained:
1,0c-1 (3.41)
c1' 0, (3.42)
C22 = 0. (3.43)
The state transition diagram associated with the Markov reliability model is displayed in
Fig. 3.10, and can be described by
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P1,0
P1,1
P2,1
P3,1
P2,2
P4,2
-AR 1 -AR 2
FiR~
'nax AR
(1 - iax Q,)AR1
AR 2
0
0
0
-AR
2
0
0
AR 2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
AR,
0
0
0
0
-AR
1
0
AR1
0
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0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
P1,0
P1,1
P2,1
P3,1
P2,2
P4,2
(3.44)
0
Figure 3.10: State transition diagram associated with the Markov reliability model for the
series RL circuit case-study.
3.6 Probabilistic Measures of Performance and Reliability
The performance metrics Z 1 , Z 2,. . .Zm are useful in determining whether each individual
system configuration is declared as failed or non-failed, and the Markov model given by
(3.20) allows the probabilities of declaring each configuration as non-failed or failed to be
computed. However, it is necessary to define other sets of measures to quantify the system
as a whole, i.e., aggregated measures for all the possible system configurations. System
Reliability R and unreliability Q are examples of these aggregated measures. The defini-
tion of these aggregated measures is very important since they will be used to compare
different system architectures, and to find weak points in a design.
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In order to define these aggregated measures, we will make use of Markov reliability mod-
els (MRM) [52, 53], which have been used extensively to quantify the performability of
computer systems [54]. Every aggregated measure, including System Reliability and Un-
reliability, will be derived from the general MRM formulation [30], which is defined by:
1. a Markov chain X = {X(t) : t > 0}, indexed in time by [0, oo[, and taking values in
some countable set C = {1, 2,. . . N}; and
2. a reward function r : C -* IR, where the reward associated with each i E C is denoted
by r(i).
System reliability R can be obtained by using the indicator function defined in (3.14)
(which takes value 1 when the configuration {i, k} is declared as non-failed, and 0 oth-
erwise) to define the reward model, thus rs(2i - 1, k) = 1 and rs(2i, k) = 0. Then, system
reliability is computed as
R = E(rs) = [ rs(i, k)pi,k(T). (3.45)
i,k
Similarly, system unreliability Q can be computed by defining the reward function r7(2i -
1, k) = 0 and rs(2i, k) = 1, thus
Q = E(rg) rg(i, k)pi,k(T). (3.46)
i,k
Aggregated measures of performance can also be computed for each performance metric
Z, with j = 1, 2, ... m, by defining a reward function as
rzj (i, k) = hj(Zj) V j = 1, 2,.... m (3.47)
where h (-) is a real function. For example, if the Zj performance metric considered is the
electrical power consumption, it is possible to obtain the system average power consump-
tion among all possible non-failed operational conditions by defining ry(2i - 1, k) = zj (i, k)
and rp(2i, k) = 0, thus the average power consumption P, when the system is in a non-
failed configuration, can be computed as
P = E(r7) = 2 rp(i, k)pi,k(t). (3.48)
i,k
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3.7 Differences Between DPRA and the New Methodology
The methodology proposed in this chapter is similar to DPRA in the sense that it makes
use of a dynamic (behavioral) system model, with additional information to model com-
ponent behavior. It also makes use of a Markov chain to model the stochastic transitions
between system configurations that take place when components fail. However, there are
certain aspects to the kind of problems that DPRA tries to solve that make the mathemati-
cal formulation of DPRA much more complex than the formulation of our methodology.
In aerospace and automotive problems the decoupling assumption stated in Section 3.4.1
holds. The system dynamic time constants are on the order of seconds; therefore, when a
component failure occurs, the system either recovers within a short transient period (on the
order of seconds), reaching a new state within the "acceptable" region of the state-space
dictated by the performance requirements, or it quickly diverts towards a state outside the
"acceptable region". In this scenario, the likelihood of two components failing within a
time on the order of magnitude of the system dynamic time constants is negligible relative
to the likelihood of just one component failing. Therefore, the system stochastic behavior
due to component failures can be be modeled as a process independent of the system dy-
namics. Thus, the resulting model is formulated in terms of just the probability of declar-
ing a system configuration non-failed or failed after a sequence of component failures has
occurred.
This is not the case in nuclear power plants, where it is not possible to decouple the stochas-
tic transitions between configurations and system state dynamic variables [37]. In nuclear
power plants, the time constants of the transitions from one configuration to another are
large enough that the likelihood of another failure happening before the system reaches a
new steady-state is relevant. Thus, in DPRA the stochastic model is formulated in terms of
the probability of the system dynamic variables in a given configuration at a given time.
Component Model Definition in DPRA
In the context of DPRA, Amendola proposed a methodology called Logical Analytical
Methodology (LAM) to quantitatively model a component with the following steps [33]:
1. An input-output scheme of the involved physical variables.
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2. A set of equations describing the component nominal behavior.
3. A component failure modes and effect analysis (FMEA).
4. Parametric operators for FMEA synthesis
5. A component logical-analytical model, which analytically describes the component be-
havior in all its possible states.
There are similarities between this modeling method and the operational modes modeling
technique introduced in this chapter. However, there are several aspects that makes the
new modeling approach more general. First, the logical-analytical model described in step
5 is just a parametric representation of the nominal model described in step 2. The pa-
rameters of this logical-analytical model are changed according to the FMEA. In contrast,
the new approach is more general because the non-nominal operational modes models
are not necessarily related to the component failure-free behavior. Second, in the LAM
approach, only transitions from the nominal behavior to the different failure modes are
allowed (according to the linear structure of the FMEA). As mentioned before, the new
approach allows us to define transitions between any behavioral modes. Finally, and most
importantly, unlike the new modeling formalism, the LAM modeling formalism does not
include the stochastic model that governs the transitions among behavioral modes.
System Stochastic Behavior Formulation in DPRA
The stochastic model associated with DPRA is formulated in terms of the probability of the
system dynamic variables in a given configuration at a given time pi,k(x,(t), t). Therefore
the formulation of the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations becomes much more complicated
[35]:
0Pk(X-(t),t) + div(fik(Xs(t), w(t))pik(xS(t), t)) =
-Ai,k (Xs (t), t)Pik (Xs (t), t) + E A' _ (Xs (t), t)Pik-1(x8 (t), t) (3.49)
i,k-1
where Ai,k(x(t), t) results from adding all the individual transition rates that can trigger a
system transition out of configuration {i, k} and it depends on the system state variables
x8 (t). A'k_,(x, (t), t) is the transition rate associated with the behavioral mode transition
that causes the system to go from configuration {i, k - 1} to system configuration {i, k} and
it depends on the system state variables x,, (t) as well. The added complexity in (3.49) with
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respect to (3.19) resides in the additional divergency div term on the left side of (3.49) and
the fact that the transition rates depend on the system state variables x, (t). Thus, unlike
the proposed methodology, to obtain an analytical solution in DPRA becomes untractable
for even simple problems. Thus several techniques based on discretization of time and
state variables, and Monte Carlo simulation have been proposed to obtain a solution [36].
3.8 Conclusions
The methodology presented in this chapter uses a quantitative mathematical model of the
behavior of the system to be analyzed. The model includes not only the system nominal
behavior (no component failures), but also degraded behaviors due to failed components.
This is an important feature of the methodology, since the system evaluation in the pres-
ence of failures no longer relies on the judgment of the analyst to assess whether or not a
sequence of component failures will cause the system to fail or not. Furthermore, by using
a quantitative system behavioral model, it is possible to evaluate degraded system opera-
tional modes, i.e., the analysis is not "system fails or not", the analysis now allows one to
assess the "degree of failure" of a system.
Notation Used in this Chapter
A: Markov model state-transition matrix
B, : Bias factor
c ' _k : Failure coverage probability for a transition from configuration {j, k - 1} to {i, k}
ci : Component i
c, r: Markov reward model parameters
C1, C 2 : Capacitor values in RLC circuit example
DPRA: Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment
ESCS: Event Sequences and Consequences Spectrum
FMEA: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
f(-, ( -) : State evolution function for the j behavioral mode of component ci
fai'k (., .) : State evolution function for system configuration {i, k}
Fi'k (.,.) : State-transition matrix for system configuration {i, k}
g , (-,-): Output function for the j behavioral mode of component ci
gk (-,-): Output function for system configuration {i, k}
Fik (.,.) : Control matrix for system configuration {i, k}
G, 9 : Sensor behavioral model example gain change factor
hj (-) : Reward model function for performance metric j
i(t) : Current through RLC circuit example
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LAM: Logical Analytical Methodology
Li : Inductance value in RLC circuit example
Pi,k (t): Probability that the system configuration is in configuration {i, k} at time t given that at t = 0 is in {1, 0}
P(t) :System configurations probability vector
Q : System unreliability, Positive semi definite matrix associated to the system input uncertainty
rz, : Reward model associated with performance metric Z,
rs Reward function associated to the reliability measure computation
ry : Reward function associated to the unreliability measure computation
ry : Reward function associated to the power aggregated performance measure example
R1 : Resistor value in RLC circuit example
R, : Sensor behavioral model example resolution
Si, (k : Indicator function for the status of configuration {i, kI
t : System global evaluation time
ti,k : Configuration {i, k} time-axis
W(t) :System input
uc1 (t): Sensor behavioral model example input
uc, (t): Component ci input
Uc, (t): Component ci operational modes random variable
v(t) : Voltage source in RLC circuit example
x, 1 (t) : Sensor behavioral model example state variables
xci (t) : Component ci state variables
x, (t) : System state variables
X(t): Random variable associated to the status of a Markov chain
y" (t): System output
Yc (t): Sensor behavioral model example output
yc (t) : Component ci output
Zj : Performance metric j
Amn.: m-to-n component behavioral mode transition rate
ANO : Nominal-to-omission behavioral mode transition rate for sensor behavioral model example
ANG: Nominal-to-gain-change behavioral mode transition rate for sensor behavioral model example
ANB : Nominal-to-bias behavioral mode transition rate for sensor behavioral model example
AGO: Gain-change-to-omission behavioral mode transition rate for sensor behavioral model example
ABO : Bias-to-omission behavioral mode transition rate for sensor behavioral model example
Aim: Transition from operational mode i to operational mode m
\ ' :_ Transition rate from system configuration {j, k - 1} to configuration {i, k)
a,-1 (.) : r -shift operator
TI: Sensor behavioral model example latency
-r : Inverse of sensor behavioral model example bandwidth
.'k (ttk) : Set of reachable states for configuration {i, k}
( (tik) : Set of possible system inputs
i~k. Set that defines the performance requirements of performance metric Z, for configuration {i, k}
: State-space region dictated by the performance requirements set of performance metric Zj
for configuration {i, k}
4X : State-space region dictated by the intersection of the performance requirements sets for
configuration {i, k}
e : A subset of the set QX' (otk) such that, if the system state variables are contained inside,
then the trajectories followed by the system are to remain, at all times, within 4)'
qli,k :Positive semi definite matrix associated with the uncertainty of the initial conditions when
the system transitions to configuration {i, k}
i,k (ti,k) : Positive semi definite matrix associated with the system states evolution uncertainty when
the system is in configuration {i, k}
r., : Steady-state value of ri k(ik)
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This chapter presents a MATLAB/SIMULINK@ tool that supports the methodology intro-
duced in Chapter 3 -InPRESTo, an acronym for Integrated Performance and Reliability
Evaluation SIMULINK® Toolbox. An overview of the tool structure and capabilities will
be presented. The definition of system behavioral models in the SIMULINK@ environ-
ment will be explained in detail, as well as the system performance metrics definition and
their associated requirements. The basic functionality of the tool will also be presented, as
well as an explanation of the tool structure. Appendix B contains the tool subroutines flow
diagram and the MATLAB@ source code
4.1 Introduction
The methodology presented in Chapter 3 can be used to evaluate the reliability and perfor-
mance of a system architecture and help identify weak points in the system. This allows
for improvements in subsequent iterations of the system design. It can also be used in
a slightly different way to compare different architecture alternatives to help identify the
optimal design in terms of reliability and performance. However, these tasks can be daunt-
ing if performed manually, due to the large number of components that a fairly complex
system may have. Therefore, in order to make the application of the methodology feasible,
a MATLAB/SIMULINK@ based tool -InPRESTo- was developed. This tool automates
the evaluation process of a system defined in the SIMULINK@ environment.
The ability of InPRESTo to analyze different complex systems has been shown in several
case-studies. In Chapter 5, a lateral-directional flight control system case-study will be pre-
sented to illustrate how the toolbox can be used to identify weak points in a system design
and how they can be improved thorough different design iterations. Chapter 6 presents
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a steer-by-wire case-study that shows how to use InPRESTo for comparing two conceptu-
ally very different architectural approaches for achieving fault tolerance. InPRESTo is now
also being used by the Systems Engineering and Evaluation Division at the Charles Stark
Draper Laboratory for the evaluation of space and tactical systems.
The purpose of the chapter is to explain the toolbox structure and main features, and also
point to ways in which the tool could be improved. Section 4.2 presents the functionality
of InPRESTo. Section 4.3 explains how to define the necessary inputs to perform a system
analysis, i.e., the system dynamics behavioral model, the system performance metrics and
their associated requirements, and the evaluation parameters. Section 4.4 explains how
to run an analysis. Section 4.5 explains how to visualize the analysis results. Section 4.6
presents an overview of the tool structure. Finally, Section 4.7 highlights further develop-
ment that could be done to improve InPRESTo's functionality.
4.2 Functionality
InPRESTo provides an environment for integrating system performance and reliability
evaluation. The toolbox helps the analyst to:
" thoroughly evaluate system behavior in the presence of component failures;
" evaluate the effectiveness of failure detection, isolation, and reconfiguration mecha-
nisms (FDIR);
" uncover weak design points, i.e., single points of failure and common modes of failure;
* quantify the main contributors to system unreliability;
" quantify the advantages of using a specific architecture among different alternatives.
The basic functionality of InPRESTo is displayed in Fig. 4.1. The inputs to InPRESTo are:
* The system dynamics behavioral model defined in the SIMULINK® environment. The
component failure behavior can be built into each component model by "drag and drop"
from a SIMULINK® library called Failure Models. This library can be accessed from the
SIMULINK® GUI, and contains several failure models.
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" System performance metrics and their requirements, which are defined within the SIMULINK®
system behavioral model. There is a library called Performance Metrics with predefined
performance metrics models from which the analyst can "drag and drop" as well.
" Evaluation parameters, which are additional parameters needed to run the analysis.
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SIMULINK® library browser
EVALUATION PARAMETERS
eGlobal evaluation time
-Configuration evaluation time
HO
-- 2
SIMULINK* system dynamics behavioral model,
performance metrics (and their requirements)
InPRESTo
* Failure sequences performance evaluation
* Reliability/Unreliability calculations
-Probabilistic measures of performance calculations
-Sensitivity analysis
Figure 4.1: Basic functionality of InPRESTo.
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InPRESTo will use the evaluation engine described in 4.6, which was coded as a collec-
tion of MATLAB@ functions. The tool can perform exhaustive analyses of all possible
sequences of component failures that can yield a system failure, or the analysis can be
truncated when sequences of component failures of a certain size are reached. In the latter
case, bounds on the reliability and unreliability are calculated to estimate the error intro-
duced by truncating the analysis. InPRESTo can also calculate probabilistic measures of
performance.
All the analysis results are automatically collected in several excel spreadsheets similar to
the system level FMEAs shown in Section 2.3.1. The tool also allows the user to analyze
and visualize the system behavior for chosen sequences of component failures. All the
data analysis is also collected in several MATLAB@ data files, and the information they
contained can be retrieved any time after the evaluation is finished.
4.3 Defining the Inputs to InPRESTo
This section explains in detail how to define the three inputs necessary to carry out a sys-
tem performance and reliability evaluation.
1. System dynamics behavioral model, which is constructed in the SIMULINK® environ-
ment;
2. Performance metrics and their associated requirements which are defined, as well,
within the SIMULINK@ system behavioral model; and
3. Evaluation parameters, which are defined through the MATLAB@ Command Window.
4.3.1 System Dynamics Behavioral Model Definition
The system dynamics behavioral model is defined in SIMULINK®. As mentioned in Chap-
ter 3, the system configurations are one of the main elements of the methodology. Theo-
retically it is necessary to have all the system configurations beforehand in order to carry
out the analysis. In practice, the system failure-free configuration ({1, 0} in equation (3.8))
is modeled in SIMULINK® by interconnecting the nominal models of each component,
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Figure 4.2: SIMULINK® Control Surface Position Sensor Model.
and afterwards augmenting each component nominal model with a corresponding fail-
ure behavior model. The realization of the remaining system configurations is carried out
through simulation by injecting different sequences of component failure modes.
To illustrate how a system model is defined, we will show how to model one of the com-
ponents within a model. The complete system model will emerge after connecting all the
component models. Fig. 4.2 shows a SIMULINK® model for one of the control surface
position sensors of the case-study presented in Chapter 5.
The mathematical model from which this example was developed is also shown in Section
3.2.1. On the upper part of Fig. 4.2, the elements labeled Transfer Fcn, Delay, and Reso-
lution are common SIMULINK® blocks that allow the sensor functional properties to be
modeled.
The block on the upper-right of Fig. 4.2, named Failures, is the component failure behavior
model. The content of the Failures block is displayed on the right bottom of Fig. 4.2. The
failure behavior of the sensor depends on the Switch control input Up, which is controlled
automatically by the MATLAB® evaluation engine (Section 4.6). For Uf = 0, the Switch
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File Edit View Help
Omission: Failure model implementation. Omission failure mode sets the output
block to zero regardless the input value. The failure rates specified for each failure
mode can be constant, e.g., 1 e-6; or time-dependent, e.g., 1 e-6+1 e-7*t^2.
N Fuzzy Logic Toolbox
* InPRESTo
Failure models - Omission, and random
±H Actuators Omission, random, stuck at last value,
N Processors and delayed
Sensors F 1 Stuck at zero, and stuck at one
N Performance metrics
a Link for ModelSim
Ready
Figure 4.3: SIMULINK@ library browser displaying a library called InPRESTo that includes pre-
defined failure models and performance metrics models.
block input 0 is passed to the output, meaning the sensor is failure-free. When the Switch
control input Uf is set to 1, 2, or 3, the inputs 1, 2,3 of the Switch block are passed to the
output, modeling, respectively, Omission, Gain-Change and Bias failure modes. Several
failure models have been predefined and can be inserted in the model by "drag and drop"
from a SIMULINK@ library called Failure models, displayed in Fig. 4.3. This library can
be accessed from the SIMULINK@ GUI. Failure models are available for actuators, pro-
cessors, and sensors, and new categories could be created if considered necessary by the
user. The failure models within the library have been created using SIMULINK@ masked
subsystems and can be modified by the user.
The bottom-left of Fig. 4.2 shows the GUI through which the user interfaces with the
Failures block, allowing the definition of failure rates for each failure mode. In this case, we
have used Omission, Gain-change, and Bias. It is possible to define constant failure rates
and time-dependent failure rates if component wear-out mechanisms are to be modeled.
The Failures block GUI allows other parameters of the component failure model to be
defined. In this case, the Gain-change factor and the Bias factor. The component can only
go from the non-failed status to any of the failed statuses defined by the failure modes, but
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Figure 4.4: SIMULINK® performance metric model definition.
once it is in a failed status, it remains there, it cannot fail in a different mode.
4.3.2 Performance Metrics Definition and Requirements Specification
The performance metrics, as well as their requirements, are defined within the SIMULINK®
system behavioral model. Figure 4.4 illustrates how to define a performance metric. The
content of the Performance metric block is displayed on the right bottom of Fig. 4.4, which
defines the performance metric as the difference between the output of the system under
evaluation and a reference, e.g., the output of the system under evaluation with no fail-
ures. The bottom-left of the figure shows the GUI through which the user interfaces with
the Performance metric block, allowing the definition of requirements (in the form of upper
and lower bounds).
There are several performance metrics models predefined in the SIMULINK@ InPRESTo
library, Fig. 4.3, that can be inserted in the model by "drag and drop". The user can add new
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performance metrics models to this library, and modify the existing ones.
4.3.3 Evaluation Parameters
There are several parameters that need to be defined before a system evaluation can be
carried out. These are:
" Global evaluation time T(h). This is the time that will be used for evaluating the
Markov reliability model. Depending on the system, it can be the lifetime, or the mis-
sion time, or the time between scheduled maintenance actions.
" Truncation level kmax. If system evaluation truncation is enabled, the truncation level
kma, is the maximum size of failure sequences that will evaluated, i.e., the maximum
number of failed elements within a sequence of failures.
* Configuration evaluation time tc(s). The total time for simulating a system configu-
ration reached after a sequence of component failures occurred. It is assumed that the
analyst will pick t, several times larger than the system's largest time constant.
* Failure rates factor for sensitivity analysis. If sensitivity analysis is required, this is
the factor by which each component failure rate value will be multiplied and the result
added to the nominal failure rate value.
4.4 Invoking InPRESTo
InPRESTo is invoked from the MATLAB@ command window. Figure 4.5 shows a snapshot
of the this window when invoking InPRESTo. As can be seen, the parameters mentioned
in Section 4.3.3 are entered through the MATLAB® command window.
Before invoking InPRESTo, make sure that the SIMULINK@ model of the system to be
evaluated is opened; and that the MATLAB@ path is set to the system SIMULINK® model
directory. Then follow these steps:
1. Type Inpresto in the MATLAB@ command window.
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Figure 4.5: Snapshot of the MATLAB® command window when invoking InPRESTo.
2. Enter the name of the SIMULINK@ model without including the mdl extension, e.g., if
the model file name is mode l_name .mdl, then just type mode l_name.
3. Enter the global evaluation time T in hours.
4. If truncation of system evaluation is to performed, then type the command y, otherwise
type the command n.
5. If truncation was chosen, then enter the truncation level kmax.
6. Enter the configuration evaluation time t, in seconds.
7. If sensitivity analysis is to be performed, then enter the command y, otherwise enter n.
8. If sensitivity analysis was required in step 7, then enter the failure rates factor for sensi-
tivity analysis.
9. Enter the name of the EXCEL® result s_file_name . xis, in which the evaluation
results are to be collected.
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4.5 Analysis Results Visualization
The analysis results are collected in an EXCEL® spreadsheet and all the relevant variables
created during the evaluation are stored in several MATLAB® data files: mat r i x__model . mat,
which stores the Markov reliability model state-transition matrix, and model_r esults . mat,
which stores the rest of the variables created during the analysis. It is possible to visual-
ize the dynamic behavior of the performance metrics for individual system configurations
after all the analyses are completed.
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Figure 4.6: A snapshot of an EXCEL® spreadsheet results file showing the
sets of sequences of failures of the same size.
results for one of the
4.5.1 Reliability and Probabilistic Measures of Performance
The performance and reliability analysis results are collected in several sheets of the same
EXCEL® spreadsheet. Each row of the EXCEL® spreadsheet shown in Fig. 4.6 is associated
with a system configuration, and it includes the following information:
* Column A: Failed components. The sequence of component failures leading to a unique
system configuration.
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" Column B: Failure rate. The failure rate value associated with the last component to
fail in the sequence displayed in Column A.
" Column C: State. An identifier that maps each system configuration into a state of the
Markov reliability model.
" Column D: Probability. The probability of being in that system configuration at the
global evaluation time T.
* Column E: Status. A binary variable that will take the value 1 if the configuration
reached after the sequence of component failures displayed in Column A is declared
non-failed, and 0 otherwise.
" Columns F, G, H, I,...: Performance metrics. The performance metrics' values in that
system configuration.
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Figure 4.7: Snapshot of an EXCEL@ spreadsheet results file showing system reliability and unre-
liability values, the failure-free configuration probability, and the probabilistic measures of perfor-
mance associated with each performance metric.
Additionally, system reliability and unreliability values, the failure-free configuration prob-
ability; and the probabilistic measures of performance associated with each performance
metric are collected in a separate sheet of the EXCEL® spreadsheet results file. Figure 4.7
shows a snapshot of this sheet, which includes the following information:
" Column B; rows 2-7: System with no failures. The Probability of being in the failure-
free configuration at the global evaluation time T; and the performance metrics' values
for the nominal configuration.
" Column D, and E; rows 2-7: Probabilities per failure level. For each failure level
(system configurations with the same number of failed components), the probability of
having declared a configuration as non-failed, or as failed.
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* Column B, C, D, E, ... ; rows 10-11: Probabilistic measures of performance. For each
performance metric, different probabilistic measures of performance can be computed,
i.e., expected value, or expected value of the absolute value deviation with respect to
the nominal behavior.
* Column B, C, D ... ; rows 14-15: Reliability and unreliability. System reliability and
unreliability. If the evaluation is truncated, lower and upper bounds for those are dis-
played, as well as the error in their estimation.
4.5.2 Performance of Individual System Configurations
When the system evaluation is completed, it is possible to visualize the dynamic behavior
of one or more system variables. This option allows the analyst to inspect the system
transient behavior for the last component failure for any given sequence of component
failures.
Variables to be displayed
Outport
Mux
Figure 4.8: Definition of the system variables whose dynamic behavior is to be displayed.
Before invoking the plotting subroutine, it is necessary to define, in SIMULINK@, which
system variables are to be plotted. The steps to define the variables to be displayed, Fig.
4.8, can be summarized as:
* From the SIMULINK@ library browser, drag an Outport block into the top level of the
SIMULINK@ system model.
* From the SIMULINK® library browser, drag a Mux block into the top level of the SIMULINK®
system model and connect it to the Outport.
* Modify the number of inputs that go into the Mux block to accommodate the number of
system variables to be displayed.
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. Connect each system variable to be displayed to an input of the Mux block.
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Figure 4.9: Visualization of the behavior corresponding to
system case-study presented in Chapter 5.
the lateral-directional flight control
After the variables to be displayed are defined as explained above, InPRESTo's plotting
subroutine is invoked by typing the command Inpresto-plot in the MATLAB@ com-
mand window. Then, the MATLAB® prompt will request the failure injection time tf,
which is the time when a failure is initiated after the simulation of each configuration is
running, with tf < t. The MATLAB@ prompt will then request which system configu-
ration dynamic behavior is to be displayed. By typing the identifier of each configuration
as it appears in column C of the EXCEL® spreadsheet, Fig. 4.6, the required system con-
figuration dynamic behavior will be plotted. Figure 4.9 shows a dynamic behavior plot
corresponding to the lateral-directional flight control system for the case-study presented
in Chapter 5.
4.6 Program Flow
InPRESTo will simulate each possible system configuration to check whether or not the
performance requirements are met, until all possible sequences are exhausted or until the
analysis is truncated. As the performance of the system is evaluated for each sequence
of component failures, the state-transition matrix associated with the Markov reliability
model is built. The functional flow diagram of InPRESTO is displayed in Fig. 4.10, and
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the functions performed in each box of the flow diagram are explained in the remainder of
this section. Appendix B contains a more detailed flow diagram, as well as the subroutines'
MATLAB@ source codes.
SIMULINK system
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Figure 4.10: Functional flow diagram.
Analysis of the system with no failures
The SIMULINK@ system model is simulated to obtain the system's nominal behavior, i.e.,
its behavior with no failures.
Construction of first-level Markov states
1. States for all possible system single failures Ni are constructed, where N, is the sum of
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failure modes of all the system components.
2. For each system single-failure constructed in step 1 a new entry is added to the Markov
model state-transition matrix.
Analysis of failure sequences of size 1
1. Each possible system single-failure is injected in the SIMULINK@ model, resulting in
the realization of N1 new system configurations.
2. The behavior of the N1 single-failure configurations is simulated for a period of time t,
(configuration evaluation time) and for a given system control input w(t). At the beginning
of the simulation period, the system state variables x, (t) are set to their values at the
end of the simulation period for the system with no failures.
3. The simulation of each configuration is carried out for 9 different equidistant failure
injection times t', i.e., t' = 1i for i = 1,..., 9. For each failure injection time tf, the
performance metrics are checked. If they do not meet requirements, the configuration
is declared as failed (for the particular injection time). If the performance requirements
are met, then the configuration is declared as non-failed (for the particular injection
time).
4. The failure coverage probability is computed as the ratio of the number of runs that
meet performance requirements in step (3) and the total number of runs 9.
After the analysis of single-failure configurations is carried out, the operations listed below
take place until all the sequences of component failures result in failed system configura-
tions, or the analysis is truncated.
Construction of (k + 1)-level Markov states
1. The sequences of component failures of size k > 1 resulting in configurations with non-
zero failure coverage probability are used to construct the remaining sequences with
(k + 1) failed elements.
2. For each (k + 1)-failure sequence a new entry is added to the Markov model state-
transition matrix.
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Analysis of failure sequences of size k + 1
1. Each possible (k + 1) failure sequence is injected in the SIMULINK@ model, resulting
in the realization of Nk+1 new system configurations.
2. The behavior of the Nk+1 configurations (with (k + 1) components failed) is simulated
for a period of time t, (configuration evaluation time) and for a given system control input
w(t). At the the beginning of the simulation period, the system state variables x,(t)
are set to their values at the end of the simulation period for the configuration with the
sequence of k failures that generated the new k + 1 failures sequence.
3. The simulation of each configuration is carried out for 9 different equidistant (failure
injection times) t', i.e., t' = { i for i = 1, ... , 9. For each failure injection time, the
performance metrics are checked. If they do not meet requirements, the configuration
is declared as failed (for the particular injection time). If the performance requirements
are met, then the configuration is declared as non-failed (for the particular injection
time).
4. The failure coverage probability is computed as the ratio of the number of runs of step
(3) that meet the performance requirements in step (3) and the total number of runs 9.
Once all possible sequences of component failures are analyzed and the state-transition
matrix is built, the following steps take place in order to compute reliability and perfor-
mance measures.
Calculation of reliability and performance measures. The set of differential equations
associated with the Markov reliability model is automatically solved, and reliability, unre-
liability and other probabilistic measures of performance are automatically obtained.
Sensitivity Analysis. In order to understand the influence of component failure rates, it
is possible to carry out a sensitivity analysis on the system reliability and performance
measures solution.
4.7 Further Development
Although InPRESTo has proved to be a very powerful tool for the performance and reliabil-
ity evaluation of fault-tolerant systems, it needs further development. In order to make it
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more user-friendly, development of a GUI would facilitate the data input, post-evaluation
results handling and visualization.
As shown in Section 4.3.1, the component behavioral models are built in such a way that
the failure model only modifies the nominal output of the component. This is a powerful
approach since the system nominal model (no component failure behavior models) can be
developed first. It is possible then to add the failure models to each component tp obtain
the complete system behavioral model. This approach to modeling component failure be-
havior is sufficient in most cases. However, there might be cases where this approach is not
sufficient. Therefore, an improvement to the tool would be to implement the more general
component modeling approach presented in Section 3.2.1. In this approach, the compo-
nent behavior is modeled as a collection of dynamic models; each of them representing a
different component failure behavior.
In terms of the stochastic model that governs the failure behavior of the components, the
current implementation only allows the component to fail from its failure-free operational
mode to each of the predefined failure modes. Once these are reached, no other transitions
are allowed. To make the stochastic model more general, it would be necessary to modify
the tool so transitions between different operational modes and even back to the failure-
free operational mode would be possible, to allow modeling transient component failures.
Regarding the component failure rates, time-dependent failure rates can be defined, which
is a big advantage to modeling wear-out mechanisms. However, to improve further the
component failure models, it would necessary to be able to define state-dependent failure
rates.
The current implementation of InPRESTo only considers one predefined system input sig-
nal to carry out the analysis. For time-varying inputs, the uncertainty at which time the
failure occurs is taken into account in the computation of the failure coverage probabil-
ity, as explained in Section 4.6. However, considering only one predefined input signal is
not enough to cover all the possible values that the control input can take. Therefore, it
is necessary to implement a simulation strategy to choose random values from the set of
possible system control inputs. As a result of this, it will be necessary to implement the
Monte-Carlo approach to compute failure coverage probabilities as discussed in Section
3.4.1.
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Notation Used in this Chapter
T : Global evaluation time
kmax: Truncation level
te: Configuration evaluation time
tf Failure injection time
w(t): System input
Uf: Component failure model switch control input
x(t) System state variables
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Lateral-Directional Flight Control System
Case-Study
In this chapter, we present a case-study of a fault-tolerant architecture for a fighter aircraft
lateral-directional flight control system. The purpose of this case-study is to show how
the performance and reliability evaluation SIMULINK@ toolbox -InPRESTo- presented
in Chapter 4 can be used to identify weak points in the system design, guide the design
pointing out to possible solutions to eliminate the uncovered weak points, compare differ-
ent architecture alternatives from different perspective, and test different failure detection,
isolation, and reconfiguration (FDIR) techniques. Part of the the work presented in this
chapter appears in [42].
5.1 Introduction
Most modern fighter aircrafts make use of fly-by-wire technology, i.e., there is no mechan-
ical linkage between the stick or the pedals, and the control surfaces. Therefore, there is a
need for a control system, including sensors, actuators and a computer, to transform the
pilot inputs into commands for the control surfaces. There are two main reasons for the
use of fly-by-wire technology: the lack of mechanical linkages reduces the weight of the
aircraft; and the use of a computer to control the aircraft allows an aerodynamically unsta-
ble design that results in increased maneuverability. Thus, in order to fly and maintain the
aircraft controllability, the control system must work at any time. Therefore, it is clear that
a fault-tolerant control system is needed in order to prevent losing the aircraft, aborting a
mission, or endangering the pilot's life if a failure occurs in the control system.
In this chapter, a case-study for the lateral-directional flight control system of a fighter
aircraft is presented. This case-study shows how to use InPRESTo to guide the design pro-
cess of aircraft avionics systems. In Section 5.2, the design goals that must be achieved are
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set forth. Section 5.3 defines the performance metrics and their associated requirements
that will be used to conduct the system performance evaluation. Section 5.4 presents a
first architectural alternative, called the dual channel architecture (DCa), in which only
pure redundancy is used as a vehicle to achieve fault-tolerance. The analysis results of
this first alternative will show that redundancy is not enough to achieve the design goals.
This analysis also uncovers the weak design points, and gives guidance to improving the
architecture. In Section 5.5 an improved design of the dual channel architecture, called
enhanced dual channel architecture (EDCa), is presented and thoroughly analyzed. The
analysis will show that this architecture does not meet all the design goals either, and will
also show how this design can be further improved. Section 5.6 presents a further im-
proved architecture, called dual-dual channel architecture (DDCa). The three architectural
alternatives are compared in Section 5.7. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 5.8.
5.2 Design Goals
For the system under consideration, the design goals are threefold:
1. The system must tolerate any single component failure, i.e, it must be single fault-
tolerant.
2. The system must be able to operate without any maintenance for 500 h.
3. The system dependability rate \(T) (as defined in (A.5)) must not exceed 10-6 fail-
ures/hour.
From (2) and (3), a system unreliability Q at the end of the maintenance period of 5 -10-4
results.
5.3 System Performance Metrics Definition and Associated Re-
quirements
The first step in carrying out the analysis of any system is to establish its performance
metrics and associated requirements. In this case, the performance metrics chosen are the
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aircraft state variables: the sideslip 0(t), the body axis roll rate pb(t), the body axis yaw
rate rb(t), and the body axis roll angle 0(t). Thus:
Z= 0(t), (5.1)
Z2= pb(t), (5.2)
Z3= rb(t), (5.3)
Z4 =q(t). (5.4)
The dynamic behavior of a reference aircraft [41] (see Appendix C for the model details)
will be used to define the performance metrics requirements. This reference aircraft state
variables are denoted by the sub index r, i.e., the sideslip is denoted by r (t), the body axis
roll rate by Pb, (t), the body axis yaw rate by rb, (t), and the body axis roll angle by 0r (t).
Thus, the performance metrics requirements are defined as
{zi = 0(t) E JR / 0| (t) - f3r(t) icc < r,3}, (5.5)
QZ2 = {pb(t) E IR I IP(t) - Pr(tI|O rb }, (5.6)
Qz3 = {rb(t) E JR / 11 rb(t) - rb,(t)lo 5 rl6}, (5.7)
Qz4 = {(t) E JR /I OM(t) - qr(t) Ioo < rg}, (5.8)
where r3 = 0.15rad, rP = 0.45rad/s, rrb = 0.45rad/s, and r4, = 0.15rad.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, when using InPRESTo for the analysis of any system, it is nec-
essary to define the system control inputs that will be used to evaluate each configuration.
In this case, a 0.2rad, 0.1Hz square wave in the roll command 5c was chosen, which is
displayed in Fig. 5.1 together with the reference aircraft dynamic response.
5.4 Dual Channel Architecture: Pure Redundancy
The proposed dual channel architecture (DCa), Fig. 5.2, is based on the use of pure redun-
dancy. No FDIR mechanisms are implemented, except for voting algorithms for the triple
redundant measurements. The architecture is composed of two redundant primary flight
computers (PFC1 and PFC 2) that receive information about aircraft attitude from three re-
dundant inertial measurement units (IMU 1, IMU 2 and IMU 3) cross strapped to both com-
puters; and also information about the control surface position from triple redundant posi-
tion sensors for the rudder (RPS1, RPS2 and RPS3), left aileron (LAPS1, LAPS2 and LAPS3 ),
- 105 -
Chapter 5 Lateral-Directional Flight Control System Case-Study
Chapter 5 Lateral-Directional Flight Control System Case-Study
0.2
0.
0.1
0.
0.0.
-0.0
-0.1
-0.
-0.2
5 -ol cmm -d
5-
2
5
0-
5 - Sideslip
-Roll rate p
5 - Yaw rate r
Roll angle$
2- Yaw commnand 8
5- 
-- Roll commrand$
0 5 10 15 20
Time [s]
Figure 5.1: Reference aircraft response to a 0.2rad, O.1Hz square wave in the roll command #c.
Sideslip response 3, roll rate response Pb, yaw rate response rb, and roll angle response, for the
system in its nominal configuration.
and right aileron (RAPS1, RAPS2 and RAPS3 ) also cross strapped to both computers. Both
PFCs have a voting algorithm implemented to compute the actual aircraft attitude from the
triple redundant IMUs measurements, and voting algorithms for each set of triple LAPSs,
RAPSs, and RPSs measurements. Both PFCs have also implemented control laws for com-
puting the appropriate commands for the control surface actuation subsystems based on
the IMUs measurements and the pilot inputs through the stick and the pedals. Each con-
trol surface is actuated by two redundant actuation subsystems, LAAS 1, and LAAS 2 for
the left aileron; RAAS1 , and RAAS2 for the right aileron; and RAS,, and RAS2 for the rud-
der. The outputs of each pair of actuation subsystems are mechanically combined to pro-
duce the appropriate command for the corresponding control surface. Each element of the
control-surface-actuation-subsystem pair is commanded independently from each PFC.
Therefore, there are three actuation subsystems per PFC, commanding both left and right
ailerons, and the rudder. Each actuation subsystem is composed of a current-controlled
electric motor. When any of the above mentioned hardware components fails, it remains
in the control loop, and the additional redundant units are supposed to compensate for the
failure.
To complete the system behavioral model, a linear lateral-directional aircraft dynamics
model [55], [56] interacting with the avionics architecture model described above is in-
cluded. The state variables of this model are the sideslip #, the body axis roll rate pb, the
body axis yaw rate rb, and the body axis roll angle 4. The control surface commands are
both left and right aileron angles 61 and r,, and the rudder angle 6r. The complete state-
space representation of the aircraft lateral-directional dynamics is shown in Appendix C.
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The component behavioral models for each hardware and software component, i.e., pri-
mary flight computers (PFC), voting algorithms, control laws, inertial measurements units
(IMU), rudder position sensors (RPS), left and right aileron position sensors (LAPS and
RAPS), rudder actuation subsystems (RAS), left and right aileron actuation subsystems
(LAAS and RAAS) rudder (R), left aileron (LA), and right aileron (RA) are described in
Appendix C.
Table 5.1: Component failure model parameters.
Component Failure modes Description U1  A(/h)
PFC 1, PFC2  Omission Output set to zero 1 2- 10-
Random Random output between -5 and 5 2 10-'
Stuck Output stuck at last correct value 3 10-7
Delayed Output delayed 0.2 s 4 10-7
LAAS1, LAAS 2, RAAS 1  Omission Output set to zero 1 10-6
RAAS2, RAS1, RAS2  Stuck Output stuck at last correct value 2 106
R, LA, RA, Omission Output set to zero 1 10-8
Trailing Output commanded by the aircraft 2 10-1
dynamics
IMU 1 , IMU 2, IMU3  Omission Output set to zero 1 4 -10-
Gain change Output scaled by a factor of 1.5 2 3. 10-7
Biased Output biased by a factor of 0.3 3 3- 10-7
LAPS1, LAPS2, LAPS3, Omission Output set to zero 1 4. 10-7
RAPS1, RAPS2, RAPS3, Gain change Output scaled by a factor of 1.5 2 3. 10-7
RPS1, RPS2, RPS3  Biased Output biased by a factor of 0.3 3 3. 10-7
Table 5.1 collects information corresponding to the failure models of the different hard-
ware components. The possible failure modes of each component are listed in column 2,
while column 3 is an explanation of the effect of each failure mode on the component be-
havior. U1 in column 4 is the variable that assigns the corresponding failure mode to the
component behavioral model equations (see Appendix C). The last column of the table
collects the failure rates A associated with each failure mode, which are necessary to build
the state-transition matrix associated with the Markov reliability model.
5.4.1 Performance and Reliability Evaluation
The system evaluation was carried under specific conditions. The aircraft is considered to
be in a cruising phase with forward velocity V = 178 m/s, pitch angle ao = 0.216 rad and
a cruising altitude of 10, 668 m. Under these conditions, the aircraft time constants dictate
a configuration evaluation time t, = 20 s.
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Table 5.2: Dual channel architecture: single points of failure and unreliability for different levels
of truncation and an evaluation time of 500 h.
Truncation Unreliability Unreliability Single points # of system
level lower bound upper bound of failure configurations
2 5.12- 10-4 5.82. 10-4 11 64
3 5.20. 10-4 5.20. 10-4 11 3088
Table 5.2 shows he number of single points of failure and the probability of system failure
(unreliability) at the end of the maintenance period for different levels of truncation. This
design does not meet the single fault-tolerance requirement as there are 11 single points
of failure. Truncating after three component failure events yields a system unreliability of
5.20. 104, which is slightly larger than the design requirement (Q < 5 - 10-4).
There is a trade-off between achieving a higher accuracy in estimating reliability and com-
putational time for performing the evaluation. By truncating the evaluation at the second
level, only 64 system configurations are evaluated, and the evaluation takes less than 4
minutes. If the truncation is done at the third level, 3088 possible configurations are ana-
lyzed and the evaluation takes 2 hours and 46 minutes. The computation was carried out
on a machine with a 2.1 GHz Pentium@ M processor, and 1.5Gb of RAM.
For clarity, in the remaining results analysis, only the response of one performance metric
- the aircraft roll angle # - will be analyzed. For several single failures, the aircraft roll
angle response # will be plotted together with the reference aircraft model response 0r, for
a 0.2rad, 0.1Hz square wave roll command #.
Single aileron failures
Figure 5.3(a) shows the roll angle aircraft response 0, and reference model response #r,
for a single failure in the left aileron, in which it fails by getting stuck at the position it
was in when the failure occurred. Although the system performance is degraded, the
performance metrics (i.e., the aircraft state variables) remain within their requirements.
Fig. 5.3(b) shows the aircraft response for another failure of the left aileron. The failure
mode is such that the aileron is now commanded by the aircraft dynamics, i.e., the aileron
trails. In this case, the failure is catastrophic. It can be seen that 4s after the failure occurs,
# rapidly increases. This means that the aircraft is rolling without any control.
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Figure 5.3: Dual channel architecture performance in response to a 0.2 rad, 0.1 Hz square wave in
roll command 4. Aircraft roll angle response 0 compared to reference aircraft model response 0,.,
for different single failure modes in the left (or right) aileron, and a failure injection time tf = 4 s.
In these cases, there are not many things that can be done to improve the system per-
formance (in the stuck-failure-mode), or to keep the aircraft stable (in the trailing-failure-
mode), since the aileron is non-redundant, and when it fails, it affects the aircraft aero-
dynamics. However, as reported in [57], NASA developed a system, called propulsion
controlled aircraft (PCA), to compensate for failures in the control surface by reconfigur-
ing the engines thrust control system, enabling the use of differential thrust to maneuver
the aircraft. This could be an example of how to achieve fault-tolerance in a system in
which is not possible to use redundancy.
Single aileron actuation subsystem failures
For any of the left aileron actuation subsystems, Fig. 5.4 displays the aircraft behavior for a
failure-by-omission, Fig. 5.4(b), and a failure-by-stuck, Fig. 5.4(a), i.e, the actuation subsys-
tem acts as a load of constant torque for the remaining healthy actuation subsystem. In this
condition, the roll angle response # does not perfectly match the reference model response
o,., thus a degraded performance behavior results. Nevertheless, the system is stable and
the performance metrics lie within the requirements. Therefore this configuration is de-
clared as non-failed. In this case, having pure redundancy is enough to compensate for
any failure in the left (or right) aileron actuation subsystems.
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(a) Output omission failure mode. (b) Stuck failure mode.
Figure 5.4: Dual channel architecture performance in response to a 0.2 rad, 0.1 Hz square wave
in roll command 0,. Aircraft roll angle response 0 compared to reference aircraft model response
0., for different single failure modes in one of the left (or right) aileron actuation subsystems, and
a failure injection time tf = 4 s.
However, there are ways to improve the performance of the aircraft when failures in the
left (or right) aileron actuation subsystems occur. An example is to introduce some sort of
FDIR mechanism to detect and isolate (some, or all) failures within the actuation subsys-
tem, and if necessary, reconfigure the control laws in the remaining actuation subsystem
to account for those failures.
Single primary flight computer failures
Figure 5.5 shows the aircraft behavior for different failure modes in any of the primary
flight computers. It can be seen that despite the presence of another primary flight com-
puter in command of half of the system, any failure will cause the aircraft to become un-
stable. For a failure-by-output-omission, Fig. 5.5(a), one of the channels in the forward
loop (Primary flight computer, left and right aileron actuation subsystems, and rudder ac-
tuation subsystems) is effectively removed, i.e., the computer stops sending any command
to the actuation subsystems, therefore these stop commanding the control surfaces. This
result in an alteration of the closed-loop dynamics that makes the system become unstable.
In the case of a linear system, the effect of removing one channel of the control-loop would
result in the relocation of the system poles, some of them moving to the right-half-plane,
which would make the system unstable. A similar explanation can be given for the failure-
by-stuck-output, 5.5(b). In this case, the computer output is set to a constant. Therefore the
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Figure 5.5: Dual channel architecture performance m response to a 0.2 rad, 01 Hz square wave
in roll command #. Aircraft roll angle response 4 compared to reference aircraft model response
q,, for different single failure modes in one of the primary flight computers, and a failure injection
time tf = 4 s.
control surface actuation subsystems commanded by the faulty computer set their outputs
to a constant value, acting as a load for the actuation subsystems in the other channel. This
causes the same effect as before: an alteration of the closed-loop dynamics that makes the
system become unstable. The effect of the other two failure modes is even more dramatic
as can be seen in Fig. 5.5(c) for the failure-by-delayed-output, and in Fig. 5.5(d) for the
failure-by-random-output.
The most important conclusion extracted from the effect of primary fight computer fail-
ures on the aircraft response is that using redundancy alone is not sufficient to achieve
fault-tolerance; unlike the case of failures in the control surface actuation subsystems,
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where redundancy alone was sufficient. The results analyses also point to possible solu-
tions to overcome the problems shown. First, failure detection and isolation is not enough;
reconfiguration of the control laws in the second computer is also necessary. The reason
for this can be understood if the failure-by-output-omission is analyzed. The effect of this
failure on the system behavior is equivalent to the effect of detecting any failure in the pri-
mary flight computer and isolating the failure by shutting the computer down. Looking at
Fig. 5.5(a) is enough to understand that this strategy will not work. Thus, it is necessary
to do something else: to reconfigure the control laws in the remaining computer after the
failed computer is shut down.
0.3- Roll command 0 -- Roll command$
Reference model response Reference model response
-. 2Aircraft response $ -- Aircraft response$0.20.
- 0.1 - 01
.0 
IV
-0.2 -0.2
0 5 10 15 20 0 5 10 15 20
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(a) Stuck failure mode. (b) Trailing failure mode.
Figure 5.6: Dual channel architecture performance in response to a 0.2 rad, 0.1 Hz square wave in
roll command 0,. Aircraft roll angle response $ compared to reference aircraft model response #r,
for different single failure modes in the rudder, and a failure injection time tf = 4 s.
Single rudder failures
Figure 5.6 shows the aircraft response for failures in the rudder. Similar to the aircraft
behavior displayed for failures in the left (or right) ailerons, Fig. 5.6(a) corresponds to a
failure-by-stuck of the rudder, which degrades the aircraft performance, but the perfor-
mance metrics are still within requirements. Figure 5.6(b) corresponds to a trailing failure
of the rudder, which results in a system failure.
As mentioned for failures in left and right ailerons, this is not a problem that can be solved
using redundancy, since there is only one rudder in the aircraft. Perhaps this can be solved
using the propulsion controlled aircraft approach already mentioned, and reported in [57].
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Figure 5.7: Dual channel architecture performance in response to a 0.2 rad, 0.1 Hz square wave in
roll command 0,. Aircraft roll angle response # compared to reference aircraft model response 0,.,
for different single failure modes in one of the rudder actuation subsystems, and a failure injection
time tf = 4 s.
Single rudder actuation subsystem failures
Figure 5.7 shows the effect of failures in any of the rudder actuation subsystems. As shown
in Fig. 5.4, any failures in the actuation subsystems for left and right ailerons affected the
system performance, but did not cause the aircraft to become unstable. This is the same
effect that failures in one of the rudder actuation subsystems cause in the system: degraded
performance, but not instability.
As mentioned for the case of failures in the left or right ailerons, the aircraft performance
could be improved by introducing failure detection, isolation, and reconfiguration (FDIR)
mechanisms to - partially or completely - detect and isolate failures within the rudder
actuation subsystem; and if necessary, reconfigure the control laws in the remaining rudder
actuation subsystem to account for those failures.
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5.5 Enhanced Dual Channel Architecture: Introducing Failure Self-
Detection in the PFCs
In the dual channel architecture presented in Section 5.4, every component, except the
control surfaces, is duplicated or triplicated in order to achieve fault-tolerance. The de-
tailed analysis of this architecture shows that redundancy was not enough to achieve fault-
tolerance in some cases. In this section, and based on the results analysis of the dual chan-
nel architecture, an enhanced dual channel architecture is proposed.
The main conclusions extracted from the analysis of single failures in the dual channel
architecture were:
1. Some failures in the control surface cause the system to become unstable which cannot
be overcome using conventional fault-tolerant techniques.
2. Failures in the control surface actuation subsystem cause degraded performance but do
not cause the aircraft to become unstable.
3. Despite the presence of two primary flight computers, any single failure in a computer
will cause the aircraft to become unstable.
As mentioned before, it may be possible to solve each of the problems listed above. How-
ever, it is not the purpose of this chapter to design sophisticated FDIR mechanisms, but
only to illustrate how the methodology can be used to uncover weak design points, how
these can be improved, and how the effectiveness of different FDIR strategies can be tested.
Therefore, only the issues related to the third item listed above, i.e., how to compensate
failures in any of the PFCs, will be treated.
Focusing on the PFC failures, from the results analysis of the dual channel architecture it
was concluded that failure detection and isolation is not sufficient, but reconfiguration of
the control laws in the remaining computer is also necessary. As explained before, the ef-
fect of a failure-by-output-omission in the computer is equivalent to the effect of detecting
any failure in the primary flight computer and isolating the failure by shutting the com-
puter down. Figure 5.5(a) shows that this strategy would not work. It is also necessary to
reconfigure the control laws in the remaining computer after the failed computer is shut
down.
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The proposed enhanced dual channel architecture (EDCa) is very similar to the dual chan-
nel architecture presented in Fig. 5.2 in the sense that it has the same components con-
nected in a very similar way. The three main differences are: within each PFC, there is a
failure self-detection circuit (PFC, -SD and PFC2-SD) that will be the core of the FDIR mech-
anism described later. Each PFC exchanges information of its status (failed or operational)
with the other PFC. The control laws within the processors of each PFC are reconfigurable
depending on the status of the other PFC. These additional components and features allow
the implementation of an FDIR mechanism with the following features:
* Detection. The self-detection circuit PFC-SD implemented in each PFC checks the range
of the output signals of the PFC processor, and if they are within a certain range, then
they are considered valid, otherwise the self-detection circuit reports a failure. Addi-
tionally, the rate of change of the outputted signals is checked, and if the self-detection
circuit detects no rate of change, then a failure is reported.
* Isolation. Once the self-detection circuit detects a failure, the main PFC processor is
shut down.
" Reconfiguration. Once the self-detection circuit detects a failure, a reconfiguration sig-
nal is sent to the remaining PFC to double the gain of the control surface actuation sub-
systems controllers. This reconfiguration strategy should compensate for the fact that
only the control surface actuation subsystems commanded by the remaining computer
are operational.
The proposed FDIR candidate should handle failure-by-output-omission, failure-by-stuck-
output, and failure-by-random-output. It is not clear whether failure-by-delayed-output
will be handled effectively by this FDIR. This will be explored further in the next section.
Table 5.3 collects the information corresponding to the failure models of the PFC-SDs in-
troduced in the enhanced dual channel architecture - the self-detection circuits for each
PFC. The failure models parameters for the rest of the components are the same as for the
pure redundancy architecture, Table 5.1.
5.5.1 Performance and Reliability Evaluation
The conditions under which the enhanced dual channel architecture was evaluated are
the same as the ones used to evaluate the pure redundancy architecture, i.e., the aircraft
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Table 5.3: Enhanced dual channel architecture: primary flight computers' self-detection circuits
failure model parameters.
Component Failure modes Description Uf A(/h)
PFC 1-SD, PFC2-SD Omission Output set to zero regardless of input 1 10-8
Commission Output set to one regardless of input 2 10-1
cruising at an altitude of 10,668 m with forward velocity V = 178 m/s, pitch angle ao =
0.216 rad, same control input, and the same configuration evaluation time (t, = 20 s) as for
the evaluation of the dual channel architecture.
Table 5.4 shows the number of single points of failure and the probability of system fail-
ure (unreliability) at the end of the maintenance period for different levels of truncation.
Truncating at the third level of failure yields a system unreliability of 1.17 -10-4, which
meets the unreliability design requirement (Q < 5 -10-4). This design still does not meet
the single fault-tolerance requirement as there are still 5 single points of failure.
Table 5.4: Enhanced dual channel architecture: single points of failure and unreliability for differ-
ent levels of truncation and an evaluation time of 500h.
Truncation Unreliability Unreliability Single points # of system
level lower bound upper bound of failure configurations
2 1.14. 10-4 1.87- 10-4 5 68
3 1.17. 10-4 1.17. 10-4 5 3924
Single primary flight computer failures
With the FDIR mechanism, it can be seen that except for the failure-by-delayed-output, Fig.
5.8(d), which causes the system to fail; the other PFCs failures are detected and isolated,
and the aircraft stays stable after the control laws in the remaining PFC are reconfigured,
Fig. 5.8(a) - Fig. 5.8(c). Additionally, the aircraft behavior is almost unaffected for a
failure-by-output-omission, Fig. 5.8(a); and for a failure-by-stuck-output, Fig. 5.8(c). For a
failure-by-random-output, there is a small transient after the failure occurs, as can be seen
in Fig. 5.8(b), but the aircraft recovers in less than 2s.
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Figure 5.8: Enhanced dual channel architecture performance in response to a 0.2 rad, 0.1 Hz square
wave in roll command #. Aircraft roll angle response # compared to reference aircraft model
response 0,, for different single failure modes in one of the primary flight computers, and a failure
injection time tf = 4 s.
Primary flight computer failures after failures in the PFC-SD
Although not shown here, single failures in a PFC-SD do not affect the aircraft performance
at all. In the case of a single failure-by commission of a PFC-SD, the computer which has
the PFC-SD will be shut down despite the fact that the computer did not fail itself, and
the control laws in the remaining computer will be reconfigured. Although these failures
will not cause the system to fail, if not announced, they can create a dangerous situation
in which the system is believed to have both computers operational. This last problem
becomes obvious when analyzing the results shown in Fig. 5.9. A first failure-by-omission
in a PFC-SD circuit followed by a failure in its own PFC will cause the system to fail.
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Figure 5.9: Enhanced dual channel architecture performance. Aircraft roll angle response q com-
pared to reference aircraft model response 0,., for different failure sequences initiated by an omis-
sion failure mode in the PFC-SD circuit, and followed by different failure modes in one of the PFCs.
5.6 Dual-Dual Channel Architecture: Introducing Lock-Step Pro-
cessors
The FDIR mechanism introduced in the previous section improves the system overall per-
formance in the sense that unreliability is smaller and several single failures have been
removed. However, it is not perfect since it is not capable of detecting failure-by-delayed
output in the PFCs. In this section, an improved FDIR mechanism will be introduced,
which will handle all the failures within the PFCs.
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The proposed further improved architecture, called dual-dual channel architecture (DDCa)
is very similar to the EDCa architecture. The main difference is that now each PFC will con-
tain a pair of lock-step processors receiving the same inputs and doing exactly the same
computations. Additionally, a dual-comparator circuit PFC-DC will compare their out-
puts. As in the EDCa design, each PFC exchanges status information (failed or operational)
with the other PFC. The control laws within the processors of each PFC are reconfigurable
depending on the status of the other PFC. With these additional elements the FDIR has the
following features:
9 Detection. The dual-comparator circuit within each PFC will check whether the outputs
of the processor pair agree or not. If the outputs disagree, the dual-comparator reports
a failure.
* Isolation. Once the dual-comparator circuit detects a failure, both lock-step processors
within the failed computer are shut down.
e Reconfiguration. Once the dual-comparator circuit detects a failure, a reconfiguration
signal is sent to the remaining PFC to double the gain of the control surface controllers
on each lock-step processor.
The use of lock-step processors requires the introduction of an additional processor in each
PFC, thus increasing its complexity and cost. However, the use of lock-step processors
should result in a perfect detection, isolation, and reconfiguration of any failure within a
PFC, thus removing all the PFC-related single points of system failure.
Table 5.5: Dual-dual channel architecture: primary flight computers' dual-comparator circuits
failure model parameters.
Component Failure modes Description Uf A(/h)
PFC1-DC, PFC2 -DC Omission Output set to zero regardless the input 1 108
Commission Output set to one regardless the input 2 10--
Table 5.5 displays the failure model information for the dual-comparator circuits within
each PFC. The failure model parameters for the rest of the components is the same as for
the dual channel architecture, Table 5.1.
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5.6.1 Performance and Reliability Evaluation
The dual-dual channel architecture was evaluated under the same conditions as the dual
channel architecture and the enhanced dual channel architecture, see Section 5.4.1 for the
details. Table 5.6 shows shows the number of single points of failure and the system un-
reliability estimates. Truncating at the third level of failure yields a system unreliability of
1.51 10-5 and a truncation error of 2.76 - 10-7. This is an improvement of one order of
magnitude with respect to both the dual architecture and the enhanced dual architecture.
Table 5.6: Dual-dual channel architecture: single points of failure and unreliability for different
levels of truncation and an evaluation time of 500h.
Truncation Unreliability Unreliability Single points # of system
level lower bound upper bound of failure configurations
2 1.49. 10-5 9.47. 10-5 3 76
3 1.51 . 10-5 1.51 . 10-5 3 4640
This design still does not meet the single fault tolerance requirement. However, as will be
shown, the single failures are exclusively control surface related. Therefore, this design is
a potential candidate to fulfill the single fault tolerance requirement if appropriate control
strategies are implemented without making any other architectural modifications; e.g.,
adding more redundancy.
Figure 5.10 completes the analysis of the dual-dual architecture. It shows the aircraft be-
havior for all possible single failures of one of the PFC processors. As can be seen, the
aircraft performance is not altered by any of these failures, thus the FDIR provided by the
lock-step processors scheme is satisfactory. Although not shown here, single failures in the
PFC-DC cause problems similar to those mentioned in the analysis of the enhanced dual
channel architecture for single failures in any PFC-SD. Thus, for reasons similar to those
given in section 5.5.1, a failure-by-omission or by-commission in a PFC-DC will not affect
the system performance.
Table 5.7: Results comparison.
Architecture Unreliability PFC-originated single Control-surface-originated
points offailure single points offailure
DCa 5.20. 10-4 8 3
EDCa 1.17. 10- 4  2 3
DDCa 1.51. 10- 5 0 3
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Figure 5.10: Dual-dual channel architecture performance in response to a 0.2 rad, 0.1 Hz square
wave in roll command #,. Aircraft roll angle response # compared to reference aircraft model
response 0,, for different single failure modes in one of the processors of a primary flight computer,
and a failure injection time tf = 4 s.
5.7 Architecture Comparisons
Table 5.7 summarizes the main analysis results for the three architectural solutions. The
unreliability of both the DCa and the EDCa designs is very similar; however, the EDCa
design removed 75% of the single points of system failure due to PFC failures with respect
to the DCa design. The introduction of the lock-step processors in the DDCa design made
a huge impact on the results. Its unreliability is one order of magnitude smaller than in
the other two designs, and all the single points of system failure due to PFC failures were
effectively removed.
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However, it is important to note that the DCa design is the less complex one in terms of
operation, i.e., there is no need for detecting, isolating or reconfiguring the system, and
in the number of components. These two issues make this architecture less expensive to
produce and to maintain. On the other hand, the DDCa design is much more complex than
the other two: more components, and more complex operation, which makes this design
more expensive to produce and to maintain. However, the impact on reliability and fault-
tolerance is very important. Therefore, it is the work of the designer to make trade-offs
between complexity and cost, and among performance, reliability, and fault-tolerance.
5.8 Conclusions
This chapter illustrated the power of the methodology presented in Chapter 3 (and its
supporting tool InPRESTo) for guiding the design process of a fault-tolerant system by
uncovering weak design points and pointing out possible ways to improve the system de-
sign. It also showed how important FDIR is to achieve fault-tolerance, and how InPRESTo
can be used to test the effectiveness of different FDIR strategies. Finally, it also showed
how to compare different architectural solutions from different points of view: reliability,
performance, and fault-tolerance.
The analysis shown in this chapter opens up further research questions. The design im-
provement shown here was done manually, analyzing the results for each iteration and
using expert judgment to guide the changes in the design. Guiding the design in a struc-
tured and automatic way is a challenging problem worthy of exploring, i.e., how to extend
the methodology to automatically determine where the problems that most impact a de-
sign are, and how they could be discussed. These issues are further addressed in Chapter
7.
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Steer-by-Wire/Brake-Actuated-Steering
System Case-Study
In this chapter, two conceptually very different designs to achieve fault-tolerance in a steer-
by-wire (SbW) system are presented. The first one -referred as SbW design, is based
on the replication of components and the introduction of failure detection, isolation, and
reconfiguration mechanisms. In the second design -referred as SbW/BAS design, a dis-
similar backup mechanism, called brake-actuated steering (BAS), is used to achieve fault-
tolerance rather than replicating each component within the system. This chapter comple-
ments Chapter 5 by showing how the performance and reliability evaluation SIMULINK
@ toolbox -InPRESTo- can be used to compare very different architectural approaches to
achieve fault-tolerance.
6.1 Introduction
Safety-critical systems in a car, for example, hydraulic brakes and power steering, require
a secondary or backup activation mechanism to prevent catastrophic failure. In a conven-
tional power assisted steering system, the mechanical connection between the driver and
the steering rack serves as the secondary steering mechanism [44]. In a SbW system the
secondary steering mechanism cannot rely on a mechanical link (e.g., the steering column
connection to the pinion) between the steering wheel and the steering rack since the goal
of SbW is to eliminate such a mechanical connection. Lacking this connection, SbW design
efforts have focused on developing fault-tolerant systems based on redundancy, i.e., the
duplication of components and modules at all levels [1], [44], [45], [46]. This solution is
widely applied in aircraft, but it adds a significant amount of complexity and cost. There-
fore, it is important to explore alternatives to classical redundancy for achieving system
integrity.
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In this chapter, a case-study of a steer-by-wire system is presented. Two different ap-
proaches to achieve fault tolerance are presented, analyzed, and compared. The first ap-
proach is based on the use of redundancy and failure detection, isolation, and reconfig-
uration (FDIR) mechanisms, as in the flight control system presented in Chapter 5. The
second approach is basically a single-string system for the computing and actuation ele-
ments dedicated to traditional steering. The fault-tolerance is achieved by using brake-
actuated-steering [43] as a backup mechanism to overcome component failures in the SbW
that otherwise would have catastrophic consequences. Brake-actuated-steering utilizes
the already-existing selective wheel braking capability provided by the antilock-braking-
system (ABS), and electronic stability programs (ESP) to actuate the steering mechanism.
As mentioned in Chapter 5, similar approaches have been proposed by NASA, in order
to develop the technology for future aircraft designs for emergency flight control, using
engine thrust to augment or replace the flight control system [57]. Both approaches will
be analyzed, and the advantages and disadvantages of using each one will be highlighted.
Section 6.2 presents a detailed analysis of the first solution in which classical redundancy
and FDIR are used to achieve fault tolerance. The steer-by-wire system with the dissimilar
backup mechanism, SbW/BAS, is introduced and analyze in Section 6.3. The comparison
of both solutions is presented in Section 6.4. Concluding remarks are presented in 6.5.
6.2 Fault-Tolerant Steer-by-Wire System
The proposed SbW architecture, Fig. 6.1, is based on the fault-tolerant architecture in-
troduced in Section 5.6 for the lateral-directional flight control system, which proved to
be an appropriate solution to achieve a high level of fault-tolerance. The architecture is
composed of two redundant steer-by-wire computers (SbWC1 and SbWC 2) that receive
information about the vehicle road wheel angle 6 from triple redundant road wheel angle
sensors (RWAS1, RWAS 2 and RWAS3) cross strapped to both computers; and also receive
information about the driver steering wheel command 6, from triple redundant steering
wheel angle sensors (SWAS1, SWAS 2 and SWAS 3 ), also cross strapped to both comput-
ers. Each SbWC has a voting algorithm to compute the vehicle road wheel angle from the
redundant RWASs measurements and the driver command from the redundant SWASs
measurements. Both SbWCs have control laws that, based on the RWASs measurements
and the driver command measured by the SWASs, compute the appropriate commands
for two redundant rack actuation subsystems (RaAS1 and RaAS2), which are responsible
for positioning the steering rack (SRa). Each rack actuation subsystem is commanded in-
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Figure 6.1: SbW design: steer-by-wire system with replicated components and failure detection,
isolation, and reconfiguration mechanisms to achieve fault-tolerance.
dependently by each SbWC (not cross strapped). Each actuation subsystem is composed
of a current-controlled electric motor. When one of the rack actuation subsystems fails, it
remains within the control loop (connected to the SRa), and the other actuation subsystem
must accommodate any impacts the failed one may have on moving the rack.
To have perfect computer failure detection of random failures, each SbWC is internally
redundant. Each SbWC is made up of a pair of lock-step processors receiving the same
inputs and doing exactly the same computations. A dual-comparator circuit within each
SbWC (SbWC1 -DC and SbWC2-DC) compares the outputs from both lock-step processors
in its SbWC. If the outputs disagree, a failure has been detected, and an isolation and
reconfiguration process starts. The isolation is accomplished by the dual comparator cir-
cuit sending a signal to the power management system to shut down the processors in
the faulty SbWC. The reconfiguration starts when the dual-comparator within the faulty
computer sends a signal to the remaining SbWC to reconfigure the control laws that are
implemented in both of its lock-step processors to accommodate the extra loads of the
(now uncommanded) RaAS.
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The component behavioral models for each component are described in Appendix D. The
component failure model parameters are collected in Table 6.1. Column 2 lists the possible
failure modes for each component, column 3 is an explanation of each behavioral model
mode. U1 in column 4 is the variable that assigns the corresponding failure mode to the
component behavioral model equations (see Appendix D). The failure rate A associated
with each failure mode is collected in the last column of the table.
Table 6.1: Component failure model parameters.
Component Failure modes Description Uf A(/h)
SbWC 1, SbWC 2  Omission Output set to zero 1 2. 10-r
Random Random output between -5 and 5 2 10-7
Stuck Output stuck at last correct value 3 10-7
Delayed Output delayed 0.2 s 4 107
SbWC1 -DC, SbWC2-DC Omission Output set to zero regardless the in- 1 10-8
put
Commission Output set to one regardless the in- 2 10-8
put
RaAS1 , RaAS2  Omission Output set to zero 1 1 0 -6
Stuck Output stuck at last correct value 2 10-6
SRa Stuck Road wheel angle stuck at last cor- 2 10-7
rect position
RWAS1, RWAS2, RWAS3, Omission Output set to zero 1 4. 10-
SWAS 1 , SWAS 2, SWAS 3  Gain change Output scaled by a factor of 1.5 2 3. 10-
Biased Output biased by a factor of 0.3 3 3- 10-7
A linear single-track vehicle dynamics model [58], interacting with the architecture de-
scried above, completes the system behavioral model. The models inputs are the road
wheel angle 6, and the state variables are the sideslip f, and the yaw rate rb. See Appendix
D for a detailed description of the linear single-track vehicle dynamics model.
6.2.1 Performance Metrics Definition and Associated Requirements
The performance metrics chosen are the vehicle state variables: the sideslip 0(t), the yaw
rate rb, and the heading angle ,. Thus
Z1 = (t),
Z2 = rb(t),
Z3 = XF(t).
(6.1)
(6.2)
(6.3)
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The dynamic behavior of a reference vehicle will be used to define the performance metrics
requirements. This reference vehicle state variables are denoted by the sub index ,, i.e., the
sideslip is denoted by 3,3(t), the yaw rate by rb, (t), and the heading angle by Tr(t). Thus,
the performance metrics requirements are defined as
{zj = 0(t) E JR / 01/(t) - Or(t)IOo r 8}, (6.4)
Qz2= {rb(t) E JR / I rb(t) - rb, (t)I oc rr } (6.5)
£z3 = {I'(t) C JR / I F(t) - Tr (t) oo ! r}, (6.6)
where rfl = 0.25 deg, rrb = 0.6 deg/s, and r = 0.5 deg.
A 10 deg, 0.5 Hz sinusoidal steering wheel angle input 6, will be used as system control
input to evaluate each configuration.
6.2.2 Results Analysis
The system was evaluated for a vehicle speed (of center of gravity) V = 70 km/h. The
vehicle time constants dictate a configuration evaluation time t, = 6 s. A vehicle lifetime
of 15 years and an average of 400 working hours per year was considered for the reliability
evaluation, which gives an evaluation time T = 6000 h.
Table 6.2: SbW design: unreliability for an evaluation time of 6000h.
Truncation Unreliability Unreliability # of system
level lower bound upper bound configurations
3 1.10. 10-3 1.13- 10-3 1716
Table 6.2 shows the probability of system failure (unreliability) at the end of the vehicle life-
time. Truncating after three component failure events yields a system unreliability upper
bound of 1.13 -10- and a lower bound of 1.10 - 10-3
The remaining analysis will display the vehicle behavior for different component compo-
nent failure modes, i.e, the road wheel angle 6 scaled by the steering ratio SR, the vehicle
heading angle response x[ (and the vehicle heading angle response X1, of a vehicle with a
conventional mechanical steering system as a reference), for a 10 deg, 0.5 Hz sinusoidal
steering wheel angle input 6m. Figure 6.2 shows the vehicle behavior for the two pos-
sible failure modes of either rack actuation subsystem. In both cases, failure-by-output-
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Figure 6.2: SbW design performance in response to a 10 deg, 0.5 Hz sinusoidal steering wheel
input at 70 km/h vehicle speed. Steering wheel angle 6, compared to road wheel angle (scaled
to steering wheel angle SR6) under failure conditions, and vehicle heading angle T, with a me-
chanical steering system compared to the vehicle (with the SbW design) heading angle response IF,
under failure conditions. Both performance comparisons shown for two failure modes of the rack
actuation subsystem, and for a failure injection time tf = 1 s.
omission, Fig. 6.2(a), and failure-by-stuck-output, Fig. 6.2(b), the vehicle performance is
almost unaffected. The difference between the heading angle response T and the head-
ing angle reference response T, is less than 0.1deg in both cases. Although there is no
FDIR mechanism to account for single failures in one of the actuation subsystems, the
fault-tolerance is provided by having a redundant rack actuation subsystem.
The component failure of interest in the analysis, for the reasons explained in the Section
6.3, corresponds to a steering rack failure where it is stuck, Fig. 6.3. In this case, the steering
rack gets stuck at a fixed position and the steering rack actuation subsystem is not able to
position it according to the driver's command. Thus, the vehicle heading angle does not
track the model reference heading angle. This is considered a catastrophic failure because
the driver is not able to control the vehicle direction. However, the same would occur with
a conventional mechanical steering system
Although not displayed here, any failure in any of the lock-step processors within each
computer does not affect the vehicle performance at all. The dual-comparator circuit will
detect every disagreement between processors within the pair, shutting down the pair,
and reconfiguring the control law within the remaining computer to account for this fail-
ure. The same occurs when any of the steering wheel angle sensors, or the road wheel
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Figure 6.3: SbW design performance in response to a 10 deg, 0.5 Hz sinusoidal steering wheel
input at 70 km/h vehicle speed. Steering wheel angle 6. compared to road wheel angle (scaled
to steering wheel angle SR3) under failure conditions, and vehicle heading angle T,. with a me-
chanical steering system compared to the vehicle (with the SbW design) heading angle response
1Q, under failure conditions. Both performance comparisons shown for the steering rack failing by
getting stuck at a certain position, and for a failure injection time tf = 1 s.
angle sensors fail: the voting algorithms implemented in the computers will disregard the
measurement yielded by the faulty sensor. Failures by omission, or by commission in the
dual-comparator circuit do not affect the vehicle performance. In the case of a failure-by-
commission (a false alarm that shuts down the computer) of the self-detection circuit, the
computer with the faulty dual-comparator circuit will be shut down despite the fact that
it did not fail, and the control laws in the remaining computer will be reconfigured. In the
case of the failure-by-omission, although the system will not fail after this failure occurs, if
not announced, it can create a dangerous situation. This is due to the fact that the system is
believed to have both computers operational, when they are not. Therefore, a first failure-
by-omission in the dual-comparator circuit of an SbWC, followed by a failure in the same
SbWC, will go undetected causing the system to fail.
6.3 Steer-by-Wire/Brake-Actuated-Steering System
In this section, a substantially different architectural solution from the one in Section 6.2 is
presented. This approach implements brake-actuated-steering (BAS) as a means to achieve
fault tolerance, thus reducing the amount of component redundancy. This will result in
a less complex steer-by-wire system, which may result, as well, in a less expensive sys-
tem. Furthermore, the additional components that are necessary for implementing BAS
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are already present in the vehicle as part of other safety systems, such as anti-lock brak-
ing system (ABS) or electronic stability programs (ESP). Additionally, in the steer-by-wire
architecture in Section 6.2, despite the presence of component redundancy and FDIR to
achieve fault-tolerance; it was shown that a stuck failure of the steering rack would result
in a single point of failure. To overcome this, a SbW/BAS architecture will be presented
that implements a skid steering algorithm.
The proposed SbW/BAS architecture is showed in Fig. 6.4. The only elements common to
both SbW and BAS are the road wheel angle sensors RWASs and the steering wheel angle
sensors SWASs. Therefore these elements are triple redundant (with their correspond-
ing voting algorithms within the steer-by-wire computer SbWC and the brake-actuated-
steering computer BASC) to avoid common modes of failure in both SbW and BAS. Un-
like the previously discussed fault-tolerant SbW architecture, there is only one SbWC with
a single processor inside; and there is only one rack actuation subsystem (RaAS). There-
fore, fault-tolerance cannot be achieved with these elements alone. The way this system
achieves fault tolerance is by using selective wheel braking to steer the vehicle when the
main SbW functionality is lost. When a failure results in disagreement between the steer-
ing wheel angle 6, and the road wheel angle 6, the failure detection circuit (SbWC-FD)
implemented in the SbWC shuts down the processor inside the SbWC, and thus, disables
the main SbW functionality. Then, the SbWC-FD sends a reconfiguration signal to the
brake-actuated-steering computer (BASC), which is in hot-standby, and the BAS computer
starts sending commands.
The BAS computer has two different control laws implemented: one for brake-actuated
steering, and one for skid steering. The BAS controller kicks in after a failure in the main
SbW has been detected, and first attempts to steer with brake-actuated steering command-
ing both front left and right caliper actuation subsystems (FLCAS and FRCAS). This will
produce the appropriate longitudinal braking forces in the front left and right tires, en-
abling the vehicle to be steered according to the steering wheel angle command and the
rack position. Thus the BAS overcomes the dangerous situation produced by the failure of
the main SbW functionality.
Additionally, if the steering rack gets stuck, the BAS computer will detect a disagreement
between the steering wheel angle 6, and the road wheel angle 6; and the BAS computer
can no longer position the rack with the BAS control law. Therefore, it will switch to the
skid-steering control law. In the skid-steering mode, the BAS computer commands all four
wheel caliper actuation subsystems (FLCAS, FRCAS, RLCAS, and RRCAS) to produce ap-
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propriate front and rear differential longitudinal braking forces to steer the vehicle. Since
the steering rack position is no longer a valid measurement to determine the vehicle head-
ing, three redundant yaw rate gyros (YRG 1, YRG2 , YRG 3) will measure the vehicle yaw
rate.
Table 6.3: Component failure model parameters for the additional components of the SbW/BAS
architecture.
Component Failure modes Description Uj A(/h)
BASC Omission Output set to zero 1 2. 10-7
Random Random output between -5 and 5 2 10-7
Stuck Output stuck at last correct value 3 10-
Delayed Output delayed 0.2 s 4 10-1
SbWC-FD Omission Output set to zero regardless the in- 1 10-8
put
Commission Output set to one regardless the in- 2 10-8
put
FLCAS, FRCAS, Omission Output set to zero 1 10-8
RLCAS, RRCAS Stuck Output stuck at last correct value 2 10-8
YRG 1, YRG2, YRG 3  Omission Output set to zero 1 4 -o-7
Gain change Output scaled by a factor of 1.5 2 3 -10-
Biased Output biased by a factor of 0.3 3 3. 10-7
The component behavioral models for the additional components introduced in this archi-
tecture, i.e., the brake-actuated-steering computer (BASC), the front left (and right) caliper
actuation subsystems (FLCAS and FRCAS), and the rear left (and right) caliper actuation
subsystems (RLCAS and RRCAS) are described in Appendix D. The component failure
model parameters of these additional components, as well as the failure detection circuit
implemented in the SbWC, are collected in Table 6.3. A linear two-track vehicle dynamics
model [43], interacting with the architecture descried above, completes the system behav-
ioral model. The models inputs are the road wheel angle 6 and the the differential longi-
tudinal forces at the front and rear tires. The state variables are the sideslip (3, and the yaw
rate rb. See Appendix D for the description of the two-track vehicle dynamics model.
6.3.1 Results Analysis
The SbW/BAS system was evaluated for the same vehicle speed as before V = 70 Km/h,
the same configuration evaluation time t, = 6s, and the same global evaluation time T of
6000 h. The performance metrics definition (and associated requirements), as well as the
control system input chosen to evaluate the SbW/BAS are the same as the ones used to
- 134 -
Chapter 6
Steer-by-Wire/Brake-Actuated-Steering System Case-Study
evaluate the SbW design.
Table 6.4 displays the system unreliability results at the end of the vehicle lifetime for a
truncation level of three. A system unreliability upper bound of 8.01 . 10-4 and a lower
bound of 7.02 -10-4 result. Although a comparison of the SbW and the SbW/BAS architec-
tures will be carried in the next section, it is very interesting to note that the unreliability
upper bound for the SbW/BAS architecture is smaller than the unreliability lower bound
of the SbW architecture. This means that without taking the analysis to a further level of
truncation, it can be concluded that the SbW/BAS is predicted to have better reliability
than the SbW architecture.
Table 6.4: SbW/BAS design: unreliability for an evaluation time of 6000h.
Truncation Unreliability Unreliability # of system
level lower bound upper bound configurations
3 7.02 -10-4 8.01- 10-4 2215
For the remainder of this section, the SbW/BAS system performance will be shown for
different component failure modes. In each case, the vehicle road wheel angle 6 scaled
by the steering ratio SR will be compared to the steering wheel angle 6m, and the vehicle
heading angle response T will be compared to the heading angle response T, of the ref-
erence vehicle model (a vehicle with a conventional mechanical steering system). These
output responses will be displayed when a 10deg, 0.5Hz sinusoidal input is applied to the
steering wheel. In order to show small errors between I and T,, different scales has been
used to display the comparison between 6, and SR6; and between , and xh.
As shown in Fig. 6.5, the two possible steering rack actuation subsystem failure modes
cause a similar effect in the vehicle response. When the failure occurs at t = 1 s, the
road wheel angle starts diverting from its reference value. When the absolute value of the
difference between the steering wheel angle 6, and the road wheel angle scaled by the
steering ratio SR6W hits 2 deg, the failure detection circuit with the SbW computer sends
a reconfiguration signal to the BASC computer. At this instant the BAS controller kicks in,
taking over the control of the vehicle after the SbWC is shut down. The most important
consequence after this failure is that the vehicle heading angle XI starts diverting from the
vehicle reference response by a value of 0.23 deg for the failure-by-omission, and 0.11 deg
for the failure-by-stuck, both considered acceptable to keep the vehicle on its heading path.
A model of the driver has not been included in the system model, but in reality, the driver
would remove this heading error.
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Figure 6.5: SbW/BAS design performance in response to a 10 deg, 0.5 Hz sinusoidal steering
wheel input at 70 km/h vehicle speed. Steering wheel angle J, compared to road wheel angle
(scaled to steering wheel angle SRJ) under failure conditions, and vehicle heading angle T, with
a mechanical steering system compared to the vehicle (with the SbW/BAS design) heading angle
response T, under failure conditions. Both performance comparisons shown for different single
failure modes in the rack actuation subsystem, and for a failure injection time tf = 1 s.
Figure 6.6 displays the vehicle performance when failures occur in the failure detection
circuit within the SbW computer. In this case, for a failure-by-omission (i.e., the detection
circuit does not report a failure), Fig. 6.6(a), the vehicle response is completely unaffected.
This is expected -a failure-by-omission will disable the detection of second failures, but
it will not cause a degraded system behavior. In contrast, a failure-by-commission will
cause a degraded system performance. In this case, the failure detection circuit sends a
false alarm to the BASC computer, thus, the brake-actuated-steering controller takes over
the control of the vehicle, resulting in the vehicle response displayed in Fig. 6.6(b).
The vehicle behaviors corresponding to different failure modes in the steer-by-wire com-
puter are displayed in Fig. 6.7. A failure-by-omission, as displayed in Fig. 6.7(a), will
cause a transient in the road wheel angle 6, but the vehicle heading angle * is almost
unaffected. In this case, when the computer stops sending commands out, the steering
rack actuation subsystem stops commanding the steering rack for a few instants until the
SbWC-FD detects the anomaly and switches control to the the BAS controller. In this sce-
nario, the steering rack time constants are much smaller than the vehicle time constants,
therefore the vehicle heading is almost unaffected. A similar behavior takes place when
a random output failure occurs in the SbW computer, Fig. 6.7(b), There is a transient in
the road wheel angle 6, but the heading angle * is barely affected. The explanation in this
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Figure 6.6: SbW/BAS design performance in response to a 10 deg, 0.5 Hz sinusoidal steering
wheel input at 70 km/h vehicle speed. Steering wheel angle 6, compared to road wheel angle
(scaled to steering wheel angle SR6) under failure conditions, and vehicle heading angle IQ, with
a mechanical steering system compared to the vehicle (with the SbW/BAS design) heading angle
response T, under failure conditions. Both performance comparisons shown for different single
failure modes in the steer-by-wire computer failure detection circuit SbWC-FD, and for a failure
injection time tf = 1 s.
case is slightly different: the computer starts sending random commands to the steering
rack actuation subsystem, which will try to position the rack accordingly. The actuation
subsystem time constants are much smaller than the rack time constants; therefore, the
steering rack only perceives the command as a random noise, which has an effect similar
to not having commanded at all (as in the previous case). The essentially uncommanded
steering rack is centered by the self-centering forces of the front wheels. The SbW-FD will
detect the anomaly, and switch control to the BAS controller. Again, the vehicle dynamics
are much slower than the rack dynamics, therefore the vehicle heading is almost unaf-
fected.
When the SbWC fails stuck, the vehicle behavior diverts from its nominal behavior as dis-
played in Fig. 6.7(c). In this case, the computer is sending a constant command to the rack
actuation subsystem, which will try to position the rack accordingly. The SbWC-FD will
detect the anomaly after a short transient and the BAS mechanism will take over; however
the actuation subsystem acted long enough on the rack, causing the vehicle heading angle
[ to divert from its nominal behavior response by 0.25 deg. A similar effect takes place
when the output of the SbW computer gets delayed, Fig. 6.7(d). In this case, the steering
rack actuation subsystem is receiving its command delayed, thus delaying the correct posi-
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tioning of the rack. By the time the SbWC-FD detects the failure and the control is handed
to the BAS controller, the vehicle heading has been modified from its nominal path by
0.40 deg. Both diversions are consider small
heading path.
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Figure 6.7: SbW/BAS design performance in response to a 10 deg, 0.5 Hz sinusoidal steering
wheel input at 70 km/h vehicle speed. Steering wheel angle 6, compared to road wheel angle
(scaled to steering wheel angle SRS) under failure conditions, and vehicle heading angle T, with
a mechanical steering system compared to the vehicle (with the SbW/BAS design) heading angle
response T, under failure conditions. Both performance comparisons shown for different single
failure modes in the steer-by-wire computer, and for a failure injection time tf = 1s.
Up to this point in the analysis of the SbW/BAS, there is nothing that has been achieved
using BAS that could not be achieved with a fault-tolerant SbW architecture as presented
in Section 6.2. Furthermore, for the failure modes analyzed in this section so far, better
performance was achieved with the SbW architecture.
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Figure 6.8: SbW/BAS design performance in response to a 10 deg, 0.5 Hz sinusoidal steering
wheel input at 70 km/h vehicle speed. Steering wheel angle 6" compared to road wheel angle
(scaled to steering wheel angle SR3) under failure conditions, and vehicle heading angle T, with
a mechanical steering system compared to the vehicle (with the SbW/BAS design) heading angle
response T, under failure conditions. Both performance comparisons shown for the steering rack
failing by getting stuck at a certain position, and for a failure injection time tf = 1 s.
The main advantage of the SbW/BAS architecture is displayed in Fig. 6.8, which shows
the vehicle dynamic behavior when the steering rack gets stuck. In this case, the SbWC-FD
will detect the anomaly, switching the control to the BAS computer. The brake-actuated-
steering control law kicks in first, trying to control the vehicle, without success. The skid-
steering controller will take control after it is detected that steering rack is not moving,
despite the fact that the steering wheel angle is not constant. It can be seen that the heading
angle , error is small enough, 0.22 deg, for the driver to keep control of the vehicle and
bring it to a safe stop.
Table 6.5: Reliability estimates for the SbW and the SbW/BAS designs at the end of vehicle lifetime
(6000 h).
Unreliability
lower bound
Unreliability
upper bound
Single points
offailure
SbW 1.10. 1O- 1.13. 10- 1
SbW/BAS 7.02. 10-4 8.01 .10-4 0
6.4 SbW-SbW/BAS Comparison
The system unreliability estimates for both the SbW and the SbW/BAS systems are dis-
played in Table 6.5. These results were obtained by truncating the analysis at the third
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level of failure. As can be noted from the results, the estimated unreliability intervals do
not overlap. This means that without the need of taking the analysis to a further level of
failure it can be concluded that the SbW/BAS has a better reliability estimate than the SbW
architecture. Furthermore, with the SbW architecture it is not possible to achieve complete
fault-tolerance at the first level of failure since a failure-by-stuck of the steering rack will
cause the system to fail. In contrast, the SbW/BAS has a skid controller implemented
to overcome this problem, and when the steering rack gets stuck the vehicle can still be
steered and brought to a safe stop. Thus the SbW/BAS is single fault tolerant.
To achieve fault tolerance, the SbW architecture implements redundancy in each compo-
nent within the system: the computers are duplicated, and furthermore, each computer has
two internal processors in lock-step; the rack actuation subsystems are duplicated as well;
and the road wheel and steering wheel angle sensors are triply redundant. The SbW/BAS
uses only redundancy for the road wheel and steering wheel sensors, which are the only
elements common to SbW and BAS. Instead of having two computers with lock-step pro-
cessor pairs, the SbW/BAS uses two single-processor computers, one for the SbW func-
tionality, and the other for the BAS functionality (which is expected to already be present
in the vehicle for ABS or ESP). The steering rack actuation subsystem is not duplicated
either. As explained before, the fault-tolerance is achieved by using the functionality pro-
vided by the ABS/ESP system elements. The SbW/BAS implements an additional triple
redundant set of gyro units, which are necessary for the skid steering control. Although
ESP systems usually include a gyro unit, thus providing the necessary vehicle yaw rate
measurement for the skid controller, it is not usually redundant.
So far, it seems that it is more advantageous to use the SbW/BAS: a better reliability esti-
mate; no single points of failure; less redundancy, and therefore less complexity and cost;
and use of already-implemented elements to achieve fault-tolerance. However, there are
other important aspects, such as the vehicle performance, that must be analyzed to obtain
a fair comparison between SbW and SbW/BAS. In the first place, it must be noted that
BAS must only be be used as an ultimate safety mechanism to bring the vehicle to a safe
stop when a failure disables the main SbW functionality. This means that although the
SbW/BAS architecture introduced here is single fault-tolerant in the sense that any sin-
gle failure will not cause a catastrophic loss-of-control system failure, once a failure in the
SbW causes the BAS to kick in, the vehicle must be brought to a safe stop. This is not
the case in the SbW fault-tolerant architecture -any first failure, except for a rack failure,
does not degrade the system performance substantially, and therefore, the vehicle can still
be driven for a period until repaired. Table 6.6 displays the number of possible system
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configurations after a single failure, together with the number of those that are required to
prevent a loss of vehicle control. As can be seen, not a single failure at the first level for
the SbW needs immediate action (the car is brought to a safe-stop, it cannot even be driven
for a warning period). On the contrary, 8 out of 48 single failures in the SbW/BAS need
immediate action, which represents 17% of the total number of first level of failures.
Table 6.6: Degraded performance comparison between the SbW and the SbW/BAS.
# of operational first # of configurations resulting in a degraded
failure configurations mode requiring the vehicle to stop
SbW 42 out of 43 0
SbW/BAS 48 out of 48 8
6.5 Conclusions
This chapter has illustrated how the methodology developed in Chapter 3, and its sup-
porting tool - InPRESTo (presented in Chapter 4) -, can be used to evaluate the pros
and cons of two very different architectural approaches to achieving fault tolerance. Fur-
thermore, from the case-study presented in this chapter, it is clear that the methodology
presented in this thesis does not only address the integration of system performance and
reliability, it also provides new insights (the designs comparison discussed in Section 6.4)
that were not possible to obtain before.
Focusing on the case study, it has been shown how a dissimilar backup mechanism -
brake-actuated steering - can be used successfully to reduce the amount of redundant
elements in a fault-tolerant system and to remove single points of failure that cannot be
remove by just adding redundancy (such as a stuck steering rack failure). Although the
BAS technology looks promising to achieve fault tolerance in SbW, BAS enables bringing
the vehicle to a safe stop after a failure has occurred, as opposed to allowing the vehicle to
be driven for a long period of time after the failure. The BAS technology could be thought
of as the ultimate safety net in a classical-redundancy-based SbW design (such as the one
discussed in Section 6.2) to accommodate very unlikely events. For example, an additional
failure between the first failure and the time the vehicle is brought into the repair shop, or
the stuck steering rack failure - a failure that even in a conventional mechanical steering
system will cause the system to fail catastrophically.
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ABS:
BAS:
BASC:
ESP:
FDIR:
FLCAS, FRCAS:
rb:
rb,:
RaAS:
RaAS1 , RaAS2 :
RLCAS, RRCAS:
RWAS1, RWAS2, RWAS3 :
SRa:
SbW:
SbWC:
SbWC 1, SbWC 2 :
SbWC 1-DC, SbWC2 -DC:
SbWC-FD:
SWAS 1 , SWAS 2 , SWAS 3 :
t :
tc :
ty :
T:
Uf:
V:
YRG 1 , YRG 2, YRG 3 :
Z1 :
Z2 :
3:0 :
Or :
6 :
A:
Liz2 :
'Q :
q'r :
Antilock braking system
Brake-actuated-steering
Brake-actuated-steering computer
Electonic stability program
Failure detection, isolation, and recovery
Front left and right caliper actuation subsystems
Yaw rate
Reference model yaw rate
SbW/BAS design rack actuation subsystem
SbW design rack actuation subsystem
Rear left and right caliper actuation subsystems
Road wheel angle sensors
Steering rack
Steer-by-wire
SbW/BAS design computers
SbW design computers
SbW design computers dual-comparator circuits
SbW/BAS design computers failure detection circuits
Steering wheel angle sensors
Time
Configuration evaluation time
Failure injection time
System global evaluation time
Behavioral modes random variable
Forward velocity
SbW/BAS yaw rate gyros
Sideslip angle performance metric
Yaw rate performance metric
Heading angle performance metric
Sideslip angle
Reference model sideslip angle
Road wheel angle
Steering wheel angle
Failure rate
Set of requirements for performance metric Z1
Set of requirements for performance metric Zi
Set of requirements for performance metric Z1
Heading angle
Reference model heading angle
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Towards Probabilistic-Informed Design
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the use of the modeling and evaluation methodol-
ogy introduced in this thesis as the enabler of a probabilistic-informed design framework
for fault-tolerant systems. The discussion begins with a review of existing probabilistic-
informed decision-making importance measures for system design. Sensitivity analysis
techniques in the context of probabilistic-informed design will be also discussed. How-
ever, these techniques only scratch the surface of the problem. To understand the extent
of the problem, the remainder of the chapter focuses on the issue of investigating how
reliability is affected by the system dynamic behavior. In this context, we propose new
importance measures that have the potential to be used as part of a probabilistic-informed
design framework within the context of the new methodology. The Chapter concludes
with a discussion of the monotonic behavior and the functional dependencies of the sys-
tem reliability function, and the main open questions on this matter. Its purpose is to fully
enable probabilistic-informed design within the framework of the modeling and evalua-
tion methodology introduced in this thesis.
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 5, we showed how the methodology presented in this thesis (and its supporting
tool InPRESTo) can be used to guide the design of a fault-tolerant system to meet certain
goals. Thus, if a given design does not meet these goals, it is necessary to extract cer-
tain information from the system evaluation analysis in order to improve its design. This
information includes identifying the weakest design points (for example single points of
failure), and the components and subsystems that are driving the system performance and
reliability.
The design goals for the case-study presented in Chapter 5 were to achieve single fault-
tolerance and a minimum reliability estimate. Thus, improving the design was a matter
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of identifying and eliminating any single point of failure and meeting the reliability goal.
The first proposed design was already very close to meeting the reliability goal. Therefore
we focused on eliminating the single points of failure. It turned out that once all the single
points of failure were eliminated, the reliability also improved an order of magnitude with
respect to the original goal. Thus, in this case, extracting the relevant information from the
analysis to improve the system design was not a difficult task.
However, extracting this relevant information might not be an easy task in other situations.
Taking the same flight control system, let's assume that even after removing all single
points of failure, the resulting design does not meet the reliability goal. In this case, the
analyst must find those parts of the system that are driving the reliability estimate and
modify them with the hope of meeting the reliability goal as well.
The problem becomes even more acute when the design goals also include probabilis-
tic performance goals, e.g., the average power consumption among all possible non-failed
operational conditions. In this case, perhaps the architectural modification that could im-
prove reliability might also harm the performance goals. Therefore, it is necessary to in-
vestigate appropriate techniques to extract the information relevant to improving a design
to optimize performance and reliability.
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss some existing techniques for this purpose, and
also discuss open questions and future research directions. Section 7.2 discusses several
existing techniques, such as importance measures and sensitivity analysis, used to rank
the impact of system parameters on reliability. Section 7.3 discusses the work we have
done in probabilistic-informed design, defining a new importance measure in the context
of the methodology proposed in this thesis. This section also discusses several open ques-
tions and future research directions within the context of probabilistic-informed design.
Concluding remarks are presented in Section 7.4.
7.2 Existing Techniques for Probabilistic Informed Design
In the framework of the nuclear industry, without focusing on a particular reliability/risk
modeling methodology, several importance measures have been proposed to quantify
which plant normal operation disturbing events, and which component failure modes
have the greatest impact on a particular risk metric in case of an accident. Focusing on
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Markov reliability models, sensitivity analysis has also been proposed to rank the com-
ponents that most influence the reliability estimate yielded by the Markov model. In this
section, all these techniques will be discussed.
7.2.1 Existing Importance Measures
The definition of the common importance measures used in the nuclear industry has been
adapted to the framework of this research. The reader is referred to [59] and [60] for their
definition in the context of the nuclear industry. Thus, the most commonly used impor-
tance measures for ranking the importance of the m failure mode of component 1 are
Risk Achievement Worth:
Qi(m)+RAW(m) = ; (7.1)Q
Risk Reduction Worth:
RRWi(m) - _ (7.2)Q((.)2
Fussell-Vesely:
Q -- (73))FV(m) = ; (7.3)
where Q is the system unreliability (as defined in Appendix A), Qi (m)+ is the system unre-
liability when the transition to the m failure mode of component 1 occurs with probability
one, and Q, (m) - is the system unreliability when the transition to the m failure mode of
component I occurs with probability zero.
These measures can only be used to compute the importance of single events; and except
for Fusell-Vesely, they cannot be applied to parameters, e.g., failure rates, or coverage prob-
abilities [61]. Furthermore, to compute any of these importance measures, it is necessary
to compute Q, (m)+ and Q, (m)- separately; i.e., it is not possible to obtain them directly
from Q.
- 145 -
Towards Probabilistic-Informed Design
7.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Focusing on Markov reliability modeling, sensitivity analysis has been proposed to rank
the influence of changes in the model parameters on the system reliability (or unreliability)
[62], [63], [64]. For each parameter a3 , with j = 1, 2, ... , K, of the state-transition matrix
A, it is necessary to solve
P(t) A 0 ... 0 P(t)
8P(t) -A 0 aP(t)
89iaA 5a-,
d aP(t) _ e9 0 0 P
Tt aa2 - a2 aa2
aP(t) DA 0 A aP(t)
L -aK . - aaK . . aK
[P(0)' . ._._] - [Pa1 U' U'
[P O) ai 4ja2 9. aK O
OQ(t) = P2i+1,k(t); Vj = 1, 2, ... ,K (7.4)
i,k ea
where Po = [1 0 0 ... 0]', 0 = [0 0 0 ... 0]', and p2i,k(t) are the components of vector P(t)
corresponding to the absorbing states.
The main advantage of using sensitivity analysis is that the ranking of the most influencing
effects on the system unreliability is done at the parameter level. However, the computa-
tional cost of using sensitivity analysis is expensive, since the set of differential equations
(7.4) is of size N x K, where N is the number of states of the Markov model, and K is the
number of parameters of the state-transition matrix.
It is possible to break the system of differential equations into K systems of size N and
obtain an exact solution for the sensitivity. In this case, although the size of the problems
to solve is of size N rather than of size N x K, there is still need to solve K of them. To
alleviate the computational burden, approximate solutions to (7.4) have been proposed
[64].
Another approach to solving the sensitivity problem is to perturb each parameter ai of
the state-transition matrix A, solve the K resulting systems, and then rank the parameters
according to the unreliability yielded by each ai-perturbed system. With this approach it
is again necessary to solve K sets of differential equations to obtain the sensitivity solution
[49]. This technique is illustrated in the analysis of the case-study presented in Chapter 2.
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The Differential Importance Measure
In the context of sensitivity analysis as a technique to rank the influence of each system
parameter aj, an importance- measure, called the Differential Importance Measure (DIM),
is proposed in [60]. DIM is defined as:
__dai
DIM(aj) = . (7.5)
0 a Q d a j '
The computation of DIM exhibits the same shortcomings as those discussed for sensitivity
analysis techniques. In fact, the solution proposed in [60] to compute DIM relies on the
same techniques used in [49] to solve the sensitivity problem; i.e., to perturb each param-
eter aj, and use the perturbed results together with the unperturbed solution to compute
an approximation of (7.5).
7.3 Further Discussion and Open Research Questions
So far, we presented some of the existing techniques, such as importance measures and
sensitivity analysis, to extract the information relevant to improving the design of a sys-
tem for optimal performance and reliability. However, these techniques only scratch the
surface of the problem. To understand the extent of the problem, we will focus on one
aspect of integrating performance and reliability, which is how reliability is affected by
system performance, and, therefore, how reliability is affected by the system dynamics of
each configuration.
In the remainder of this section, we will discuss the work we have done in this area,
proposing a new importance measure that has the potential to be used as part of a probabilistic-
informed design framework within the context of the new methodology. Its main advan-
tage is that it can be computed using only the nominal solution of the Markov model. The
purpose of this measure is not to rank only the importance of component failures, but also
the importance of the different system performance metrics. Several related issues which
are still unsolved will be also discussed.
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7.3.1 On the Functional Dependence of the Reliability Function
The system reliability is a function of the component failure rates and the coverage proba-
bilities:
R = F(A, e, t), (7.6)
where A is a vector containing the individual component failure rates, 6 is the vector of
failure coverage probabilities, and t represents time.
On the Monotonicity of the Reliability Function with respect to time
The first question that must be answered is how the system reliability function behaves
with respect to time. Usually reliability requirements must be met for a certain system
evaluation time, e.g., the system life-time or the maintenance period. This makes sense as
the reliability function is monotonically decreasing with time, and, therefore, by fixing a
reliability requirement for some time T, we ensure that this requirement is met at any time
t < T.
Lemma. Let R = F(A, 6, t) be the reliability function of a system, then R is monotonically
decreasing with t.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove that 1R is non-positive for any value of t. The result follows
from (3.21) and the following properties of the state-transition matrix A associated with
the Markov reliability model (3.20): the diagonal elements are negative or zero, the off-
diagonal elements are zero or positive, and A is a diagonally-dominant matrix.
Importance of the Component Failure Modes
The natural issue that arises now is to find the component failures that are driving the
system reliability. As stated in Chapter 3, each system configuration {i, k} is determined
by a unique sequence of component failure mode transitions. Thus, some transitions be-
tween certain component failure modes will be driving the system reliability/unreliability.
Therefore, identifying those transitions will allow us to modify the components with the
largest possible impact on the system reliability.
- 148 -
Chapter 7
Towards Probabilistic-Informed Design
Let s kbe an indicator function that takes value 1 when the sequence of component fail-
ures that yields system configuration {i, k} includes a transition to failure mode m of com-
ponent 1, and 0 otherwise. Then the importance measure for failure mode m of component
1 is defined by
Ii,m(t) =1 - Q + SI'rP2i,k(t), (7.7)
i,k
where p2i,k(t) is the probability that, at a time t > 0, the system is in configuration {i, k},
and it is being declared as as failed, conditioned on p1,0(0) = 1.
This importance measure can be interpreted as the contribution of the failure mode m of
component j to the total system unreliability Q. The following cases are possible:
" I,m (t) = 1 means that the m failure mode of component 1 is present in each sequence of
component failures that contributes to the system unreliability.
* If Ii,m(t) < 1 means that the m failure mode of component 1 is not present in at least one
of the sequences of component failures that contributes to the system unreliability.
* If Ii,m(t) = 1 - Q means that the m failure mode of component 1 is not present in any of
the sequences of component failures that contribute to the system unreliability.
Therefore the largest value of the importance measure I,m indicates the component 1 (and
its associated failure mode m) that most influences the system reliability.
On the Monotonicity of the Reliability Function with respect to failure rates and cover-
age probabilities
Once the component failures that most affect the reliability are identified, the natural ques-
tion that arises is how the system reliability function behaves with respect to changes in
the failure rates of those components.
We could think that a way to improve the system reliability is by improving the com-
ponent failure rates. However, the reliability function R = F(A, 6, t) is not, in general,
monotonic with respect to each entry Ai of the vector of component failure rates A. There-
fore, it might be the case that by making a component more reliable, the system reliability
is being harmed.
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As an example of this kind of behavior, let a system with three components C1, C2 and C3
be arranged as follows:
" The system will be functional if C1 or C3 are operational, operating with component Ci
before any failures has occurred.
" When C1 is in operation C3 can not fail.
* C1 needs component C2 to work, if C2 fails while Ci is in operation, the system fails.
" If C1 fails, 03 is brought on-line and can perform its function without C2, i.e, C2 does
not affect the function of the system when C3 is operational.
Under the above assumptions, the state-transition matrix A of the resulting Markov relia-
bility model is given by:
-Ac, - Ac2 0 0 0
Aci -Ac0  0 0
Ac2 0 0 0
0 Ac 0 0
The Reliability function corresponding to this system is given by:
R(t) = -(Acl+AC2)t + Aci (e-(ACi+Ac 2 )t - e-\ACt) (7.9)Ac 3 - (Ac, + Ac2 )
For Ac, = 2 - 10-6 failures/h, AC 2 = 3. 10-6 failures/h, AC, = 10-6 failures/h, and
t = 1000h, R 1(1000) = 0.99700648951303. Now making Ac, = 2.5. 10-6, R 2 (1000) =
0.99700698760028. It is clear that R1(1000) < R 2 (1000). Thus, by making C1 less reliable,
i.e., increasing Acl, the system Reliability at t = 1000 increases.
Therefore, this is one of the research problems that must be further explored, i.e., under
what conditions the system reliability function is monotonic with respect to component
failure rates. In this context, we will pose a hypothesis that if proven right, could be a
powerful technique for identifying weak points in the design. Although not discussed
here, similar ideas apply to the coverage probabilities. Thus, we state the following hy-
pothesis, which is something to be proven by further work.
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Hypothesis. If a system reliability function R = F(A, e, t) is not monotonic decreasing
with respect to each entry Ai of the vector of component failure rates A, there is a weak
point in the design that can be identified by finding the Ai's for which R = F(A, 6, t) does
not exhibit monotonic behavior.
7.3.2 On the Functional Dependence of the Coverage Probability
The coverage probabilities are a function of the performance metrics and their require-
ments, and also of the system dynamics, therefore
E = G( 2 ,<DZ, f(.), p(.)), (7.10)
where 2 represents the system performance metrics, and <b2 represent the associated re-
quirements to those performance metrics. The functions f(-) and p(-) represents the dy-
namics of the different system configurations.
Performance Metrics Dependence
As stated before, the performance metrics 2 are system-related properties that will quan-
tify how well a system performs the function for which it was designed. Therefore, even
if the coverage probability depends on them, there is not much we can do to improve the
coverage probability, as they cannot be changed. However, by identifying the performance
metric that most often violates its requirements, we are identifying the system properties
that are driving the system reliability; and, therefore, the system design could be modified
accordingly.
Let s, be an indicator function that takes value 1 whenever the system configuration {i, k}
is declared as failed due to performance metric Z failing to meet its requirements. Then
the importance measure for performance metric Zj is defined by
Izj (t) = 1- Q + E sjp2i,k(t), (7.11)
i,k
where P2i,k(t) is the probability that, at a time t > 0, the system is in configuration {i, k},
and it is being declared asfailed, conditioned on p1,0(0) = 1.
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The following cases are possible:
" Iz, (t) = 1 means that the Z performance metric is always violated whenever a system
configuration is declared asfailed.
* If Izj (t) < 1 means that the Zj performance metric is not violated in at least one of the
system configuration declared asfailed.
" If Iz (t) = 1 - Q means that the Zj performance metric is never violated whenever a
system configuration is declared asfailed.
Therefore, the largest value of the importance measure Iz, indicates the performance met-
ric that most influences the system reliability.
Requirements Dependence.
The requirements Q2 associated with the performance metrics constrain the values these
can take; therefore there is not much we can do about them either. However, it might be
the case that the reliability is very sensitive to certain performance requirements. Thus, as
with the performance metrics, if we could identify the requirements to which reliability
is more sensitive, we would be able to identify the system properties that are driving the
system reliability.
System Dynamics Dependence.
The most challenging issue related to the functional dependence of the coverage probabil-
ities is related to the system dynamics f(.), p(-) adopted by the system for every sequence
of failures. Thus it is necessary to investigate the behavior of the coverage probability with
respect to changes in f(-), g(-).
7.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we discussed the use of the methodology introduced in this thesis as the
enabler of a probabilistic-informed design framework for fault-tolerant systems. Exist-
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ing probabilistic-informed decision making importance-measures and sensitivity analy-
sis techniques were reviewed. We also discussed the work we have done in the area of
probabilistic-informed design, proposing a new importance measure that has the poten-
tial to be used within the framework of the new methodology. The discussion was com-
pleted with open questions and suggestions for future research directions in probabilistic-
informed design. Although this chapter poses more questions than answers, the challeng-
ing issues brought up here are crucial for enabling probabilistic-informed design within
the context of the methodology developed in this thesis.
Notation Used in this Chapter
a: j parameter of the Markov model state-transition matrix
A: Markov model state-transition matrix
DIM(aj) : Differential Importance Measure for parameter aj
1() : Vector of system configurations state evolution functions
FV(m): Fussell-Vesely importance measure for the m failure mode of component I
X(-) : Vector of system configurations output functions
Iim : Importance measure for the m failure mode of component 1
Izj :Importance measure for performance metric Z3
P2i,k(t) : Probability that the system configuration i, k is declared as failed at time t given that at t = 0 is in {1, 0}
P(t): System configurations probability vector
Q : System unreliability
Q+ (m): System unreliability when the transition to the m failure mode of component 1 occurs with probability one
Q, (m): System unreliability when the transition to the m failure mode of component 1 occurs with probability zero
R : System reliability
RAW, (m): Risk achievement worth importance measure for the m failure mode of component I
RRW (m): Risk reduction worth importance measure for the m failure mode of component 1
s i Indicator function for the operational status of component I when the system is in configuration {i, k}
s : Indicator function for the Zj performance metric when the system failed after reaching configuration {i, k}
t :Time
2 :Vector of system performance metrics
<1) : Set of sets of system performance requirements
A : Vector of component failure rates
A: Failure rate
c : Vector of system failure coverage probabilities
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Concluding Remarks
This last chapter presents a summary of the thesis, highlighting its main contributions to
the disciplines of system reliability analysis and system design. It concludes by discussing
the observations the author has made over four years of research in the fields of reliability
theory, dynamic system theory, and system design theory.
8.1 Thesis Summary and Highlights of Major Contributions
Chapter 1 stated the necessity of developing a new methodology for analyzing the relia-
bility and performance of fault-tolerant systems for aircraft, space, tactical, and automo-
tive applications. The main shortcoming of current reliability evaluation techniques was
clearly identified in this chapter as: the incompleteness of the system models used to analyze the
system behavior in the presence of component failures. Thus, the main goal of this thesis was
set forth: the development of a new methodology for evaluating fault-tolerant systems. The main
concern this methodology would address would is the gap between the system model be-
havior and the reliability model. That is, to minimize the subjectivity introduced in the
analysis clue to incompleteness of current methodologies. In order to put this thesis in the
appropriate context, we reviewed classical reliability evaluation methodologies and tools,
as well as related work in the field of Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (DPRA).
Chapter 2 illustrated the application of Markov models for system reliability evaluation, as
Markov modeling is used to model the system stochastic behavior in the framework of the
new methodology presented in Chapter 3. A case-study of an automotive power net archi-
tecture for automotive safety-critical applications was presented. The main contribution
of this chapter was the development of a technique to systematically build a system-level
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) that allows direct mapping to the Markov reli-
ability model, thus making its construction easier. Sensitivity analysis (discussed in details
in Chapter 7) was used to understand the influence of perturbations in the Markov model
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parameters. The results of the sensitivity analysis helped to determine the robustness of
the reliability estimate with respect to parameter uncertainty, and also helped to improve
the design in terms of reliability. Most of the work presented in this chapter was published
in [40].
Chapter 3 introduced the mathematical foundations of the new modeling and evaluation
methodology proposed in the thesis. This methodology introduced the use of behavioral
models of the system dynamics, similar to the ones used by control engineers when de-
signing the control system, but with additional features to model the dynamic behavior of
the component in the presence of different failures. The performance evaluation is based
on the system dynamic behavior when component failures within the system occur. The
proposed methodology allows one to assess not only system reliability, but other impor-
tant dynamic performance metrics that might be relevant in the design of a fault-tolerant
system. The system stochastic behavior due to component failures is modeled by using
Markov models. In this framework, a rigorous approach for computing failure coverage
probabilities was presented; providing analytical solutions for LTI systems, and a Monte-
Carlo based methodology for non-linear systems. Several examples were developed to
illustrate the concepts introduced in this chapter.
Chapter 4 presented a MATLAB/SIMULINK@ based tool that was developed in order to
make the application of the new methodology feasible. This tool automates the evalua-
tion process of a system defined by the analyst using the SIMULINK@ environment. The
tool is called InPRESTo, an acronym for Integrated Performance and Reliability Evaluation
SIMULINK® Toolbox. The functionality, structure, and main futures of InPRESTo were ex-
plained in detail in this chapter. This chapter is also a succinct user manual, which includes
explanations on how to define the necessary inputs to perform a system analysis, and how
to visualize the analysis results. A testament to InPRESTo's importance is the fact that it
is being used by the Systems Engineering and Evaluation Division at the Charles Stark
Draper Laboratory for the evaluation of space and tactical systems.
Chapter 5 explained how the new performance and reliability modeling and evaluation
methodology introduced in Chapter 3 and its supporting SIMULINK® toolbox -InPRESTo-
can be used to: identify weak points in the system design; guide the design by pointing to
possible solutions to eliminate the uncovered weak points; compare different architecture
alternatives from different perspectives; and test different failure detection, isolation, and
reconfiguration (FDIR) techniques. To demonstrate this, a case-study of a fault-tolerant ar-
chitecture for a fighter aircraft lateral-directional flight control system was presented and
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analyzed in detail. This case-study proved the scalability of the tool to analyze large sys-
tems.
Chapter 6 illustrated how the new methodology (and its supporting tool) can be used to
compare conceptually very different architectural approaches to achieve fault-tolerance.
For this purpose, two different designs to achieve fault-tolerance in a steer-by-wire (SbW)
system were presented, analyzed, and compared in terms of performance, reliability, and
fault-tolerance. The first design was based on redundancy of components, and the in-
troduction of failure detection, isolation, and reconfiguration mechanisms. In the second
design, a dissimilar backup mechanism called brake-actuated steering (BAS), was used to
achieve fault-tolerance. This chapter complements Chapter 5 by showing how the new
modeling and evaluation methodology (and its supporting SIMULINK@ toolbox) can be
used to compare very different architectural approaches to fault-tolerance design.
Chapter 7 discussed the use of the modeling and evaluation methodology introduced in
this thesis as the enabler of a probabilistic-informed design framework for fault-tolerant
systems. This chapter posed more questions than gave answers. However, the challenging
issues brought up here are crucial for developing a probabilistic-informed design frame-
work based on the methodology presented in this thesis. To understand the extent of the
problem, we focused the discussion on the issue of investigating how reliability is affected
by system performance, and therefore, how reliability is affected by system dynamics. In
this context, we proposed new importance measures that have the potential to be used as
part of a probabilistic-informed design framework within the context of the new method-
ology. The chapter concluded with a discussion of functional dependencies of the system
reliability function and the main open questions in this matter.
8.2 Conclusions
The design of an effective fault-tolerant system requires a thorough and comprehensive
analysis to fully understand and quantify potential failures and assess the effectiveness
of failure detection, isolation, and reconfiguration (FDIR) mechanisms. The literature
abounds with well-established techniques that support the system reliability evaluation
during its design phase.
Unfortunately, all these techniques have a common shortcoming: the difficulty of generat-
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ing the reliability model in a systematic and objective way from the functional descriptions
of the system and the component failures, i.e, there is a gap between the system functional
model description and the system reliability model. For some conventional systems, this
shortcoming can be overcome, as it might not be very difficult to generate an objective and
complete reliability model from the system functional description, and from expert judg-
ment to assess the impact of component failures on the system functionality. However, this
is not the case for large complex systems or embedded software-intensive systems, typical of
fault-tolerant systems. For the analysis of these systems, all these techniques can yield
ambiguous and/or incomplete results, as it is virtually impossible to fully understand the
system behavior in the presence of failures -and thus, to determine its reliability- by
only using a qualitative description of the system's functionality and expert judgment.
We postulated that an excellent way to fill the gap between the system functional and
reliability models would be to use a behavioral model of the system dynamics, similar to
the ones used by control engineers when designing the control system, but with additional
features to model different failure behaviors of the components. The reliability model is
thus based on the system dynamic behavior when component failures within the system
occur. In this context, Markov models are the perfect formalism to model the stochastic
behavior due to component failures of fault-tolerant systems.
One of the most important challenges when formulating the mathematical foundations
of the new methodology was to link the system dynamic behavioral model and the sys-
tem reliability model. The way we approached and solved this problem was by introduc-
ing failure coverage probabilities in the stochastic model. We defined these probabilities
through the set of possible initial conditions at the time of failure, and a subset of possible
initial conditions that result in trajectories which are contained in some predefined set of
"acceptable" states. This resulted in the integration of system dynamic performance and
reliability, which enabled a completely new way of analyzing fault-tolerant systems, and
provided new insights from the analysis that were not possible to obtain before. Exam-
ples of these are the way the testing of FDIR effectiveness can now be incorporated into
the system performance and reliability analysis, and the multiple ways conceptually very
different architectural approaches to the same application can now be compared.
This thesis is a culmination of four years of research and development in the area of fault-
tolerant systems evaluation and design. The main contribution of this thesis is bringing
control theory, reliability theory, and system design a step closer to a unified systems sci-
ence discipline. In addition, this thesis bridges the gap between the system model behavior
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and the reliability model, thus integrating dynamic performance and reliability evalua-
tion into one framework. The thesis covers many aspects of fault-tolerant systems design,
yet one of its major contributions is to provide a rigorous mathematical framework that
will enable future researchers to develop a fully integrated probabilistic-informed design
framework.
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Appendix A
Basic Concepts and Definitions
A.1 Basic Definitions
The purpose of this appendix section is to define some basic concepts that appear in this
thesis. This section is by no means an extensive collection of reliability concepts and defi-
nitions. The reader is referred to [6, 65] for other reliability-related definitions.
Failure Rate. Let T 'j be a random variable that represents the time-to-failure-mode-j for
component i. The failure rate for failure mode j of component i is defined as
P(t < T'3 < t + At | T" > t)
Aq M) = limAt-o . (A.1)
It is frequently assumed that the failure rate follows the general shape of a bathtub curve
[6]. Most reliability analyses consider only the flat part of the curve, therefore assuming
a constant failure rate. This is not very realistic in applications where the system lifetime
is large enough to make component wear-out effects important. It is possible to model
wear-out effects using time-dependent failure rates.
Repair Rate. Let T '3 be a random variable that represents the time-to-repair for failure
mode j of component i. The repair rate for failure mode j of component i is defined as
SP(t < T|'i < t + At | T)'3 > t)
Failure Coverage Probability. A component is said to failed covered when a failure event
that occurs within the component, affecting its performance, can be detected, isolated, and
the system reconfigured to compensate for that failure [21]. Thus, the failure coverage
probability c is defined as the probability that given a failure event has occurred, it can be
detected, isolated, and the system reconfigured to compensate for the failure (in order to
keep delivering its function) before an unrecoverable transient occurs.
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Point-Wise Reliability R(t). The point-wise system reliability R(t) is defined as the prob-
ability that the system is in a non-failed configuration at time t and can be computed as
R(t)dt = SpFC(t) (A.3)
where S [1 1 1 ... 1]' is a vector of ones and size m (the number of transient states), and
PFC corresponds to the transient states probabilities.
Point-Wise Unreliability Q(t). The point-Wise Unreliability Q(t) is defined as the proba-
bility that the system is in a failed configuration at time t and can be computed by
Q(t) = 1 - R(t). (A.4)
Dependability Rate (T). The dependability rate A(T) is defined as the ratio of the point-
wise unreliability Q(T) to the global system evaluation time T:
\ Q(T) (A.5)
T'
where T is the system evaluation time, e.g., system lifetime, or mission time. It has been
adopted from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations [66]. It can be thought
of as an average failure rate for the system at time T.
A.2 Continuous-Time Markov Chains
Let the random process X = {X(t) : t > 0} be a family of random variables which take
values in some countable set C = {1, 2, ... N}, called the state space and indexed by [0, oo[.
The process X is called a continuous time Markov chain if it satisfies the Markov condition,
stated by
P(X(tn) = j X(t) = i, ... , X(_1) = in1) = P(X(tn) = j I X(tn_1 ) = in-1)
for all n > 1 and all j, ii, ..., in- 1 E S and any sequence ti < ... < tn. (A.6)
Denoting tn_ 1 by t and tn by t + At, with At -> 0, it is possible to write
P(X(t + At) = j I X(t) = i) = Aij(t)At, (A.7)
where A (t) is known as the transition rate from state i to state j.
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By using the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations, we obtain the set of differential equations
dpk(t) = Ak (t)pk (t) + EjJk Ajk (t)pj(t) with j, k {1, 2, ... N}
[P1(0) P2(0) ... PN(0)] = PO,
where P (t) is the probability of being in the state k E C at time t, given the
probability density function po, Ajk(t) is defined by
(A.8)
states initial
Ajk(t) = lim~t--o,P(X(t + At) = k I X(t) = j)At
and Ak(t) is the transition rate out of state k, and it is defined as
limAt-oP(X(t + At) = k I X(t) = k) = limAt.o(1 - Ak(t)At).
Equation (A.8) can be written in matrix form as
dt = AP(t)
P(O) = Po,
where P(t) = [p1(t) p2(t) ... pN(t)]' and A is called the generator of the chain (or the state-
transition matrix), and it is built using the transition rates Ak(t) and Ajk(t).
Notation Used in this Chapter
Markov chain state-transition matrix
Probability of being in state k at time t, given the states initial probability density function
Point-wise system unreliability
Point-wise system reliability
Time
System global evaluation time
Time-to-failure-mode-j for component i
Time-to-repair for failure mode j for component i
Transition rate out of state k
Transition rate from state j to state k
Failure rate for failure mode j of component i
Dependability rate
Repair rate for failure mode j of component i
System non-failed configurations probability vector
- 161 -
(A.9)
(A.10)
(A.11)
A:
Pk ():
Q(t) :
R(t)
T :
T;:
Ak:
Ajk
Xi :
(T)
pFC(t) :
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Subroutines Description
Inpresto InPRESTo main script. All the subroutines, except Inpresto-plot are called from
this script.
failure-information searches in the Simulink model for the failure information of each
block.
init-evaluation will evaluate the initial behavior of the system when no failures has oc-
curred.
metrics-assessment will check whether the requirement specifications are met.
sequences-first-level will create the failure sequences to inject at the first level of failure.
evaluation This function will evaluate each sequence of failures at the k level.
sequences-separation This function will return the failed and non-failed sequences at each
level of failure
sequences-k-level This function will create the failure sequences to inject at the k level of
failure.
matrix helps establishing the state-transition matrix.
truncate-matrix truncates the state transition matrix at truncation level k-level after the
system was evaluated at k-level-1
markov-model-solver Script to solve the system of differential equations associated to the
Markov model.
metrics-models-evaluation This function will analyze the results of the evaluation.
sensitivity-analysis Similar to the previous one, when sensitivity is carried out.
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results-analysis This function will collect the results in an excel spreadsheet.
Inpresto-plot This function will plot some of the the results of the evaluation.
SIMULINK system
behavioral model,
sequencesirstevel -nit_evaluation +-failure nformation performance metrics,
and requirements
initmatrix
evaluation
sequences-separation NO
sequences-k-level Truncation H as k. YE S
level k. been reached?
matrix
Are all sequences of NO truncate-matrix
failure catastrpi? 
N
YES
....... e.it vity N O
markov model solver metrics models evaluationi anaLyss
YES
sesiiity-analysis
YES Plot individual
plot-solution failure results-analysis
sequences?
NO Analysis results
END spreadsheet report
Figure B.1: Subroutines flow diagram.
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InPRESTo's Main Script
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Alejandro D. Dominguez-Garcia
% aledan@MIT.EDU
% Laboratory for Electromagnetic and Electronic Systems
% Massachusetts Institute of Technology
% Created: October 20, 2005
% Modified: April 19, 2006
% Main script of the Performance Evaluator. Type Evaluator to invoke it.
% Make sure the Simulink model to be analyzed is opened.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function Inpresto
clear all
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% INIT VARIABLES %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Init variables and global variables declaration
states-perjfailurelevel=l; % Only one possible state when
% no components have failed
system states.metrics=[]; % Metrics to assess the system
% performance
system states.stateof-the-system=[]; % Vector of zeros and ones
% representing if the system
% exhibitis some performance
system states.previous-state=[]; % Previous system state
systemstates.xfinal=[]; % Final states that will be used
% as initial conditions for the
% next sequence
system states.currentfailuremode=[]; % Current component failure mode
global stoptime;
global injection;
global time; % Row vector with the
% information regarding the time
% at which a failure occurs
global failure-modes; % Row vector with the
% information regarding each
% component failure mode
global symjmatrix; % It will be used by several
% subroutines
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global P;
global sensitivity
global zimearr;
global levelnumber;
global sensanalysis;
global sensitivity-factor;
global truncation;
time_arr=[];
% Markov model state-transition
% matrix
% Structure to store the
% sensitivity matrices
% Number of failure levels
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% ANALYSIS PARAMETERS INPUT %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
modeljname=input('Enter model name: ' , 's');
evaluationtime=input('Global evaluation time T (h) :
truncation=input('Truncate evaluation (y/n): ', 's');
if truncation=='y'
t_level=input('Truncation level kmax :
else
t_level=le6;
end
stoptime=input('Configuration evaluation time tc (s): ');
injection=input('Failure injection time (between 0 and 1) :
sensanalysis=input('Sensitivity analysis (y/n): ', 's');
if sens-analysis=='y'
sensitivityfactor=...
input('Failure rates factor sensitivity analysis: ');
else
sensitivityfactor=0;
end
filename=input('xls file name for report: ' , 's');
tic
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% MODEL PREPARATION %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%tic
% Obtain the failure information included in the model.
[components information,failurejinfo,num-ofcomponents,...
failuremodesvector,metricsinformation,lambda,lambdasym]=...
failureinformation(modelname);
%disp(['Time taken to gather data and prepare model: ' num2str(toc)]);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%SYSTEM EVALUATION AND MARKOV MODEL CONSTRUCTION %%%%%%%
%tic
% Initial performance of the system
signals=[0 zeros(l,num-of-components) 1 0 0];
-165-
Appendix B
Appendix B InPRESTo Subroutines
evaluatedstatescounter=O;
[system states,evaluatedstates-counter,state ofthesystem]=...
initevaluation(modelname,signals,evaluated statescounter,...
numofcomponents,system-states);
% First set of signals for failure modes injection
[signals,statecounter,failurejlevelcounter]=...
sequences-firstlevel(failuremodesvector);
% First column of the state-transition matrix from the original set of
% signals.
[P sensitivity]=init-matrix(signals,failurejinfo,lambda,lambdasym);
while ((sum(state_of_thesystem)~=O) & (failurelevelcounter+l)<=(t_level))
states-perfailurejlevel=[statesper_failurejlevel ; size(signals,1)];
[system-states,evaluated statescounter,state ofthesystem]=...
evaluation(modelbname,signals,evaluatedstatescounter,...
numofcomponents,system states);
[nonfailure-sequences,failure-sequences]=...
sequences-separation(state_ofthe-system,signals);
if (failurelevelcounter+l)<=(tlevel)
[signals,statecounter,failurejlevelcounter]=...
sequences_k_level(non-failuresequences,...
failuremodes-vector,state_counter,failurelevel counter);
[P sensitivity]=matrix(signals,failureinfo,lambda,lambdasym);
end
evaluatedstatescounter
end
if ((failurejlevelcounter)==(t_level) & (sum(stateofthe-system)~=O))
[P,sensitivity]=truncatematrix(evaluatedstatescounter);
system-states(evaluatedstatescounter+l).metrics=O;
system-states(evaluatedstatescounter+l).stateofthe-system=O;
system-states(evaluatedstatescounter+l).previous state=[];
system-states(evaluatedstatescounter+l).xfinal=[];
system-states(evaluatedstates-counter+l).currentfailuremode=[];
statesper-failurejlevel=[states-perfailurelevel ; 1];
end
disp(['Time taken to evaluate system and build Markov model: ' num2str(toc)]);
disp(['Size of the Markov model transition matrix: ' num2str(size(P,1))]);
%tic
save matrixmodel P
save lambdamatrix lambda
disp(['Time taken to save the Markov model: ' num2str(toc)]);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% MARKOV MODEL SOLVER %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
tic
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[t,p,pstates] = markovmodelsolver(evaluationtime,lambda);
disp(['Time taken to solve the Markov model: ' num2str(toc)]);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% METRICS EVALUATION %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
tic
[non-functionalmetricsmeasures,...
nonfunctionalmetricsmeasureslevels,...
probabilistic-performance measures]=...
metricsmodelsevaluation(system-states,statesper-failurelevel,t,p);
disp(['Time taken to evaluate metrics: ' num2str(toc)]);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
if sens-analysis=='y'
[sensitivitymeasures sensitivity-driver driver]=...
sensitivity-analysis(system states,t,pstates,...
components-information);
else
sensitivitymeasures=[];
sensitivity-driver=[];
driver=[];
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% ANALYSIS RESULTS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
tic
results-analysis(components information,system-states,...
states-per failure_level,t,p,non-functionalmetrics measures,...
nonfunctionalmetricsmeasureslevels,...
probabilistic-performance measures,sensitivitymeasures, ...
driver,filename)
disp(['Time taken to analyze results: ' num2str(toc)]);
disp(['Time taken to evaluate the system: ' num2str(toc)]);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% SAVE IMPORTANT RESULTS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
save modelresults modelname evaluationtime stop-time ...
injection filename lambda system-states t p numofcomponents
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failure-information
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Alejandro D. Dominguez-Garcia
% aledan@MIT.EDU
% Laboratory for Electromagnetic and Electronic Systems
% Massachusetts Institute of Technology
% Created: October 21, 2005
% Modified: February 08, 2006
% This script searches in the Simulink model for the failure information
% of each block.
% INPUTS:
% -modelname: name of the Matlab Simulink model we want to search for
% failure
% information.
% OUTPUTS:
% -components-information: an array variable with the following fields:
% -name: name of the component with associated failure information
% -failureinfo: an array variable with the the following fields:
% -failuremodes: component failure modes
% -failurerates: failure rates associated to each failure mode
% listed in the failuremodes field.
% -failureinfo: componentsinformation.failureinfo. This is necessary
% to pass to the matrix subroutine.
% -num-of-components: variable that returns the number of components in
% the system
% -failuremodesvector: a vector of dimension the number of components
% with associated failure information. Each elements has an integer
% thatrepresents the number of failure modes associated to the
% component.Each element has an integer that represent the number of
% failure modes considered for each component.
% -lambda: a matrix with as many rows as components and columns equal to
% the number of failure modes of each component.
% COMMENTS:
% This function is able to reado both symbolic and numerical data from
% the simulink failure blocks information. It is possible to introduce
% time-dependent failure rates or constants to carry out sensitivity
% analysis later on.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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function [components information,failure info,num-ofcomponents,...
failuremodesvector,metrics information,lambda,lambdasyml=...
failureinformation(modelname)
%Init
components information.name=[];
componentsinformation.failureinfo=[];
failureinfo.failuremodes=[];
failureinfo.failure_rates=[];
failureinfo.failurerates-sym=[];
failureinfo.lambda=[];
failuremodesvector=[];
metricsinformation.name=[];
syms lambda-sym;
syms t;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% COMPONENTS INFORMATION %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% It breaks the links with all the libraries so it is possible to modify
% the library blocks
save_system(modelname,model_name, 'BreakLinks');
% Look for the components with associated failure information.
failureblocks=...
findsystem...
(model_name,'LookUnderMasks','all','Regexp', 'on','Name','Failures');
failuremodestag=...
find-system...
(model_name,...
'LookUnderMasks','all','Regexp', 'on','Name','Failuremode');
for i=l:size(failureblocks,l)
% We label each block with the right index
set-param...
(char(failuremodes-tag(i)), 'Time', ['time(' num2str(i) ')'],...
'After', ['failuremodes(' num2str(i) ')']);
% look for the last two field of the string
failurestag=regexp(char(failureblocks(i)),' (\w*)/Failures','match');
% look for the name of the component with failure information
component-name=regexp(char(failures-tag),'(\w*)/','match');
componentsinformation.name=...
[components_information.name ; component-name];
% Look for all the variables withing the mask
failurevariables=getparam(char(char(failure blocks(i))),'MaskNames');
% look for the different values of the mask
failurerates=getparam(char(failure-blocks(i)),'MaskValues');
for j=l:size(failure variables,1)
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% it only takes the information regarding failure modes
if size(char(failurevariables(j)),2)>l
failureinfo.failuremodes=...
[failureinfo.failure_modes ; failurevariables(j)];
failureinfo.failurerates=...
[failure_info.failurerates; sym(char(failurerates(j)))];
lambda(i,j)=eval(sym(char(failure rates(j))));
lambdasym(i,j)=['lambda(' num2str(i) ',' num2str(j) ')'];
failurerates-sym=['lambda(' num2str(i) ',' num2str(j) ')'];
failureinfo.failure-rates-sym=...
[failureinfo.failurerates-sym ; sym(failure rates-sym)];
end
end
componentsjinformation.failureinfo=...
[componentsinformation.failure_info ; failure_info];
% Empty the auxiliary variables for the next iteration
failureinfo.failure-modes=[];
% Empty the auxiliary variables for the next iteration
failureinfo.failure rates=[];
% Empty the auxiliary variables for the next iteration
failureinfo.failurerates_sym=[];
end
% We will be passing only the failureinfor portion to the matrix
% subroutine
failureinfo =componentsinformation.failureinfo;
numof-components=size(failure-info,1);
% Failure modes vector. It is a row vector with as many elements as
% system components. Each element has an integer that represent the number of
% failure modes considered for each component.
for i=l:size(failure_info,l)
failuremodesi=size (failureinfo(i).failuremodes,1);
failuremodesvector=[failuremodesvector failuremodes_i];
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% METRICS INFORMATION %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
metricsblocks=...
find-system(model-name,'LookUnderMasks','all','Regexp', 'on',...
'Name','Metrics');
for i=l:size(metricsblocks,l)
% look for the name of the metrics
metricsinformation(i).name=get-param(metrics-blocks(i),'VariableName');
end
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init-evaluation
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Alejandro D. Dominguez-Garcia
% aledan@MIT.EDU
% Laboratory for Electromagnetic and Electronic Systems
% Massachusetts Institute of Technology
% Created: January 24, 2005
% Modified: April 19, 2006
% This function will evaluate the initial behavior of the system when no
% failures has occured.
% INPUTS:
% -modelname: name of the Matlab Simulink model we want to analyze.
% -signals: matrix with failure sequences information. Each row
% represents a sequence of failures. The first column is an index
% associated with the
% element that has failed. Columns 2 to numofcomponents+l represents
% the state of each component. If the element signals(2,3) has a value
% of k=4, means that element 1 in the third possible failure sequence
% failed in failure mode with index 4. If k=0, it means normal
% operation of the component.
% -evaluatedstatescounter: index representing the highest state
% already evaluated by the algorithm.
% -num-of-components: variable that returns the number of components in
% the system.
% -systemstates: an array with the following fields:
% -metrics: metrics to assess the system performance.
% -stateofthe-system: vector of zeros and ones representing if the
% system exhibitis some performance.
% -previous-state: previous system state.
% -currentfailuremode: current component failure mode. It has two
% sub-fields:
% -component: index to represent which component has failed
% -componentfailuremode: index to represent the corresponding
% failure mode.
% OUTPUTS:
% -systemstates: see above.
% -evaluated states counter: see above.
% -stateofthe-system: column vector with zeros and ones. A one
% represent the system exhibiting some performance.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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function [system states,evaluatedstates-counter,stateof-the-system]=..
initevaluation(modelname,signals,evaluated statescounter,...
numofcomponents,system-states)
global stoptime;
global time;
global failure-modes;
global levelnumber;
levelnumber=O;
stateofthesystem=[];
y=[];
time=zeros(l,num of_components);
failuremodes=signals(2:numof_components+l);
options=[];
% Final conditions for this sequence of failures that will be passed to
% the next sequence of failures
[timearr,x,yout]=sim(model_name, [0 stoptime],options);
xfinal=x(size(x,l),:);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% This is just to get an steady-state picture of the system response
xinitial=xfinal;
[timearr,x,yout]=sim(model_name, [0 stoptime],options);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
[stateofthesystemji,metrics]=...
metricsassessment(Performance metrics,upper-bound,lowerbound);
stateofthesystem= [stateofthe-system ; stateofthesystemji];
systemstates(evaluatedstatescounter + 1).metrics=metrics';
systemstates(evaluatedstatescounter + 1).stateof_thesystem=...
stateofthe-system-i;
systemstates(evaluatedstatescounter + 1).previousstate=...
signals(size(signals,2) - 1);
systemstates(evaluatedstatescounter + 1).xfinal=xfinal;
currentfailuremode.component=signals(1,1);
currentfailuremode.component-failure mode=signals(signals(1)+1);
systemstates(evaluatedstatescounter + 1).currentfailuremode=...
currentfailure_mode;
evaluatedstates-counter=evaluatedstatescounter+size(signals,1);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% AUXILIARY FUNCTION %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function [stateofthesystemji,metrics]=...
metricsassessment(Performancemetrics,upper-bound,lowerbound)
metrics=[];
% Metrics definition for each of the performance metrics.
for i=l:size(Performancemetrics,2)
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metrics (i)=norm(Performancemetrics (:,i) ,inf);
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% AUXILIARY FUNCTIONS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
if max((metrics(:)>upper-bound(:) I metrics(:)<lowerbound(:) ))==1;
stateofthe-systemji=O;
else
stateofthe-systemji=l;
end
end
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sequences-first-level
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Alejandro D. Dominguez-Garcia
% aledan@MIT.EDU
% Laboratory for Electromagnetic and Electronic Systems
% Massachusetts Institute of Technology
% Created: October 20, 2005
% Modified: October 20, 2006
% This function will create the failure sequences to inject at the first
% level of failure.
% INPUTS:
% -failuremodesvector: a vector of dimension the number of components
% with associated failure information. Each elements has an integer
% that represents the number of failure modes associated to the
% component.
% OUTPUTS:
% -signals: a matrix with as many rows as the sum of failure modes
% of all the components and many columns as components plus 4. The
% first column is an index to represent the failed component. The last
% column represents the component that failed just before. The one
% before the last and the one before the one before the last is the
% state number.
% -statecounter: it counts the number of states.
% -failurelevel: it counts the levels of failure.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function [signals,statecounter,failurejlevelcounter]=...
sequencesfirstlevel(failuremodesvector)
% Init
statecounter=l;
signals=sparse ([]);
failurelevelcounter=l;
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% Create signals
for i=l:size(failuremodesvector,2)
failuremodesi=failuremodes vector(i);
signals-aux=...
[i*ones(failure modesji,1) ...
zeros(failuremodes_i,size(failuremodesvector,2))...
statecounter*ones(failuremodes_i,l)+[1:1:failure-modes_i]' ...
ones(failuremodes_i,1) zeros(failure_modes_i,1)];
signalsaux(:,i+l)=[1:1:failure modes_i]';
signals=[signals; signalsaux];
statecounter=statecounter+failuremodesi;
end
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init-matrix
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Alejandro D. Dominguez-Garcia
% aledan@MIT.EDU
% Laboratory for Electromagnetic and Electronic Systems
% Massachusetts Institute of Technology
% Created: October 24, 2005
% Modified: April 19, 2006
% This script helps establishing the state-transition matrix.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function [P sensitivity]=...
init_matrix (signals, failureinfo,lambda, lambdasym)
global symmatrix;
global sensitivity;
for i=l:size(signals,l)
if symmatrix=='n'
lambdai=lambda(signals(i,l),signals(i,signals(i,l)+l));
elseif symmatrix=='y'
lambdai=lambda-sym(signals(i,l),signals(i,signals(i,l)+1));
end
% State transition matrix
P(signals(i,size(signals,2)-2),signals(i,size(signals,2)-1))=...
lambda_i;
aux=-lambda_i;
P(signals(i,size(signals,2)-1),signals(i,size(signals,2)-1))=...
P(signals(i,size(signals,2)-1),signals(i,size(signals,2)-1))+aux;
% Sensitivity matrices
k=signals (i, 1) ;
l=signals(i,signals(i,1)+1);
m=signals(i,size(signals,2)-2);
n=signals(i,size(signals,2)-1);
sensitivity(k,l).matrix(m,n)=sparse(l);
sensitivity(k,l).matrix(n,n)=sparse(-1);
end
P=sparse (P);
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evaluation
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Alejandro D. Dominguez-Garcia
% aledan@MIT.EDU
% Laboratory for Electromagnetic and Electronic Systems
% Massachusetts Institute of Technology
% Created: October 24, 2005
% Modified: February 08, 2006
%% This function will evaluate each sequence of failures at the k level
%% INPUTS:
% -modelname: name of the Matlab Simulink model we want to analyze.
% -signals: matrix with failure sequences information. Each row
% represents a sequence of failures. The first column is an index
% associated with the element that has failed. Columns 2 to
% num of components+l represents the state of each component.
% If the element signals(2,3) has a value of k=4, means that element 1
% in the third possible failure sequence failedin failure mode with
% index 4. If k=0, it means normal operation of the component.
% -evaluatedstatescounter: index representing the highest state
% already evaluated by
% the algorithm.
% -num-of-components: variable that returns the number of components in
% the system.
% -systemstates: an array with the following fields:
% -metrics: metrics to assess the system performance.
% -stateofthe-system: vector of zeros and ones representing if the
% system exhibitis some performance.
% -previousstate: previous system state.
% -currentfailuremode: current component failure mode. It has two
% sub-fields:
% -component: index to represent which component has failed
% -componentfailuremode: index to represent the corresponding
% failure mode.
% OUTPUTS:
% -systemstates: see above.
% -evaluated states counter: see above.
% -stateofthe-system: column vector with zeros and ones. A one
% represent the system exhibiting some performance.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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function [systemstates,evaluatedstatescounter,state ofthe-system]=...
evaluation(modelname,signals,evaluatedstates counter,...
num-of components,system-states)
global stop-time;
global injection
global time;
global failure-modes;
stateof-the-system=[];
global levelnumber
options=[];
levelnumber=levelnumber+l;
for i=l:size(signals,l)
time=zeros(1,num-of-components);
time(signals(i,1))=injection*stop-time;
failuremodes=signals(i,2:num-of-components+l);
xinitial=system states(signals(i, size(signals,2) - 1)).xfinal;
%options=simset('InitialState',xinitial);
[timearr,x,yout]=sim(model_name, [0 stoptime],options);
% Final conditions for this sequence of failures that will be passed
% to the next sequence of failures
xfinal=x(size(x,1),:);
[state_ofthesystemji,metrics]=...
metricsassessment(Performance_metrics,upper-bound,lowerbound);
stateofthe-system= [state-of-thesystem ; state_of_thesystemji];
systemstates(evaluatedstatescounter + i).metrics=metrics';
systemstates(evaluatedstatescounter + i).stateofthe-system=...
stateof-the-systemji;
systemstates(evaluatedstatescounter + i).previousstate=...
signals(i, size(signals,2) - 1);
systemstates(evaluatedstatescounter + i).xfinal=xfinal;
currentfailuremode.component=signals(i,1);
currentfailuremode.component-failure_mode=signals(i,signals(i)+l);
end
evaluatedstatescounter=evaluatedstatescounter+size(signals,l);
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% AUXILIARY FUNCTION %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function [stateofthe_systemi,metricsV= ...
metrics_assessment (Performancemetrics, upper-bound, lower-bound)
metrics=[];
% Metrics definition for each of the performance metrics.
for i=l:size(Performancemetrics,2)
metrics (i)=norm(Performancemetrics (:,i) ,inf);
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% AUXILIARY FUNCTIONS %%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%
if max( (metrics (:)>upper-bound(:) I metrics (:)<lower_bound(:) ) )==l;
state_of_the-systemji=O;
else
state_of_the-systemji=l;
end
end
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sequences-separation
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Alejandro D. Dominguez-Garcia
% aledan@MIT.EDU
% Laboratory for Electromagnetic and Electronic Systems
% Massachusetts Institute of Technology
% Created: July 5, 2005
% Modified: July 5, 2005
% This function will return the failed and non-failed sequences at each
% level of failure
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function [non-failure-sequences,failuresequences]=...
sequences-separation (state-of-the-system, signals)
% Init of auxiliary variables
aux2=[];
aux4=[];
% Augmented matrix with the last row including the state of the system
signals-aug=[state-ofthe-system signals];
% The number of columns and rows is needed for following calculations
[m,n]=size(signalsaug);
for i=l:m
% we will compute the sequences of failures that are not
% catastrophic
if signalsaug(i,l)==l
auxl=signals-aug(i,2:n);
aux2=[aux2; auxl];
else
aux3=signals-aug(i,2:n);
aux4=[aux4; aux3];
end
end
nonfailuresequences=aux2;
failure-sequences=aux4;
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sequences-k-level
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Alejandro D. Dominguez-Garcia
% aledan@MIT.EDU
% Laboratory for Electromagnetic and Electronic Systems
% Massachusetts Institute of Technology
% Created: October 20, 2005
% Modified: October 20, 2005
% This function will create the failure sequences to inject at the k
% level of failure.
% INPUTS:
% -nonfailure-sequences: the sequences of failures corresponding to the
% states at level k-l that did not produce a system failure.
% -failuremodesvector: vector of dimension the number of components
% with associated failure information. Each elements has an integer
% that represents the number of failure modes associated to the
% component.
% -statecounter: it counts the number of states.
% -failurelevel: it counts the levels of failure
% OUTPUTS:
% -signals: a matrix with as many rows as the sum of failure modes
% of all the components and many columns as components plus 4. The
% first column is an index to represent the failed component. the last
% column represents the component that failed just before. The one
% before the last and the one before the one before the last is the
% state number.
% -statecounter: see above.
% -failurelevel: see above.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function [signals,state-counter,...
faiLurelevel-counter]=sequences k_level(non-failuresequences,. ..
failuremodesvector, state counter, failurelevelcounter)
% Init signals
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signals=sparse([]);
% Increases the failure level counter
failurelevelcounter=failurelevel_counter+l;
for j=l:size(non-failure-sequences,1)
single-sequence=non failure-sequences(j,:);
for i=2:size(failuremodesvector,2)+l
if single-sequence(i)==O;
failuremodesi=failuremodes vector(i-1);
new-sequences-aux-j=...
[ones(failuremodes_i,1)*singlesequence];
new-sequences-aux-j(:,i)=[1:1:failure-modesji]';
new-sequences-aux-j(:,l)=i-1;
new-sequences-aux_j(:,size(failuremodesvector,2)+3)=...
single-sequence(size (failuremodes-vector,2)+2);
new-sequences-aux-j(:,size(failuremodesvector,2)+2)=...
statecounter*ones(failuremodes i,l)+[1:1:failuremodes i]';
new-sequencesaux_j(:,size(failuremodesvector,2)+4)=...
single-sequence(1);
state-counter=statecounter+failuremodesi;
signals=[signals ; new-sequencesaux_j];
end
end
end
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matrix
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Alejandro D. Dominguez-Garcia
% aledan@MIT.EDU
% Laboratory for Electromagnetic and Electronic Systems
% Massachusetts Institute of Technology
% Created: October 24, 2005
% Modified: April 19, 2005
% This script helps establishing the state-transition matrix.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function [P sensitivity]=matrix(signals,failure_info,lambda,lambdasym)
global symmatrix;
global ?;
global sensitivity;
for i=l:size(signals,l)
if symmatrix=='n'
lambdai=lambda(signals(i,l),signals(i,signals(i,l)+l));
elseif symmatrix=='y'
lambdai=lambda-sym(signals(i,l),signals(i,signals(i,l)+l));
end
P (signals (i, size (signals, 2) -2) ,signals (i, size (signals, 2) -1)) =...
lambdai;
aux=-lambdai;
P (siLgnals (i, size (signals, 2) -1) ,signals (i, size (signals, 2) -1)) =...
P(signals(i,size(signals,2)-1),signals(i,size(signals,2)-1))+aux;
% Sensitivity matrices
k=signals (i, 1);
l=s:Lgnals (i, signals (i, 1)+1);
m=s:gnals (i, size (signals, 2) -2);
n=signals (i, size (signals, 2) -1);
sensitivity (k, l) .matrix (m, n)=sparse (1);
sensitivity(k,l) .matrix(n,n)=sparse(-l);
end
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truncate-matrix
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Alejandro D. Dominguez-Garcia
% aledan@MIT.EDU
% Laboratory for Electromagnetic and Electronic Systems
% Massachusetts Institute of Technology
% Created: February 10, 2006
% Modified: April 19, 2006
% This script truncates the state transition matrix at truncation level
% tlevel after the system was evaluated at tlevel-1.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function [P, sensitivity]=truncatematrix(evaluated_states_counter);
global P;
global sensitivity;
% Truncate transition matrix
P = [P(1:evaluatedstatescounter, :) ;
sum(P((evaluated_states_counter+l) :size(P, 1), :),l) ];
% Truncate sensitivity matrices
for i=l:size(sensitivity,l)
for j=l:size(sensitivity,2)
if size(sensitivity(i, j) .matrix, l)>evaluated_states_counter
sensitivity(i, j) .matrix= ...
[sensitivity(i,j) .matrix(l:evaluatedstatescounter, :) ;
sum(sensitivity(i, j).matrix( ...
evaluatedstatescounter+l) :size (sensitivity(i, j) .matrix, 1), :),l) 1;
end
end
end
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markov-model-solver
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Alejandro D. Dominguez-Garcia
% aledan@MIT.EDU
% Laboratory for Electromagnetic and Electronic Systems
% Massachusetts Institute of Technology
% Created: August 23, 2005
% Modified: April 19, 2006
% Script to solve the system of differential equations associated to the
% Markov model.
% INPUTS:
% -evaluationtime: time for which we want to analyze the system under
% study information.
% OUTPUTS:
% -t: column vector with the times corresponding to each row of the
% matrix p
% -p: matrix with as many columns as system states. The number of
% columns is equal to the number of time steps taken by the solver to
% solve the system.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% NEW IMPLEMENTATION %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% This is a very fast algorithm that only works for Sparse numerical
% matrices. It has implemented the inline evaluation of matrices for
% time-dependent coefficients, but this is not compatible with sparse
% matrices, therefore, only sparse connstant matrices can be solved
function [t,p,p_states] = markovmodelsolver(evaluationtime,lambda)
global P;
global A;
global sensitivity
global symmatrix;
global Lambdaij;
global sensitivity-factor;
global sensanalysis;
% Number of equations
[N,M]=size(P);
P=[P sparse (N,N-M)];
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% Time span for simulation
tspan=[O,evaluationtime];
% Initial conditions
p_0=zeros(N,1);
p-0(1)=l;
% To check if the matrix is purely numerical. In this case, a faster
% evaluator will be used
syms t
if sym-matrix=='y'
A=eval(P);
else
A=P;
end
options=odeset('RelTol',l.e-4);
whoslambda=whos('lambda');
if length(whos_lambda.class)==3
A=inline (P);
[t,p]=ode23(@jacobiantime,tspan,pO,options);
else
[t,p]=ode23(@jacobian-constant,tspan,p_0,options);
end
%%%%%%%%%% SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS WITH RESPECT TO EACH FAILURE RATE %%%%%%
if sens-analysis=='y';
for i=l:size(sensitivity,1)
for j=l:size(sensitivity,2)
[a,b]=size(sensitivity(i, j).matrix);
aux=sparse([sensitivity(i,j).matrix ; zeros(N-a,b)]);
DeltaLambdajij=[aux zeros(N,N-b)];
Lambda-ij=P+sensitivity-factor*lambda(i, j)*Delta_Lambda_ij;
[t,ps]=ode23(@jacobian-sensitivity,tspan,pj,options);
p_states(i, j).p=ps;
end
end
else
p_states=[];
end
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% AUXILIARY FUNCTIONS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function dpdt=jacobiantime(t,p)
global A
dpdt=A(t)*p;
end
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function dpdt=jacobianconstant (t,p)
global A
dpdt=A*p;
end
function dpdt=jacobian-sensitivity(t,p)
global Lambda_ij
dpdt=Lambdai j*p;
end
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metrics-models-evaluation
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Alejandro D. Dominguez-Garcia
% aledan@MIT.EDU
% Laboratory for Electromagnetic and Electronic Systems
% Massachusetts Institute of Technology
% Created: November 2, 2005
% Modified: March 21, 2006
% This function will analyze the results of the evaluation.
% INPUTS:
% -systemstates: an array with the following fields:
% -metrics: metrics to assess the system performance.
% -stateofthe-system: vector of zeros and ones representing if the
% system exhibitis some performance.
% -previous-state: previous system state.
% -currentfailuremode: current component failure mode. It has two
% sub-fields:
% -component: index to represent which component has failed.
% -componentfailuremode: index to represent the corresponding
% failure mode.
% -states-per-failurelevel: row vector with as many elements as levels
% per failure. Each element is an integer representing the number of
% each states at that level.
% -t: column vector with the times corresponding to each row of the
% matrix p
% -p: matrix with as many columns as system states. The number of
% columns is equal to the number of time steps taken by the solver to
% solve the system.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function [non-functionalmetricsmeasures, ...
nonfunctionalmetricsmeasureslevels, ...
probabilistic-performancemeasures =...
metrics_modelsevaluation(system-states,statesper-failurelevel,t,p)
level=[];
global -:runcation;
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if isempty(systemstates(size(systemstates,2)).currentfailuremode)==O
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% NON-FUNCTIONAL METRICS MEASURES %%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%% NOMINAL VALUES (UNALTERED FAILURE RATES) %%%%%%%%
% Reliability
system state=[system states.state_ofthe-system];
state-probability=p(size(t,1),:);
reliability-lower bound=system state*state-probability';
reliability-upper-bound=reliability_lower bound;
nonfunctionalmetricsmeasures(l).name='System Reliability';
nonfunctionalmetricsmeasures(l).value=...
[reliability_lowerbound reliability-upper-bound];
nonfunctionalmetricsmeasures(l).error=O;
% Unreliability
unreliabilityjlowerbound=...
(ones(l,size(systemstate,2))-systemstate)*state-probability';
unreliability-upperbound=unreliabilityjlower-bound;
nonfunctionalmetricsmeasures(2).name='System Unreliability';
nonfunctionalmetricsmeasures(2).value=...
[unreliability_lowerbound unreliabilityupperbound];
nonfunctionalmetricsmeasures(2).error=O;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% PROBABILISTIC PERFORMANCE METRICS %%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Expected value model
metricj=[system-states.metrics];
evacc=metricl*(state-probability'*size(metric_1,1));
probabilistic-performancemeasures(1).name='Accuracy Expected Value';
probabilistic-performancemeasures(1).value=evacc;
% Expected value of the deviation absolute value model
devmetricl=...
metric_l-[system-states(1).metrics ...
zeros(size(metric_1,1),size (metric_1,2)-1)];
evaccabsval-dev=...
abs(devmetricl)*(stateprobability'*size(metric_1,1));
probabilistic-performancemeasures(2).name=...
'Accuracy absolute value deviation expected value';
probabilistic-performancemeasures(2).value=evaccabs-val_dev;
else
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% NON-FUNCTIONAL METRICS MEASURES %%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Reliability
system state=[systemstates.stateofthesystem];
state-probability=p(size(t,1),:);
reliability-lower-bound=system state*state-probability';
reliability-upper-bound=...
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system state*state-probability'+...
state-probability(size(stateprobability,2));
nonfunctionalmetrics measures(1).name='System Reliability';
non-functionalmetricsmeasures(1).value=[reliabilitylowerbound ...
reliability-upperjbound];
nonfunctionalmetricsmeasures(1).error=[state-probability(size...
state-probability,2))];
% Unreliability
unreliabilityjlowerbound=...
(ones(1,size(system-state,2)-l)-system-state(1,1:(...
size(system-state,2)-l)))*stateprobability(1,1:(...
size(system-state,2)-1))';
unreliability-upper-bound=(ones(...
1,size(system-state,2))-system-state)*stateprobability';
nonfunctionalmetricsmeasures(2).name='System Unreliability';
nonfunctionalmetricsmeasures(2).value=...
[unreliability_lowerbound unreliabilityupperbound];
non-functionalmetricsmeasures(2).error=...
[stateprobability(size(state-probability,2))];
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% PROBABILISTIC PERFORMANCE METRICS %%%%%%%%%%%%%
% This is the new probabilistic performance measure in which only the
% non-failed states are considered.
% Expected value model
metricl=...
[systemstates(1,1:size(system states,2)-l).metrics zeros(...
size(system-states(1).metrics,1),1)];
evacc=...
metric_1*((1/reliabilityjlowerbound)*system state.*state-probability)';
probabilistic-performancemeasures(1).name='Accuracy Expected Value';
probabilistic-performancemeasures(1).value=ev-acc;
% Expected value of the deviation absolute value model
devmetricl=metricj-[system states(l).metrics ...
zeros(size(metric_1,1),size(metric_1,2)-1)];
evaccabsvaldev=...
abs(devmetric_1)*((l/reliability_lower-bound)*...
systemstate.*state-probability)';
probabilistic-performancemeasures(2).name=...
'Accuracy absolute value deviation expected value';
probabilistic-performance measures(2).value=evaccabsval_dev;
end
for i=2:size(states-perfailurejlevel,1)
initialstatelevel i=sum(states-perfailurelevel(l:i-1)) + 1;
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finalstate_leveli=sum(states-per-failure-level(l:i));
reliability-i=...
system-state(initial_state_level_i:final_state_level_i)* ...
state_probability(initial_state_level_i:finalstate_level_i)';
unreliability-i...
=(ones(l,finalstate_level_i-initial_state_level_i+l)-...
system-state(initial_state_level_i:final_state_level_i))* ...
state-probability(initial_state_level_i:final_state_level_i)';
level_i=[reliability-i unreliability_i];
level=[level ; level_i];
end
nonfunctionaltmetricsmeasureslevels=level;
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Alejandro D. Dominguez-Garcia
% aledan@MIT.EDU
% Laboratory for Electromagnetic and Electronic Systems
% Massachusetts Institute of Technology
% Created: April 19, 2006
% Modified: April 19, 2006
% This function will carry out the sensitivy analysis
% system.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function [sensitivity measures sensitivity-driver driver]= ..
sensitivity-analysis(system-states,t,pstates,components-information)
sensitivity measures . driver= [];
sensitivity measures.value-lower-bound=[];
sensitivity measures.value-upperbound=[];
sensitivity-driver=[];
if isempty(systemstates (size(systemstates,2)) .current_failuremode)==0
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% NON-FUNCTIONAL METRICS MEASURES %%%%%%%%%%%%%
system state=[system states.state_of_thesystem];
for i=l:size(pstates,1)
for j=l:size(p_states(i),2)
state-probability=p_states(i,j) .p(size(t,l), :);
unreliability-ij=...
(ones (l,size(system-state,2) )-systemstate) *state-probability' ;
sensitivitymeasures (i, j) .driver= ...
{[cell2mat(components_information.name(i)) ...
cell2mat( ...
componentsinformation.failure_info(i) .failuremodes (j))] };
sensitivitymeasures (i, j) .value_lower_bound=unreliabilityjij;
sensitivitymeasures (i, j) .value-upper-bound=unreliability-ij;
sensitivity-driver(i, j)=[unreliability-ij];
end
end
[drivervalue_i driver_index_i]=max(sensitivitydriver');
[drivervaluej driver_indexj]=max(drivervaluei);
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driver={[cell2mat(componentsinformation.name(driverindex_i)) ...
cell2mat(components_information.failureinfo(...
driverindexji).failurejnodes(driverindex-j))]};
else
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% NON-FUNCTIONAL METRICS MEASURES %%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Reliability
system state=[system states.stateofthe-system];
for i=l:size(pstates,1)
for j=l:size(p_states(i),2)
state-probability=pstates(i,j).p(size(t,1),:);
unreliability-ijlowerbound=...
(ones(1,size(system-state,2)-1)-...
system-state(1,1:(size(system-state,2)-l)))*state-probability(1,1:(...
size(system-state,2)-i))';
unreliability-ijupperbound=...
(ones(1,size(system-state,2))-systemstate)*state-probability';
sensitivity-measures(i, j).driver={[cell2mat(...
componentsinformation.name(i)) ...
cell2mat(components_information.failurejinfo(i).failuremodes(j))]};
sensitivity-measures(i, j).valuelowerbound=unreliability-ijjlower-bound;
sensitivity-measures(i, j).valueupper-bound=unreliability-ij-upper-bound;
sensitivity-driver(i, j)=[unreliability-ij-upper-bound;];
end
end
[drivervaluei driverindexji]=max(sensitivitydriver');
[drivervaluej driverindex-j]=max(driver value_i);
driver={[cell2mat(componentsinformation.name(driver_index i)) ...
cell2mat(...
componentsinformation.failure_info(...
driverindexji).failure-modes(driver_indexj))]I;
end
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results-analysis
%%%%%%%:%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Alejandro D. Dominguez-Garcia
% aledan@MIT.EDU
% Laboratory for Electromagnetic and Electronic Systems
% Massachusetts Institute of Technology
% Created: October 26, 2005
% Modified: February 08, 2006
% This function will analyze the results of the evaluation.
% INPUTS:
% -components-information: an array variable with the following fields:
% -name: name of the component with associated failure information
% -failureinfo: an array variable with the the following fields:
% -failuremodes: component failure modes
% -failurerates: failure rates associated to each failure mode
% listed in the failuremodes field.
% -systemstates: an array with the following fields:
% -metrics: metrics to assess the system performance.
% -stateofthe-system: vector of zeros and ones representing if the
% system exhibitis some performance.
% -previous-state: previous system state.
% -currentfailuremode: current component failure mode. It has two
% sub-fields:
% -component: index to represent which component has failed.
% -componentfailuremode: index to represent the corresponding
% failure mode.
% -states-per-failurelevel: row vector with as many elements as levels
% per
% failure. Each element is an integer representing the number of each
% states at that level.
% -t: column vector with the times corresponding to each row of the
% matrix p
% -p: matrix with as many columns as system states. The number of columns
% is equal to the number of time steps taken by the solver to solve the
% system.
% -filename: name of the *.xls file where the analysis will be stored.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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function results-analysis(components-information,system-states,...
states-per-failure_level,t,p,nonfunctional metricsmeasures,...
nonfunctionalmetricsmeasureslevels,...
probabilistic-performance measures,...
sensitivity-measures,driver,filename)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% MAIN ANALYSIS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Init variables
sequence=[];
failurelevel-info=[];
metrics=[];
nonfunctionalmetricsinfo=[];
probabilistic-performance measures_info=[];
probabilistic-performance measures_value=[];
drivers=[];
valuelowerbound=[];
value-upper-bound=[];
global sensanalysis;
% Copy the template analysis file into the file entered for outputing the
% results
copyfile('results-analysis.xls', filename,'f');
% Initial state, system with no failures
state-probabilityO=p(size(t,1),l);
metricsjl=systemstates(l).metrics;
failurelevelinfo = [state-probabilityO ; metrics_l];
xlswrite(filename, failure_levelinfo,
['Failure Level 0 and Metrics'], 'B3');
failurelevelinfo=[];
% Subsequent states, system with one, two, ... , n failures
for i=2:size(states-perfailurelevel,1)-l
% Initial state label at level i
initialstate-leveli=sum(states-perfailurelevel(l:i-1)) + 1;
% Final state label at level i
finalstateleveli=sum(states-per-failurelevel(l:i));
for j=initialstateleveli:finalstatelevel_i
currentfailuremode=system-states(j).currentfailure-mode;
% Sequence of failures at the first level
if i==2
sequence(j).aux={[cell2mat(componentsinformation.name(...
currentfailure-mode.component)) cell2mat(...
componentsinformation.failure_info(...
currentfailuremode.component).failuremodes(...
currentfailuremode.componentfailure-mode))]};
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% Sequence of failures after the first level
else
sequence(j).aux=...
{[cell2mat(sequence(system-states(j).previousstate).aux) ...
'->' cell2mat(components_information.name(...
currentfailuremode.component)) ...
cell2mat(components_information.failure_info(...
currentfailuremode.component).failuremodes(...
currentfailuremode.component-failure-mode))]};
end.
% Sequence of failures yielding to the current state,
% including the current failure mode
sequence-j=cell2mat(sequence(j).aux);
% Failure rate for the last failure mode
failureratei=char((components-information.failure_info(...
currentfailuremode.component).failure_rates(...
currentfailuremode.component-failure-mode)));
% State number
state_index=j;
% State probability at the end of the evaluationtime
state-probability-j=p(size(t,l),j);
% System metrics for each state
metrics-j=system-states(j).metrics';
% State of the system (failed or operational)
stateofthe-system=system-states(j).state_ofthesystem;
failurelevelinfo = ...
[failure_level_info ; {sequencej, failure_rate_i, ...
state_index, state-probability_j, ...
stateof-the-system};
metrics=[metrics; metricsj];
end
% Failure level information
xlswrite(filename, failure_level_info,
['Failure Level ' num2str(i-l)], 'A2');
% Performance metrics
xlswrite(filename, metrics, ['Failure Level ' num2str(i-l)], 'F2');
failurelevelinfo=[];
metrics=[];
end
%This is to write the last level of failure%%%
i=size(statesperfailure_level,1);
% Initial state label at level i
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initialstateleveli=sum(states-perfailurejlevel(l:i-1)) + 1;
% Final state label at level i
finalstateleveli=sum(states-per-failurelevel(l:i));
% The system has more than one component
if initialstateleveli<=finalstatelevel_i
if isempty(system-states(...
initialstateleveli).currentfailure mode)==O
for j=initialstateleveli:finalstatelevel_i
currentfailuremode=system-states(j).current_failure-mode;
% The system is not single string
if initialstateleveli>2
sequence(j).aux=...
{[cell2mat(sequence(system-states(j).previousstate).aux) '->'
cell2mat(componentsinformation.name(...
currentfailuremode.component)) ...
cell2mat(components_information.failure_info(...
currentfailuremode.component).failuremodes(...
currentfailuremode.componentfailure mode))]};
else
% All the failure modes are at the first level
sequence(j).aux=...
f[cell2mat(components-information.name(...
currentfailuremode.component)) ...
cell2mat(componentsinformation.failure_info(...
currentfailuremode.component).failuremodes(...
currentfailuremode.component-failurejmode))]};
end
% Sequence of failures yielding to the current state,
% including the current failure mode
sequence-j=cell2mat(sequence(j).aux);
% Failure rate for the last failure mode
failureratei=char((components-information.failure_info(...
currentfailuremode.component).failure_rates(...
currentfailuremode.component-failure-mode)));
% State number
state_index=j;
% State probability at the end of the evaluationtime
state-probability-j=p(size(t,l), j);
% System metrics for each state
metrics-j=system-states(j).metrics';
% State of the system (failed or operational)
stateofthe-system=system-states(j).state_ofthesystem;
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failurelevelinfo = [failurelevel_info ; ...
{sequencej, failure_rate_i, ...
state_index, state-probability-j, state_of_thesystem}];
metrics=[metrics; metricsj];
end
% Failure level information
xlswrite(filename, failure_level_info,....
['Failure Level ' num2str(i-1)], 'A2');
% Performance metrics
xlswrite(filename, metrics, ['Failure Level ' num2str(i-1)], 'F2');
failurelevel-info=[];
else
stateindex=initialstatelevelJi;
state-probability-j=p(size(t,l),initial_state_level_i);
failurelevelinfo = [failurelevel_info ; {'ABSORBING STATE', 'N/A',
state_index, state-probability-j, 'N/A', 'N/A'}];
% Failure level information
xlswrite(...
filename, failure_levelinfo, ['Failure Level ' num2str(i-1)], 'A2');
failurelevelinfo=[];
metrics=[];
end
end
state-probability_0=p(size(t,1),l);
metrics=system-states(1).metrics;
failurelevel_info = [stateprobability_ ; metrics];
xlswrite(filename, failure_level_info, ['Failure Level 0 and Metrics'], 'B3');
failurelevel_info=[];
%%%%%% NON-FUNCTIONAL METRICS RESULTS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
for j=l:size(nonfunctionalmetricsmeasures,2)
nonfunctionalmetricsinfo=[non_functionalmetrics_info
[nonfunctional-metrics measures(j).value non_functionalmetricsmeasures(j...
).error]];
end
xlswrite(filename,...
nonfunctionalmetrics_info, 'Failure Level 0 and Metrics','E7');
xlswrite(filename, ...
nonfunctionalmetricsmeasures_levels, ...
'Failure Level 0 and Metrics','E12');
for j=l:size(probabilistic-performance-measures,2)
probabilistic-performancemeasuresinfo=...
[probabilistic-performance measures_info ; ...
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{probabilisticperformancemeasures(j).name}];
probabilistic-performance measuresvalue=...
[probabilistic-performancemeasuresvalue ; ...
probabilistic-performancemeasures(j).value'];
end
xlswrite(filename, probabilistic-performance measures_info,
'Failure Level 0 and Metrics','D2');
xlswrite(filename, probabilistic-performance measures-value,
'Failure Level 0 and Metrics','E2');
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS %%%%%%%%%%%
if sensanalysis=='y'
for j=l:size(sensitivity measures,1)
drivers=[drivers ; {cell2mat(sensitivity measures(j).driver)}];
valuelowerbound=...
[value_lower_bound ; sensitivity measures(j).valuelower_bound];
value-upperbound=...
[value-upper-bound ; sensitivity measures(j).value_upperbound];
end
xlswrite(filename, drivers, 'Failure Level 0 and Metrics','A25');
xlswrite(filename, valuelowerbound, ...
'Failure Level 0 and Metrics','B25');
xlswrite(filename, value-upper-bound, ...
'Failure Level 0 and Metrics','C25');
xlswrite(filename, driver, 'Failure Level 0 and Metrics','E25');
end
% Open xls file with report
winopen(filename);
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Inpresto-plot
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Alejandro D. Dominguez-Garcia
% aledan@MIT.EDU
% Laboratory for Electromagnetic and Electronic Systems
% Massachusetts Institute of Technology
% Created: February 09, 2005
% Modified: May 23, 2006
% This function will plot some of the the results of the evaluation.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function Inpresto-plot
% We need to load the results in the workspace in order to be able to
% plot any dynamic behavior
load modelresults
global stop-time;
global time;
global injection
global failure-modes;
plotting=' y';
while plotting=='y'
state=input('Introduce the state number (spreadsheet column C): ');
failuremodes=zeros(l,num-ofcomponents);
time=zeros(1,num-of-components);
currentfailuremode=system-states(state).current_failuremode;
[time_arr,x,yout]=sim(model_name, [0 stoptime]);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% This is just to get an steady-state picture of the system response
xinitial=x(size(x,1),:);
options=simset('InitialState',xinitial);
[time_arr,x,yout]=sim(modelname, [0 stoptime],options);
y-l=[time-arr yout];
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if system-states (state) .previousstate ~=0
time (currentfailure_mode.component)=injection*stoptime;
previous=system-states (state) .previousstate;
previous failure-mode=systemstates (state) .currentfailuremode;
while previous~=0
failuremodes(previous failuremode.component)=...
previous failuremode.component-failure mode;
previous_failuremode= ...
system-states (previous) .currentfailuremode;
previous=systemstates (previous) .previous_state;
end
xinitial= ...
systemstates (system-states (state) .previousstate) .xfinal;
options=simset('InitialState',xinitial);
[timearr,x,yout]=sim(model_name, [0 stoptime],options);
y_k=[timearr,yout];
else
[timearr,x,yout]=sim(model_name, [0 stoptime],options);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
yk=[timearr,yout];
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% FcS case study Chapter 5 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
figure (state) ;
plot(y_k(:,1),y_k(:,2),'-','LineWidth',l); hold
plot(yk(:,1),y_k(:,3),'g--','LineWidth',l)
plot(yk(:,1),yk(:,4),'r:','LineWidth',1)
set(gca,'fontsize',16,'fontname','times new roman');
xlabel('Time[s]','fontsize',16,'fontname','times new roman');
ylabel('\phi-c [rad], \phir [rad], \phi [rad]','fontsize',16,...
'fontname','times new roman');
legend('Roll command \phi_c','Reference model response \phi-r',...
'Aircraft response \phi')
axis([0 stop-time -0.25 0.25]);
hold off
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% SbW case study Chapter 6 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
figure (state) ;
subplot (2,1,1)
plot(yk(:,l),yk(:,2),'b-','LineWidth',l); hold
plot(y_k(:,1),y_k(:,3),'r-','LineWidth',1)
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set(gca,'fontsize',14,'fontname','times new roman');
xlabel('Time [s]','fontsize',16,'fontname','times new roman');
ylabel('\delta-w [deg], SR\delta [deg]','fontsize',16,...
'fontname','times new roman');
legend('Steering wheel angle \delta-w',...
'Scaled road wheel angle SR\delta')
axis([0 stop-time -20.5 13.5]);
subplot (2,1,2)
plot (yk (:,1),y_k(:,4),'b-','LineWidth',l); hold
plot (yk,(:,1),y_k(:,5),'r-','LineWidth',1);
set(gca,'fontsize',14,'fontname','times new roman');
xlabel('Time [s]','fontsize',16,'fontname','times new roman');
ylabel('\Psir [deg], \Psi [deg]','fontsize',16,...
'fontname','times new roman');
legend('Conventional vehicle response \Psir', 'SbW vehicle response \Psi')
axis([0 stop-time -0.85 1.5]);
hold of:'
plotting.=...
input('Do you want to plot some of the performance solutions? (y/n): ','s');
end
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Control System Case-Study
C.1 Primary Flight Computer
C.1.1 Voter
61 = IU1 - U21
E2= IU1 - U31
E3= JU2 - U31
u - max{ui} - min{ui},
NIL,
if E i,j = 1, 2,3 / e + ej < 2e
if i = 1, 2,3
otherwise (C.1)
where c = 0.1rad.
C.1.2 Roll Control Law
Rr(S) KrO/c(S)+ Kr 2 Rb(S) + Kr3 Pb(s)
( =(Pr + L + Drs)(Rr (s) ±Kra (s))
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5Ilr)(t) = f 6o (t), for r =2A5 (t), for r = 1
2V(), for U1 = 0
0, for Uf = 1
-( rand(l, u), for U1 = 2
61 (r) (r), for Uf = 3
og ( Oa)(t)), for U1 = 4 (C.2)
where Kr1 = 0.66, Kr2 = -0.145s, Kra = 2.16s, zr = 11.1s- 1 , pr 25s-1, Pr 0.45A,
Ir = 6A/s, Dr = 0.OlAs, and Kr = -1.33 were taken from [41]; and 1 = -5A, u = 5A
r,= 0.2s, and r is the time at which the computer gets stuck.
C.1.3 Yaw Control Law
Ry (s) = Ky cc(s) + 2K 2 Rb(s) + Ky3 Pb(s))
6r-(s) = (Py + + Dys) (Ry (s) + Kycr (s))
6r,(t) = { 6r (t), for r = 0
26r-(t), for r = 1
6r,(t), for Uf = 0
0, for Uf = 1
6r,(t) = rand(l, u), for Uf = 2
6r,(T), for Uf = 3
OaI(Orr(t)), for U1 = 4 (C.3)
where Ki =0.001, Ky2 = -0.7816s, KY3 = 0. 172s, zY1  -0.00125s-2, zY2 = -0.001875s-1,
py = 1.5s- 1, Py = 0.45A, I, = 6A/s, Dy = 0.OlAs, K. = -1.33, were taken from [41]; and
1 = -5A, u = 5A T- = 0.2s, and r is the time at which the computer gets stuck.
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C.2 Actuation Subsystem
C.2.1 Ailerons
G(s) = iT (+(s+L)(s+ )
T (r) = k G (s) 1(r)(+
1l(2) = k21+G(s)(arS)
T 2)(t), for Uf = 0
(t) = 0, for Uf = 1
T (r), for Uf = 2 (C.4)
where k, = 5000s 2, k2  50, T= 10s, Tm = 10s, Ti = 4s, T2 = 10s, T3 = 100s, and r is the
time at which the actuation subsystem gets stuck.
C.2.2 Rudder
(s+')(s+a)(s) = k (s
Trl2 (S) = k21I+ -G(s) 6r (S)
Trl(2, for Uf = 0
Trl(2 ) (t) = 0 for Uj = 1
Tr (2 )(T), for Uf = 2 (C.5)
where k, = 5000s 2, k 2 = 50, Tc = 10s, Tm = 10s, Ti = 4s, T2 = 10s, T3 = 100s, and T is the
time at which the actuation subsystem gets stuck.
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C.3 Mechanical Combiner
C.3.1 Ailerons
Ta' = Ga, ali + £a2) (C.6)
where G, = 0.5.
C.3.2 Rudder
Tr = Gr(tri + tr) (C.7)
where Gr = 0.5.
C.4 Control Surfaces
C.4.1 Ailerons
. 1,r 1 Ir __ r
a =--xa+ Tl,r
Xa )Ta Ta a
61l(r) = 0'r,(Xa)
6a(r)
l(r) = (T),
ao,
for U1 = 0
for Uf = 1
for U1 = 2 (C.8)
where -re, = 0.04s and r, = 0.11s, ao = 0.216rad, were taken from [41]. r is the time at
which the aileron gets stuck.
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C.4.2 Rudder
Xr = -X ±x+TrTr Tr
6r=0'r1 (Xr)
where r, = 0.05s and Ti = .ls were taken from
stuck.
for Uf = 0
for Uf 1
for U1 = 2 (C.9)
[41]. T is the time at which the rudder gets
C.5 Inertial Measurement Unit
Ximu(t + At) = ximu(t) + randn(0, o 1 - e-2At/r)
ximu(0) = 0 ss
yimu(t +
[M1 + M 2 + I]
randn(0,
Mi = Ki 0
0
M2 = K2 -ran
rand
At) Ximu(t + At) +
[Pb 1 randn( b, Ob)
qb + randn(Pb, Ob)
rb J [ randn( Pb, Jb)
1) 0 0
randn(0, 1) 0
0 randn(0,
0 0 0
dn(0, 1) 0 0
n(0, 1) 0 -randn(0, 1)
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yimu, for Uf = 0
0, for Uf = 1
{yimu+=YiU Gyimu, for Uf = 2
yimu + B, for Uf = 3 (C.10)
where o, = 3.15 - 10-6, At = 0.01s, -r = 100s, yb = 4.85 - 10- 6 rand(0, 1), 9b = 2.09 - 10-5,
K1 = 10-4, K 2 = 9.7. 10-5, G = 1.5, and B = 0.3deg.
C.6 Control Surfaces Position Sensor
C.6.1 Ailerons
.1(r) = _1 X1(r) 1 Xl(r)
XSa 7. Sa a
1(r)r=
YSa1
( y(r) for f= 0
y07), for Uf =I
Sa Gyl[) for Uf =2
yr) + B, for Uf = 3
where Ts = 0.01s, ,r = 0.001s, R = 0.001, G = 1.5, and B = 0.3deg.
C.6.2 Rudder
(C.11)
' S -~s,+± 6r
X 0sr (X rsS T1
Ysr
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YS,, for Uf = 0
0, for Uf 1
YS GyS for Uf = 2
yo, + B, for Uf = 3 (C.12)
where r, = 0.01s, Tj = 0.001s, R = 0.001, G = 1.5, and B = 0.3deg.
C.7 Linear Lateral-Directional Aircraft Dynamics
) -O sin ao - cos ao g cos o )
Pb _ LO Lp Lr 0 Pb
7b No Np Nr 0 rb
L 0 1 tan c0  0 J
0 0 YS 1
N61 N6' Ng a
+ a a Nr (C.13)
LSt L6, LS, a
0 0 0
where Y3 = -50.69m/s 2, V = 178m/s, ao = 0.216rad, g = 9.81m/s 2, Lj3 -32.3s 2,
LP = -0.374s- 1 Lr = 2.40s- 1, N3 = 1.06s 2 , NP = -0.0406s 1 Nr = -0.0809s 1, Y6, =
0.0179s- 1, N6 = -3.175s- 2, N6r = 3.175s- 2 , N6, = 6.66s- 2, Li = -0.855s- 2, Lsr =
0.855s- 2, and LSr = -1.18S- 2, were taken from [67].
Notation Used in this Appendix
B: Bias factor for IMUs and control surface position sensors
g :Acceleration of gravity
G: Gain change factor for IMUs and control surface position sensors
Ga: Left and right mechanical combiner gain
G, : Rudder mechanical combiner gain
LO: Dimensional variation of rolling moment about X, with 3
LP: Dimensional variation of rolling moment about X, with p
Lr: Dimensional variation of rolling moment about X, with r
Li :Dimensional variation of rolling moment about X, with 3i
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N, :
N, :
N 51
N 6 '-:
N 6,-:
Nb, : (S
pb, Pb(s) :
r :
R :
rb, Rb(s)
t:
Tr
1(21)
Taa
Tr (2), r I)
U1/U, Ua:
f3 :
USr:d
V :
1,r:
Ximu :
T
r:
yiMU, Iyimu :
-i 8 r
[*]
k1, :2 - 1 T2 3
) : n
r , a , :
br,*, 6r, I r,,:
Ta:
7r:
-r :
rand(l, u) :
randn(p, a-) :
ki , k2, Tj , T2, T3,
Tc, 1 M :
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Dimensional variation of rolling moment about X, with 5'
Dimensional variation of rolling moment about X8 with 
6
r
Dimensional variation of yawing moment about Z, with /
Dimensional variation of yawing moment about Z, with p
Dimensional variation of yawing moment about Z, with r
Dimensional variation of yawing moment about Z. with Sa
Dimensional variation of yawing moment about Z with 5j
Dimensional variation of yawing moment about Z with Sr
Roll rate
Primary Flight Computers reconfiguration signals
Control surface position sensors resolution
Yaw rate
Laplace transform variable
Time
Left (right) aileron torque command
Left (right) aileron actuation subsystem torque output
Rudder torque command
Rudder actuation subsystem torque output
Voter inputs
Voter output
Component failure model switch control input
Forward velocity
Left (right) aileron state variable
Inertial measurement unit state variables
Rudder state variable
Left (right) aileron position sensor state variable
Rudder position sensor state variable
Inertial measurement output
Left (right) aileron position sensor output
Rudder position sensor output
Dimensional variation of Y-force with /
Dimensional variation of Y,-force with 5r
Pitch angle
Sideslip angle
Yaw command
Left (right) aileron angle
Rudder angle
Roll control output
Yaw control output
Voter tolerance error
Roll angle
Roll command
r1 -shift operator
Heading angle
Inverse of aileron bandwidth
Inverse of rudder bandwidth
Inverse of left, right, and rudder position sensors bandwidth
Ceiling function
Uniformly distributed random generator between I and u
Gaussian distributed random generator with mean p and standard deviation a
Left, right, and rudder actuation subsystem parameters
Component Behavioral Models for the Flight Control System Case-Study
K 1, K 2 , At,T, 7Ab,
resa, O-b :
KrI, Kr2 , Kr3 ,
Zr,Pr, Pr, Ir,
Dr, Kr :
Kyl ,KY2, KY3 ,
Iy, Dy, Ky :
IMU parameters
Roll control law parameters
Yaw control law parameters
Appendix C
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Component Behavioral Models for the
SbWIBAS Case-Study
D.1 Steer-by-wire Computer
D.1.1 Voter
El = JUl - U21
E2 =|U1 - U31
E3 = 1U2 - U31
ui - max{ui} -
U2 + U3
NIL,
where c = 0.1rad.
min{ui},
if I i= 1,2, 3 /ci < E
otherwise
D.1.2 Steering Rack Position Controller for the lock-step processors architec-
ture
T,.(s) = (P1 + + Dis)(y6, - y6)
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if 2 ij = 1, 2, 3/cis+ Ej < 2c
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Tr, M= T (t),2T- (t),
Trr (t ),
0,
Tr,(t) = rand(l,u),
-(T()),
where PI = 60A, I, = 7A/s, Di = 15As, 1 = -5A,
which the computer gets stuck.
for r = 0
for r = 1
for Uf = 0
for U = 1
for Uf = 2
for U = 3
for U = 4 (D.2)
u = 5A -r = 0.2s, and r is the time at
D.1.3 Steering Rack Position Controller for the SbW/BAS architecture
Tr,(s) = 2(P 2 + L2+ D2s)(y6,s - kly s)
Trr(t ) = { T
Tr(t),
0,
Tr,(t) = rand(l, u),
Trr(r),
0-1 (T,(0)), 1
where P2 = 15A, 12 = 15A /s, D2 = 3As, k, =1.23, 1
time at which the computer gets stuck.
for r = 0
for r = 1
for U1 = 0
for U1  1
for Uf = 2
for U1 = 3
for U = 4 (D.3)
= -5A, u = 5A ri = 0.2s, and r is the
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D.2 Brake-Actuated-Steering Computer
D.2.1 Voter
El = Jul
E2 = Jul
63 = IU2
- U21
- U31
- U31
3
Zui - maxfui I - minjui },
i= 1
Ui + Uj12NIL,
if] i,j = 1,2,3 / c +Ej < 2e
if 3i = 1,2,3/ci < E
otherwise
where e = 0.1rad.
D.2.2 Longitudinal Force Tires Controller
FlfI*(s) = -FIf*(s) = }(P2 + + D 28)(ye5w - k6y 2 )
F1! i(r),(t ) = {~f~)()
,Flf(r) t ,
0,
Fifl(r)r(t) = rand(l, u),
FIfl(r) (r),
0- ( FfI,),(t)),
where P3 = 60A, 13 = 1OA/s, D3  7As, k2 =1.07, 1 =
time at which the computer gets stuck.
for r = 0
for r = 1
for Uj = 0
for Uj = 1
for Uf = 2
for U = 3
for Uf = 4 (D.5)
-5A, u = 5A Tj = 0.2s, and T is the
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D.3 Steering Rack Actuation Subsystem
G(s)= k
1(S+) )(s+ ' )(s+)
Tr (s)) =Sg r (s)
Tr1 ()(t) = 0,
Trl(2 (W),
for Uf = 0
for U1 = 1
for U1 = 2 (D.6)
where kI = 5000s 2 , kr = 1 for the lock-step processor architecture, and kr = 11.3 for the
SbW/BAS architecure, rcr = 10s, rf, = 10s, rr = 4s,4rr = 10s, rr = 100s, and r is the time
at which the actuation subsystem gets stuck.
D.4 Mechanical Combiner
Tr = (Trl + Tr 2) (D.7)
where SR = 17.
D.5 Caliper Actuation Subsystem
G(s) = k(s+)(s±4)(s+-)(s+g)
Fl fl(r (s) =k +(s) F (s)F1!l~)(S 2 1 G(s) lf l(r)r(S
Flfi(r),
FIfl(r)(t) = 0,
Flfl(r) (-r),
for U1 = 0
for Uj = 1
for U1 = 2 (D.8)
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where k' = 0.5s 2, k' = 0.1, Tg = 10s, rC = 10s, Tf = 4s, r2 = 0.Is, and r is the time at
which the actuation subsystem gets stuck.
D.6 Road Wheel Angle Sensor
--3+ 167
5 Ts
y6 Gs -1--
yJ, for Uf = 0
0, for Uf = 1
Gy, for Uf = 2
yj + B, for Uf = 3 (D.9)
where Ts = 0.01s, Ti = 0.001s, R = 0.001, G, = 17.85, G = 1.5, and B = 0.3deg.
D.7 Steering Wheel Angle Sensor
&J. IX. +±i6W
OW Ts 
0
W Ts
-6 For 1,(X6w)-A
RIY6"' for Uf =0
0, for Uf = 1
= Gyjw, forUf=2
y 3w + B, for Uf = 3 (D.10)
where rs = 0.01s, r = 0.001s, R = 0.001, G = 1.5, and B = 0.3deg.
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D.8 Linear Single-Track Vehicle Dynamics
-F
1.
Cf +C,
mV
aCf -bC,
.0
aC -bCr - 1
mV 2
a
2Cf+b 2 C, 0 bv.
1 0 T
1+
FafI = Ff, = f(0 + 1 - 6)
-[mV-aC1
0
I~
(D.11)
where a = 1.046m, b = 1.712m, Cf = -1090N/deg, m = 1741.6 Kg, J = 3007 Kgm2, and
V = 70 km/h, correspond to a medium-size Ford® vehicle.
D.9 Linear Two-Track Vehicle Dynamics
-F1Z -FCf+C,mVaCf -bC,J
0
aCf-bCr 
- -
mV 2  i
a 2 Cf+b2Cr 0l
1 0i
-0 0 
-~ iAFif
+J 2J AFir
0 0
0/
rb
T,
I+ ['ilmV-aCf
J
0
I
Fii + Ffr + FrI + Fir= 0
F F5 =f, = Cf (0B + a _ Fsfi = Ffr =( V -6 2)
Fsr =Fsrr =!r (03 - ) (D.12)
where a = 1.046m, b = 1.712m, Cf = -1090N/deg, Cr = -1090N/deg, m = 1741.6 Kg,
J = 3007 Kgm 2, and V = 70 km/h, correspond to a medium-size Ford® vehicle.
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D.10 Rack
J6+B6= S(Flfl -tnfr)+T(Fsfl+Fsfr) +Tr, for -4wr <6<47r
= 0, for 6 = 4r
6 = 0, for 6 = -41r
where J, = lOKgm 2 , B, = 0.lNms, S = -0.02m, and T = 0.025m.
Notation Used in this Appendix
a:
b :
B:
B,:
Cf
Cr:
G:
Fif , Ffr, P;f1, PIf
Fqf I, Faf, :
Flff1,, Fif 1,, if G,., Elfr* , Flfrr ,lfrr
G, :
JC:
kk, r, rg, r , r , r :1~ 2 7 ,29Th'3 7 m
k, k', r, -r, -, 4r,, -r4:
M :
P1, I1, D1 :
P2, 12, D2, ki :
P3, 13, D3,k3:
r :
R :
rb :
5 :
S:
SR:
t :
R :
Tr:
Tr( 2 ), trI(:2 )
Tr ,Tr,* Ir, :
U1, U2, U3 :
Distance from center of gravity to front axle
Distance from center of gravity to rear axle
Bias factor for road wheel angle and steering wheel angle sensors
Steering rack and actuation motors combined viscous coefficient
Front axle equivalent cornering stiffness
Rear axle equivalent cornering stiffness
Gain change factor for road wheel angle and steering wheel angle sensors
Longitudinal forces acting on the front left and right tire
Side forces acting on the front left and right tire
Longitudinal force tires controller output
Road wheel angle sensors gain
Yaw inertia
Steering rack and actuation motors combined inertia
Steering rack actuation subsystem parameters
Caliper actuation subsystem parameters
Mass
Steering rack position controller parameters for the lock-step processors architecture
Steering rack position controller parameters for the SbW/BAS architecture
Longitudinal force tires controller parameters for the SbW/BAS architecture
Primary Flight Computers reconfiguration signals
Control surface position sensors resolution
Yaw rate
Laplace transform variable
Scrub radius
Steering ratio
Time
Mechanical trail
Steering rack torque command
Steering rack actuation subsystem torque output
Steering rack position controller output
Voter inputs
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f : Voter output
V :Center of gravity speed
X6 :Road wheel angle sensor sensor state variable
x6W :Steering wheel angle sensor sensor state variable
y6, y6 Road wheel angle sensor sensor output
y, Steering wheel angle sensor sensor output
/3: Sideslip angle
3 : Road wheel angle
Steering wheel angle
Voter tolerance error
' : Heading angle
og-~ (r) : w-shift operator
Inverse of road wheel angle and steering wheel angle sensors bandwidth
[] : Ceiling function
rand(l, u): Uniformly distributed random generator between I and u
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